Essays on the interaction between financial development and real economy. by Bena, Jan
1The London School of Econom ics and Political Science
Essays on the Interaction between Financial Development 
and Real Economy
Jan Bena
A thesis submitted to the Department of Finance of the London School 
of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, April 
2009
UMI Number: U615952
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U615952
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
I, «»Library
Z o
o^ C ?
2Declaration
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the 
London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than 
where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent 
of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in 
it).
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, 
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced 
without the prior written consent of the author.
I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights 
of any third party.
3Abstract
Economists disagree about the role of the financial sector in economic growth. My 
thesis contributes to this discussion. I show that better financial systems do pro­
mote productivity growth and that limited access to external finance interacts with 
product market competition in determining corporate investment.
The first chapter “The Effect of Financial Development on Corporate Growth in 
the EU Single Market”compares within-industry growth rates of similar EU ‘single- 
market’ firms facing financial systems of different depth and institutional quality as 
of ‘single-market’ inception. Moving from the least to the most developed finan­
cial market within the EU boosts firms’ annual value-added growth by about three 
percentage points. Our results also suggest that the growth gap due to initially 
under-developed financial systems was closed by 2003.
In the second chapter “Which Firms Benefit More from Financial Development?” we 
test whether more developed financial systems foster corporate growth through tack­
ling market frictions proxied by firm size and age. Our main finding is that more 
developed financial systems are able to overcome the relative opaqueness of younger 
firms. We also find that freshly incorporated firms in less financially developed coun­
tries have unusually high shares of equity capital in total assets. The two chapters 
provide evidence that limited access to external finance affects corporate structures 
and hinders economic growth.
In the last chapter “The Effect of Credit Rationing on the Shape of the Competition- 
Innovation Relationship” I study how financial constraints affect innovation activity. 
The novel theoretical results derive from an analysis of the interaction between the 
incentive effect of competition on innovation and the effect competition has on the 
degree of credit rationing. I find that the negative effect of financial constraints on
4firm- and aggregate-level R&D investment is most pronounced at both high and low 
levels of competition. These predictions are supported by empirical evidence.
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1. FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CORPORATE GROWTH 
IN THE EU SINGLE MARKET
(joint with Stepan Jurajda)
1.1 Introduction
Understanding the positive association between financial market development and 
economic growth is crucial for guiding financial sector policies. Recent work in this 
area uses industry-level identification strategies to establish a causal link from finance 
to growth (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Fisman and Love, 2004).1 This progress on 
causality, however, comes at the cost of not providing a quantification of the finance- 
growth aggregate effect. Yet, from the policy perspective it is important to know the 
size of the finance-growth effect in order to compare alternative pro-growth policies.
In this paper, we therefore return to earlier country-level work on the finance- 
growth nexus that allowed, under strong assumptions, for a quantification of the 
effect of finance on growth, and we address several of the concerns that were raised 
regarding its validity. Specifically, we return to the identification strategy of King 
and Levine (1993) and Levine and Zervos (1998) who relate financial development 
indicators from an initial period to subsequent growth performance of a sample of 
countries. The key concern with this research design is that it is in general unable
1 Levine (2005) surveys the literature on the relevant dimensions of financial development, the 
channels through which it affects growth, as well as the identification strategies used in estimating 
the growth effect of financial systems. We discuss how our study fits into this literature in detail 
in Section 2.
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to disentangle the effect of financial development from the influence of other, poten­
tially unobservable country-level determinants of growth. The other criticism of this 
country-level approach is that financial development may be a leading indicator of 
future growth because financial markets are forward-looking and initial-period differ­
ences in measures of financial system depth could, in fact, merely reflect differences 
in future growth opportunities.
To address these concerns, we introduce four improvements on their original ap­
proach. First, we study a highly homogenous set of countries where the assumption 
that heterogeneity in the initial level of financial development is orthogonal to other 
country-level determinants affecting growth is arguably most likely to hold. Specifi­
cally, we believe tha t the establishment of the ‘single market’ of the EU-15 economies 
in 1993 provides a unique opportunity to study the effect of financial development on 
growth. The EU-15 countries started sharing a common product market, but they 
differed markedly in their level of initial financial development.2 The ‘single market’ 
removed trade barriers, harmonized product market regulation, and exposed tech­
nologically highly similar firms to common growth opportunities.3 If reaping these 
growth opportunities required external finance provided by national financial sys­
tems, then only firms operating in countries with high levels of financial development 
were able to respond to these new opportunities by increasing their external financing 
and by growing. The ‘single market’ makes it likely that in the absence of differences 
in financial development growth of similar firms would be similar across the EU-15.4 
We therefore believe that country-level determinants of corporate growth (other than 
the level of financial development) are of relatively low importance in the EU-15 in 
comparison to the wide set of countries used in the existing cross-country research
2 The within-EU differences in financial development are highlighted by Guiso et al. (2004) and 
Allen et al. (2006).
3 For evidence on the rapid and synchronized implementation and effects of the Single Market 
Programme in manufacturing see Badinger (2007) or Bottasso and Sembenelli (2001).
4 For recent evidence on EU business cycle synchronization see Camacho et al. (2008).
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and hence can be assumed as heterogenous to financial development.
Second, one may be worried that, e.g., the Greek industrial structure and level 
of development as of the start of the ‘single market’ pre-destine the Greek economy 
to grow faster than the UK. However, it is less clear why  a Greek and a UK firm 
sharing the same industry identity, size, age, and the sam<e structure of firm finan­
cial indicators ought to grow at a different rate. We therefore contrast the growth 
experience of highly comparable companies facing different; financial systems, rather 
than comparing the growth performance of countries or industries. In particular, 
we control for firm characteristics measured at the time of the establishment of the 
‘single market’. This effectively conditions on the pre-deterimined economic structure 
of countries at different levels of financial development in a fashion similar to our 
(weak) exogeneity assumption of initial financial development. We also control for 
the initial level of GDP to capture ‘convergence’ effects.
Third, we lower the influence of country-industry unobservables by excluding from 
the analysis those industries that appear to be affected by national regulations. It is 
natural to expect industry growth synchronization within the ‘single market’, which 
combines a high degree of regulatory and economic integration with technological 
similarity. An industry that shows no signs of growth synchronization is therefore 
likely to be affected by (time-changing) national regulation or large idiosyncratic 
shocks and should be excluded from the analysis of the finance-growth nexus. We 
therefore quantify the degree of industry growth ‘synchronization’ using measures of 
industry growth time co-movement across the EU-15 countries and “weed out” those 
industries that do not co-move in time, arguing that they would bring noise to the 
estimation of the finance-growth relationship.
Fourth, we directly control for the forward-looking nature of financial markets. 
In order to check for the possibility that current financial development reflects future 
growth opportunities, we control for differences in aggregate future growth opportu­
nities implied by pre-existing industrial structure. (A similar strategy was recently
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employed by Bekaert et al., 2007.) Specifically, we use as a regressor a country-level 
growth rate computed as the average of the realized EU-15-wide industry growth 
rates over our sample period weighted by the country’s initial-period industrial com­
position. In an alternative specification, we replace this industry-structure-induced 
future growth with country GDP growth predictions made by the OECD at the time 
of the establishment of the ‘single market’.
In sum, our approach is to regress annual firm-level value-added growth from 
the first decade of the ‘single market’ on several dimensions of country financial 
infrastructure measured as of before the introduction of the ‘single market’, as well 
as on a set of firm-level pre-determined controls, industry-time dummies, and a 
limited number of country-level growth determinants. The parameters of interest 
are identified by cross-country variation in financial development, while industry­
time fixed effects remove the growth patterns of EU-wide industry-level business 
cycles.
Despite the improvements we introduce, the King and Levine (1993) strategy is 
unable to fully control for the presence of co>untry-specific policies or institutional 
features that affect growth and are correlated with the level of development of the 
financial sector. It may be that countries with more developed financial systems 
are also leading in terms of the effectiveness of their legal system etc., resulting 
in an upward bias in our finance-growth coefficients. Our estimates can therefore 
be viewed as providing a quantified upper bound on the growth effects of financial 
system development. On the other hand, th e  proxies the literature and our study 
use to capture the extent of financial sector development are clearly measured with 
error, which is likely to lead to a downward bias in the estimated effects.5 These two 
potential biases may therefore partly offset each other.6
5 The measurement error in different proxies of financial development is likely to be correlated, 
preventing the use of instrumental variable strategies that are typically employed to deal with 
attenuation biases.
6 In a related line of research, Frankel and Romer ((1999) report estim ates of the effect of trade
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We also investigate the significance of EU financial integration for corporate 
growth. Throughout our analysis, we rely on pre-determined initial levels of financial 
development as using time changes in the degreie of financial development could be 
subject to temporal endogeneity. However, if E1U integration leads to faster growth 
of financial markets in countries with initially low levels of financial development or if 
EU integration lowers the importance of national financial markets as firms increas­
ingly obtain external finance in other EU-15 countries, then one would expect firm 
growth to increase faster over time, ceteris paribus, in initially low-financial devel­
opment countries. We therefore interact our initial financial-development measures 
with time trend and ask to what extent an initial growth disadvantage due to lower 
financial development has been closed over the sipan of our sample frame.
We find a substantial positive association between initial level of financial devel­
opment and subsequent growth of comparable companies. The magnitude of this 
relationship is not affected by controlling for the forward-looking nature of finan­
cial markets. Allowing for the presence of EU financial integration by interacting 
the initial financial development level with a time trend suggests that disadvantages 
in firm-level growth due to under-developed national financial markets were large 
initially but disappeared by 2003.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 relates our approach to the lit­
erature, Section 3 presents the methodology, and Section 4 contains the data descrip­
tion. Section 5 presents the results together with robustness checks, while Section 6 
summarizes our findings.
1.2 Relationship to the Literature
Trying to disentangle the finance-growth nexus empirically raises a fundamental 
identification problem: one needs to isolate the part of the variation in financial
on growth based on ordinary-least-squares and instrumental-variable regressions that are of similar 
size, which is consistent with upward and attenuation biases being balanced.
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development that is unrelated to current and future growth opportunities, which are 
inherently unobservable. Three approaches aiming to overcome the reverse causality 
problem have been proposed in the literature. First, the country-level strategy of 
King and Levine (1993), discussed above, relates financial development indicators 
from an initial period to subsequent growth performance of a sample of countries. 
Second, La Porta et al. (1998) and Levine et al. (2000) are examples of studies that 
search for instrumental variables predicting a country’s level of financial development 
but unrelated to economic performance.7 Third, Rajan and Zingales (1998) together 
with many follow-up studies rely on industry-country comparisons to provide quali­
tative evidence on the causal link from finance to growth.
The Rajan and Zingales (1998) approach is based on a quantification of the un­
observable industry-specific need for tapping the financial system (using external 
finance) in a sample of countries. They assume that both the industry technology 
(driving the amount of external finance needed to expand production by one unit) 
and industry growth opportunities (driving the units of potential production expan­
sion) are constant across countries. Next, they quantify industry differences in the 
use of external finance in the US, where listed firms presumably face a perfectly 
elastic supply of funds, and use this measure as a counterfactual for what indus­
try differences in external finance use would be in economies as diverse as Sweden 
or Zimbabwe, were their financial systems as developed as that of the US. They 
regress industry growth from a sample of countries on country and industry fixed 
effects as well as on the interaction between US industry external finance dependence 
(EFD) and country financial development. Such regression asks whether industries 
predicted to be in more need of external finance grow faster in countries with more 
developed financial markets, conditional on all country- and industry-specific factors 
driving growth.
7 This approach is made difficult by the scarcity o»f valid instruments and the need to combine 
data on many countries in order to avoid small-sample biases of instrumental variable estimators.
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The Raj an-Zingales approach is a powerful tool for dealing with country-level 
reverse causality,8 but there are no direct tests available of the validity of its un­
derlying assumptions. The notion that relative growth opportunities of different 
industries remain constant along the development path is contradicted by much of 
trade economics. Similarly, the assumption of constant technological content of in­
dustries is threatened by recent empirical trade research, which highlights extensive 
intra-industry technology heterogeneity across countries at different income levels 
(Schott, 2003).
Fisman and Love (2004) relax some of the Rajan-Zingales assumptions and avoid 
the overt quantification of the industry structure of EFD. They assume that indus­
try differences in the need for external finance are similar across countries and ask 
whether industry-growth co-movements across pairs of countries are more strongly 
correlated for pairs of countries with more developed financial markets. The find­
ings based on both the Rajan-Zingales (1998) and the Fisman-Love (2004) approach 
suggest the presence of a causal link from financial market development to industry 
growth. However, their analyses do not lead to an estimate of the effect of financial 
development on growth whose magnitude would directly translate into economically 
measurable terms.9
In this paper, we follow the country-level strategy of King and Levine (1993) 
and relate initial-period indicators of country financial development to subsequent 
growth. However, similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998), we focus on growth devi­
ations from global industry means.10 Furthermore, we use micro data to perform
8 It also speaks to one of the mechanisms underpinning the finance-growth effect— provision of 
external funds to reap growth opportunities. Levine (2005) highlights that financial systems (i) 
acquire and produce risk-return information for possible investments; (ii) monitor investments; (iii) 
facilitate trading, hedging, diversifying, and pooling of risk; (iv) mobilize savings; and (v) ease the 
exchange of goods and services that permits greater specialization and innovation.
9 The Rajan-Zingales estimates measure only the percentage-point difference in growth of indus­
tries facing a different need for external finance.
10 We control for EU-wide industry-level business cycles. Aghion et al. (2005) suggest that the
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cross-country comparisons within industries by comparing the growth experience of 
highly similar firms facing different aggregate levels of financial development. Unlike 
Rajan and Zingales (1998), we do not control for country fixed effects; hence, our 
approach is problematic to the extent that financial markets develop faster to “off­
set” the negative growth effect of high labour market rigidity or that they develop 
faster in countries with a specific legal framework, which also drives growth directly. 
We make such a strong assumption for two reasons. First, like Fisman and Love 
(2004), we want to avoid quantification of industry-level EFD, but, unlike them, we 
want to provide economically measurable estimates of the effect of financial devel­
opment on growth. Second, we believe that the assumption of orthogonality of the 
growth-affecting unobservables to the country’s financial development level is more 
likely to hold for the manufacturing sector of the EU-15 economies compared to the 
aggregate GDP growth in the extensive set of countries used in, e.g., King and Levine 
(1993).
Our estimation is complementary to that of Guiso et al. (2004), who also use 
extensive firm-level data from the EU to study the effect of financial development on 
growth, but who adhere fully to the Rajan-Zingales specifications and EFD measures. 
Our results, based on an alternative set of assumptions, are in accord with the 
conclusions of Guiso et al. (2004) that financial markets facilitate corporate growth. 
Unlike them, we quantify this effect in economically measurable terms. Finally, our 
indirect evidence on EU financial integration is related to studies directly measuring 
the extent of integration, e.g., Pagano and von Thadden (2004) or Baele et al. (2004).
effects of business cycle volatility on growth depend on the level of financial development. In their 
analysis, the interaction occurs during recessions; however, real GDP per capita grew in all EU-15 
countries during our sample frame.
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1.3 M ethodology
We ask about the effect of financial development on firms’ growth, controlling for all 
determinants of industry growth and several firm characteristics. Our basic regres­
sion specification is
Gijkt =  ot +  (3F D i  +  7 GDPi -(- 6tj  +  (1.1)
where Gijkt denotes the annual growth rate of the real value added of firm k in 
industry j  in country i in year t , and where FDi corresponds to a measure of pre­
determined financial development (determined before the start of our sample period 
in order to alleviate reverse causality). In all specifications, we control for a full set of 
industry-year dummies, Stj , which capture the (synchronized) time path of industry 
growth across the EU-15, and for a set of firm-specific initial-period characteristics 
Xijk including firm size, age, leverage, tangibility, collateralization, as well as an 
indicator for quoted companies and a set of indicators for company concentration of 
ownership and legal form. Finally, we control for a country’s growth potential by 
adding real GDP per capita (GDPi),  also as of before the beginning of our sample 
frame.
To interpret the (3 coefficient as corresponding to the effect of financial develop­
ment, we assume that FDi is not related to . In particular, we assume that in the 
absence of differences in financial development and firm-type composition, industry 
growth synchronization would be near perfect. Clearly, we will be able to detect 
departures from synchronized growth driven by differences in financial development 
only in industries that face highly similar shocks to growth opportunities. In other 
words, we expect our regressions to be successful in detecting the finance-growth 
effect in industries that display a significant degree of growth synchronization. On 
the other hand, we have no clear interpretation for growth differences detected for 
‘single-market’ industries, in which growth is mainly a matter of the firms’ country of
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residence and may therefore be driven by local regulations or government policies.11
We therefore start our analysis by “weeding out” industries that lack any sign 
of growth synchronization across the economies of the EU-15. To this effect, we 
use annual industry value-added growth data for the EU-15 economies and apply 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to examine the explanatory power of year factors as 
opposed to country identity for each industry separately. We then classify industries 
as synchronized or not based on two alternative criteria. First, we simply use the 
share of total country-year growth variability (sum of squares) explained by the year 
factors as a measure of industry co-movement. Second, we classify industries as 
synchronized or not based on the statistical significance of year and country factors. 
Details of the procedure are laid out in Section 1.5.12
Our analysis is based on the fact that the ‘single market’ combines a high level of 
regulatory and product market integration with substantial initial diversity in the de­
velopment of countries’ financial markets. However, the use of pre-determined levels 
of financial development, which alleviates reverse causality, also raises an important 
question. If subsequent EU integration leads to faster growth of financial markets in 
countries with initially low levels of financial development or, alternatively, if inte­
gration lowers the importance of local financial markets as firms increasingly obtain 
external finance in other EU-15 countries, then one would expect firm growth to in­
crease faster over time, ceteris paribus, in initially low -FD  countries. The presence
11 Given the existing literature on the finance-growth nexus, it is likely that differences in financial 
development lower the degree of industry co-movements, but it is very unlikely that they fully 
decouple industry growth rates across highly economically integrated countries.
12 We also go beyond industry groupings based on synchronization and use a continuous measure of 
synchronization— the share of total growth variability explained by the year factors in our ANOVA 
exercises. We then interact indicators of financial development with this measure of industry 
synchronization and use the interaction as an additional regressor in equation (1.1). It is important 
to clarify the interpretation of such ‘synchronization interaction’. We maintain the assumption that 
the underlying finance-growth effect is the same across industries; however, we expect to be able to 
detect the effect better in those industries where growth shocks are more synchronized.
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of such an effect would make it harder for us to detect the finance-growth relation­
ship using specification (1.1). To check for the importance of financial integration, 
we therefore augment equation (1.1) with the interaction of the initial financial de­
velopment level with a time trend:
G^kt =  ot + 0oF Di + 0 i (t*  F D i) +  7 G D P i + 5tj  + + eijkt• (1-2)
This enriched specification, which does not rely on the likely endogenous observed 
annual changes in the depth of financial markets, allows us to measure to what extent 
an initial growth disadvantage due to lower financial development has been closed 
over the span of our sample frame.13
1.4 D ata
We analyze EU-15 economies during the first decade of the single market’s operation, 
before its extension to post-communist countries in 2004, using firm-, industry- and 
country-level data. Firm financial statements come from the Amadeus database. 
Industry measures of value-added growth are taken from the OECD STAN database. 
Finally, country-level measures of financial development come primarily from the 
World Bank.
1.4.1 Firm-Level Data
We use firm-level data from the Amadeus (Analyse MAjor Databases from EUropean 
Sources) database, created by Bureau Van Dijk from standardized commercial data 
collected by about 50 vendors across Europe. Among the key advantages of the 
data from our perspective is that they cover both listed and unlisted firms of all 
size categories. In principle, the database should cover most public and private
13 It does not differentiate whether financial development matters less for firm growth because 
financial markets develop faster in initially under-developed economies or because firms increasingly 
rely on international sources of financing.
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limited companies;14 it includes up to 10 years of information per company, although 
coverage varies by country and generally improves over time. The database represents 
the best available firm-level EU-wide data source as argued in Gomez-Salvador et al. 
(2004).
These data have been tapped in the finance-growth literature by Guiso et al. 
(2004) and have also been recently used by Klapper et al. (2006) to study firm 
entry. Our selection of the analysis-ready sample follows the choices made by these 
two studies. Similar to Guiso et al. (2004), we use the ‘TOP 250 thousand’ module 
of the Amadeus data ,15 which we downloaded in May 2006. Following Klapper et al. 
(2006) we use only unconsolidated statements to avoid double counting and we also 
exclude all legal forms other than the equivalent of public and private limited liability 
corporations due to the uneven coverage of partnerships, proprietorships, and other 
minor legal forms. (Definitions of key variables and a listing of the included legal 
forms of firms by country are provided in the Data Appendix, in Tables l.DA.l and 
1.DA.2, respectively.)
The dataset is drawn from EU-15 countries that were part of the EU ‘single 
market’: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. As did Guiso 
et al. (2004) we exclude Luxembourg, because its financial sector is statistically 
anomalous, and we lose Ireland due to missing firm-level information. Firm coverage 
in the Amadeus data is incomplete before 1995 and so we use only observations from 
1995-2003. Following Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Guiso et al. (2004), we focus
14 There are exceptions to the rule. For example, small and medium size German firms are not 
legally forced to disclose (Desai et al., 2003).
15 Firms selected as TO P 250,000 had to meet at least one of the following inclusion criteria: For 
UK, Germany, France, and Italy operating revenue at least 15 million euros, total assets at least 30 
million euros, or the number of employees at least 150. For all other countries operating revenue 
at least 10 million euros, total assets at least 20 million euros, or the number of employees at least 
100.
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on manufacturing industries (ISIC 15 to 37). We exclude firms with missing size 
(total assets) as well as non-active firms. We also omit from analysis (i) companies 
in the top 1% of the size distribution, as such extremely large firms are likely to have 
access to international sources of finance, (ii) growth observations falling outside of 
the 5-to-95 percentile range of firms’ value added growth rate, and (iii) firms with 
significant state ownership.16 Since Greek firms do not report value added, we used 
sales as a surrogate for them .17 Table 1.1 shows the final number of firm-year value- 
added growth observations used in the study for each country, together with simple 
firm-level descriptive statistics corresponding to these observations.18 It is clear that 
coverage varies across countries; specifically, firm size in Germany is affected by non­
reporting of small firms. Nevertheless, the data provide extensive coverage of most 
of the EU-15 economies and represent the best firm-level EU data source available 
to date.
1.4.2 Financial Development Indicators
Data on financial development are drawn from the World Bank’s Financial Structure 
and Economic Development Database (March 2005 version) described in detail in 
Beck et al. (2000). To make our results comparable with those in the literature we 
use a number of measures of finance activity to proxy financial development. We 
start with the traditional measures of activity in the credit and stock markets, namely 
the ratio of private credit to GDP (variable Private Bank Credit) and the ratio of 
stock market capitalization and stock market total value traded to GDP (Market 
Capitalization, Market Value Traded). We also rely on a measure of total country-
16 Specifically, we drop firms in which the state is as an ultimate owner of at least 10 percent of 
shares or a direct owner at least 10 percent of shares. There is virtually no sensitivity to the choice 
of the percentage threshold.
17 See Guiso et al. (2004) for the use of sales instead of value added.
18 We use IMF-IFS annual average exchange rates to  convert all accounting data into millions of 
US dollars.
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level finance activity equal to the sum of (i) stock market capitalization, (ii) bank 
credit to the private sector, and (iii) domestic debt securities issued by the private 
sector. This summary measure (Total Capitalization) is taken from Hartmann et al. 
(2006) and is expressed, again, as a fraction of country-level GDP. All proxies for 
financial development are averaged over the years 1990-1994, that is, mainly before 
the establishment of the ‘single market’. We rely on time averages to avoid year- 
to-year fluctuations and use pre-firm-sample measures to alleviate reverse causality 
problems.
In addition to volume-of-finance-activity measures of financial development, we 
also use two proxies for the institutional quality of financial markets. First, we use 
an indicator of the ‘quality of accounting standards’ (Accounting Standards), pro­
duced by International Accounting and Auditing Trends (Center for International 
Financial Analysis h  Research, Inc.). This indicator rated companies’ 1990 annual 
reports on the basis of their inclusion or omission of 90 items in the balance sheets 
and income statements and ranges from 0 to 90. Second, we rely on a market- 
based measure of institutional quality. Specifically, we use equity block premia—the 
private control premia that correspond to benefits enjoyed by a controlling share­
holder and not shared by other shareholders (Control Premium). Control premia 
derive from the effective level of limits to diversion and private-benefit extraction 
by controlling shareholders and, thus, reflect (the value of) a country’s degree of 
investor protection. Dyck and Zingales (2004) estimate such equity block premia 
corresponding to transactions spanning the 1990-2000 period.19 To keep the sign 
of the estimates of financial-development coefficients comparable across our various
19 They show that the premia are higher in countries where capital markets are less developed, 
ownership is more concentrated, minority shareholders are less protected, law enforcement is weaker 
and the press has less influence in affecting owners’ reputation. From our set of EU-15 countries, 
the Dyck-Zingales estim ates are available for Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. The lowest (highest) level of the 
premium required to gain a controlling position in a firm is 1% (38%) in the UK (Austria).
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specifications (financial-development measures), we use control premium values ex­
pressed as 0.38 minus the original Dyck-Zingales value estimates, where 0.38 is the 
highest level of the premium observed in the sample.
All indicators of financial development are summarized across our EU countries 
in Table 1.2. (Variable definitions are provided in the Data Appendix Table l.DA.l.) 
It is clear that despite the extensive integration of EU national product markets up 
to 1994, there is still substantial diversity in the degree of financial development 
across the EU-15. The coefficient of variation is particularly high for our measures 
of stock-market activity and for the control premium measure.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Basic Estimates
We start by presenting the results of our basic linear regressions of equation (1.1) in 
Table 1.3. The table presents selected coefficients from regressions of annual firm- 
level real value-added growth rates of manufacturing firms from the period 1995- 
2003 on country-level financial development indicators, most of which are measured 
in 1990-1994. The control variables are industry-year dummies based on the 3-digit 
ISIC classification, firm-level controls, and the 1993 country GDP per capita in 
millions of US dollars. The firm-level controls are age, size,20 leverage, tangibility, 
collateralization, and indicators of being quoted, legal form type, and ownership 
concentration;21 these controls are measured as of the first year a firm enters the 
sample and remain fixed over time.
The coefficient estimates in Table 1.3 suggest that initial financial development
20 We measure firm size in percentage-point deviation from the median firm size in a given industry 
to reflect the fact that different industries are characterized by different optimal firm size (Kumar 
et al., 1999).
21 Ownership concentration (company independence with regard to its shareholders) is divided 
into low, medium and high based on the presence of shareholders with an ownership share over 
25% or 50%.
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measures are related to company growth deviation from year-industry averages. The 
precisely estimated financial development coefficients are economically significant. 
Moving from the minimum to the maximum value of our financial development indi­
cators results in an increase in value-added growth rate of about 3 percentage points 
in the case of all four measures based on volume of financial activity while it adds 
about 5 points in the case of our accounting quality measure. The effect is smaller, 
at about 1.5 of a percentage point, when using the control premium comparison. 
The magnitude of the private credit growth effect we estimate is about twice the size 
of the corresponding effect estimated across a more extensive set of countries in the 
country-level analysis of Levine and Zervos (1998).
The results in Table 1.3 are not sensitive to (i) alternatively using industry-year 
fixed effects based on a 2-digit industry classification, (ii) excluding leverage from 
the list of control variables, (iii) dropping firms with less than five years of value- 
added data available, or (iv) excluding those value-added growth observations where 
at least one of the two underlying levels of value added were negative. (We present 
some of these robustness checks for our preferred specification in Section 1.5.5.) We 
also note that aggregate GDP convergence effects are strongly detected by the data 
and that older and larger firms grow more slowly, as expected. Furthermore, we 
find that highly leveraged firms grow faster as do quoted companies and firms with 
initially high tangibility of assets.22
1.5.2 Focusing on Synchronized Industries
In order to lower the importance of country-industry unobservables, we divide the 
data into industry groups displaying different degrees of synchronization and re- 
estimate equation (1) for each sub-sample. First, we compute a quantitative measure
22 Presumably, having obtained more external finance in the past helps reap current growth 
opportunities. Alternatively, growth opportunity attracts external finance and is strongly correlated 
over time at the firm level.
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of synchronization for each industry based on the OECD STAN database. The 
measure equals the fraction of the total variation of industry-level annual value-added 
growth rate across countries and years explained by year factors in an ANOVA with 
year and country factors. We also calculate another measure of synchronization taken 
from an ANOVA exercise, where we additionally control for a country’s aggregate 
growth rate (aggregate business cycle). Both measures are presented in Table 1.4. 
The “synchronized”fraction of growth variability (i.e., th a t linked to years) varies by 
almost a factor of seven when comparing the least synchronized industries of leather, 
office machinery, or precision instruments, to the most synchronized industries of 
food and beverages, petroleum, or basic metals.
Next, we divide industries into four groups based on quartiles of the first quanti­
tative synchronization measure. Alternatively, we divide industries into groups based 
on a qualitative assessment of the degree of synchronization. We split the sample 
industries into three types based on the p value of the estimated country and year 
factors from our ANOVA exercises. In Table 1.4, we denote industries where year 
factors do not reach the 10% level of statistical significance as low-synchronization in­
dustries, we call industries where only the year factors but not the country factors are 
significant as high-synchronization industries, and we denote the remaining group, 
where both types of factors are important, as medium-synchronization industries.
We are now ready to estimate the finance-growth relationship for each “syn­
chronization group” separately. The results are displayed in Table 1.5, where each 
presented parameter comes from a separate regression. The top panel of the table 
corresponds to the qualitative grouping, while the bottom panel lists results for the 
four quartiles of the first synchronization measure.23 Using either type of “synchro­
nization grouping”, we detect little evidence of a finance-growth relationship for the
23 The results are similar when we use the second quantitative synchronization measure of Table 
1.4. We have also alternatively used an industry grouping based on ANOVAs estimated not with 
STAN at ISIC 2-digit level, but with the Amadeus data at ISIC 3-digit level. We obtained results 
very similar to those presented in Table 1.5.
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group of least synchronized industries, while the estimated effect is significant and 
similar in more synchronized industry groups.24
In sum, our comparisons fully support the notion th a t we can effectively detect 
the effects of financial development on firm-level growth deviation from industry 
average in those industries where there is a synchronized time pattern of industry 
growth across all EU-15 economies.25 The inclusion of low-synchronization indus­
tries only brings noise to our analysis and, therefore, we exclude the group of low- 
synchronization industries from the rest of our analysis. In the top panel of Table 
1.6, we display the basic financial development coefficients re-estimated after exclud­
ing the group of low-synchronization industries. The parameter estimates are all 
somewhat larger compared to those presented in Table 1.3, as one would expect.
1.5.3 Financial Integration
In Section 1.3, we discussed the'implications of EU financial integration for our 
estimation strategy. Specifically, faster financial development of initially financially 
under-developed countries hinders the detection of a finance-growth effect using our 
initial specification of equation (1.1). To check for the presence of such an integration 
process and to ask to what extent a growth disadvantage due to initially lower 
financial development has been closed over the span of our sample frame, we estimate 
equation (1.2), which allows for the interaction of initial financial development level
24 We have re-estimated the regression for high-synchronization industries on a randomly chosen 
sub-sample mimicking the size of the low-synchronization group. We again obtained coefficients 
and significance levels nearly identical to those presented in Table 1.5.
25 We have also estimated a regression specification for the whole sample, where we interacted 
the country-level measures of financial development with industry-level measures of growth co­
movement. See note n. 12 for a discussion of this specification. The coefficient estimates for the 
interaction terms, which are available upon request, were positive and statistically significant— in 
line with our group-level analysis. If one were to base the magnitude of the estim ated finance- 
growth effect on the highest observed level of synchronization in the data, the effect would be 1.5 
to 3 times larger than that reported in Section 1.5.1.
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with a time trend (starting from 1 in 1996).
The results presented in the second panel of Table 1.6 suggest that the positive 
influence of initially more developed financial markets on firm-level growth diminishes 
over time for all of our measures of financial development.26 The precisely estimated 
parameter estimates imply that (i) the initial financial development growth effect 
from the mid 1990s is almost four times larger as the sample-period-average effect 
estimated in the top panel of Table 1.6, and (ii) the growth gap of similar firms 
operating in more and less financially developed EU-15 countries has been fully 
closed within the nine years of our sample frame. For example, taking the base- 
effect coefficient for total capitalization (0.076) and subtracting 7 years of the trend 
interaction corresponding to year 2002 (-0.012 * 7) results in a total effect of -0.008, 
which is for all practical purposes zero. Taking these estimates at face value, one 
would conclude that EU-15 financial integration was complete as of 2002, at least in 
terms of its effect on within-industry firm growth.27
The underlying integration process may be different for our various measures of 
financial development as suggested by a simple comparison of our financial devel­
opment measures from the early 1990s to those from a recent period. Comparing 
the 1990-1994 averages of the ratio of private credit to GDP to the corresponding 
averages taken over the 2000-2004 period suggests that the country-level volume of 
private credit is now relatively similar across the EU-15 economies. In contrast, EU- 
15 countries with higher levels of stock market capitalization as of the early 1990s
26 The non-reported coefficients corresponding to firm-level controls are little affected by the 
introduction of the time interaction with financial development level.
27 As previously noted, our statistical inference reflects group-level variation in financial devel­
opment by clustering residuals at the country level. Alternatively, we follow the suggestion of 
Wooldridge (2003) and break the estimation into two stages, one firm-level, the other country-level. 
Using this alternative procedure, we obtain similar, if sometimes smaller coefficient estimates, most 
of which remain statistically significant at conventional levels. These results are available upon 
request.
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experienced a faster growth of their stock market size in the subsequent decade.28 
Hence, our results are consistent with a diminishing importance of local stock mar­
kets for firms’ growth as well as with an equalization of access to private credit 
through faster growth of initially under-developed local banking sectors.
1.5.4 Controlling for Aggregate Growth Opportunities
A  potential criticism of our approach is that financial development measures, based, 
e.g., on initial volumes of credit or equity, are misleading because they capture not 
only the development of the country’s financial markets, but also reflect the demand 
for finance in the initial period, which, in turn, is driven by future country-level 
growth opportunities. We then put growth on the left hand side of our regressions, 
thus closing a full circle.
In order to assess the importance of this criticism and to allow for the co­
determination of country-level growth opportunities and financial development mea­
sures, we additionally condition on predicted future country growth, calculated as 
follows. We take the time-averages of EU-15 future realized growth of all our in­
dustries and weight these growth rates by the initial-period country-level shares of 
each industry. This is the growth rate one would expect of a manufacturing sec­
tor in a particular country if one could perfectly forecast industry-specific growth 
at the EU-15 level from 1995 to 2003. We use the STAN value-added growth fig­
ures to calculate this “expected” growth rate. The perfect-foresight assumption is 
quite strong as companies are unlikely to know the global shocks to industry growth; 
hence, we hope that controlling for this variable in our regressions alleviates the 
worry that country-level financial development proxies simply reflect future growth 
opportunities.
28 It is well known that the structure of the financial sector differs across countries (Allen and 
Gale, 2004), which in part reflects differences in firm type structure as firms of different type raise 
external finance through different channels (e.g., Beck et at., 2008). Our analysis conditions on 
pre-existing firm type structure.
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The time interaction specification controlling for this ‘future growth potential’ is 
presented in the third panel of Table 1.6. Comparing the second and third panel, we 
see that our main results are little affected by this robustness check. A very similar 
set of results is obtained when alternatively controlling for a country’s GDP growth 
forecast made at the start of the ‘single market’.29 It appears that our estimates are 
not driven by the forward-looking nature of financial markets.
1.5.5 Further Robustness Checks
In Table 1.7 we present our preferred specification from the third panel of Table 1.6, 
namely the specification with the financial development/time interaction controlling 
for predicted growth, together with a number of further robustness checks. First, 
we compare the estimates across firms of different size and find little sensitivity. 
Second, we assess the sensitivity of our estimates to excluding one country from the 
sample. We do so for each country in turn with the aim of discerning which countries 
may be driving our results. Given the general lack of sensitivity, we present the 
results after excluding the UK together with an alternative set of estimates based 
on excluding Greece—the most and the least financially developed country in our 
data, respectively. There is virtually no sensitivity to excluding any country with 
the exception of the United Kingdom. Clearly, the UK presents the most financially 
developed country in our sample and the strong growth performance of UK firms 
supports some of the estimated finance-growth effect. Excluding the United Kingdom 
results in much smaller and statistically insignificant effects of stock-market-based 
measures of financial activity, which is perhaps not surprising given that the UK 
stock market is unusually developed in the EU context. Omitting the UK also 
lowers the size of the finance-growth effect for the other three measures of financial
29 The forecast for 1997-2000 was produced by the OECD in 1994. See the Appendix Table l.D A .l 
for details.
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development, but they remain statistically significant.30
Finally, the bottom panel of Table 1.7 presents estimates based on subsamples of 
our main data that exclude either firms with less than four years of value-added data 
or those value-added growth observations where at least one of the two underlying 
levels of value added were negative. We also assess the sensitivity to excluding 
leverage as a control variable based on the argument that initial leverage may be 
more endogenous than other control variables. None of these checks points to any 
important sensitivity in our estimates.31
Up to now, we have avoided the influence of value-added growth outliers, present 
in any company-level financial data, by symmetrically excluding extreme values of 
annual growth from our linear ‘mean’ regressions. In our last robustness check, 
we alternatively apply median regressions, which are robust to outliers by design 
and allow us to use all available growth rate data (even observations falling outside 
the 5-to-95 percentile range). The results are shown in Table 1.8, the structure 
of which replicates that of Table 1.6. The clustered standard errors we report are 
bootstrapped. The presented pattern of median regression coefficients confirms our 
previous findings.
1.6 Conclusion
The Rajan-Zingales literature established the causal link from finance to growth, 
but the Rajan-Zingales (1998) or the Fisman-Love (2004) approach do not lead to 
a quantification of the aggregate finance-growth effect. We use the establishment 
of the EU ‘single market’ as a unique opportunity for revisiting the identifying as­
30 When we return to the specification without the time interaction and exclude the UK, we 
obtain an effect of private credit on growth that is identical to that estimated by Levine and Zervos 
(1998).
31 We also reach the same results when we use only non-quoted companies or only firms that are 
present in the data in all years, or when we additionally interact the initial GDP level with a time 
trend. These results are available upon request.
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sumptions of King and Levine (1993), which allow one to estimate the economic 
magnitude of the finance-growth effect. Specifically, we relate pre-determined levels 
of financial development to subsequent growth and address some of the concerns 
with the validity of this approach. In contrast to early country-level research, we 
study a highly homogenous set of countries, focus on within-industry growth rates 
of similar companies, and control for country-level future growth potential implied 
by inherited industrial structure. To aid identification, the estimation is explicitly 
based on highly synchronized industries.
Using volume-of-finance-activity measures, we find that moving from the least to 
the most developed financial system within the EU-15 boosts the firm-level average 
annual value-added growth rate between 1995 and 2003 by up to three percentage 
points. The effects of institutional quality, proxied here by a measure of accounting 
standards and a measure of investor protection (control premia), are also positive 
and significant, but more varied in size. Excluding the UK reduces the effects of 
private credit and investor protection by about half and renders stock market activity 
effects statistically insignificant. Overall, our estimates of the size of the finance- 
growth effect are similar to those obtained by Levine and Zervos (1998) who contrast 
country-level growth rates across countries at widely different levels of economic as 
well as financial development.
Allowing for the presence of financial integration by interacting the initial finan­
cial development level with a time trend suggests that disadvantages in firm-level 
growth due to under-developed financial markets were much larger in the mid 1990s 
than in the late 1990s and that the growth gap related to country-level financial 
development was fully closed by 2003. Taking these findings at face value implies 
successful financial integration of the EU-15 area in the sense that real economic 
activity as measured by corporate growth is no longer affected by a firm’s location, 
which is consistent with direct evidence on integration provided by, e.g., Pagano and 
von Thadden (2004).
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Appendix: Tables
Tab. 1.1: Corporate Descriptive Statistics by Country: Firm-Year Data over 1995-2003
Size Growth Age Leverage
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Austria 67.6 38.2 0.038 0.015 22.2 15.0 0.51 0.53 689
Belgium 47.6 15.9 0.016 0.010 22.7 18.0 0.62 0.65 9,091
Denmark 49.2 19.9 0.069 0.067 23.9 17.0 0.55 0.58 682
Finland 45.8 14.3 0.041 0.035 21.3 12.0 0.54 0.55 3,183
France 58.9 20.1 0.023 0.016 30.1 24.0 0.54 0.55 10,127
Germany 128.8 50.1 0.030 0.023 32.9 20.0 0.47 0.47 3,446
Greece 25.9 11.5 0.055 0.048 17.1 15.0 0.58 0.59 4,834
Italy 38.9 18.4 0.028 0.021 20.4 16.0 0.58 0.59 32,355
Netherlands 54.2 26.8 0.006 -0.004 37.2 30.0 0.52 0.51 1,026
Portugal 39.3 17.9 0.006 -0.003 26.8 22.0 0.58 0.61 1,387
Spain 39.7 16.7 0.051 0.044 22.0 19.0 0.58 0.59 16,884
Sweden 39.9 12.3 0.042 0.040 32.3 27.0 0.48 0.48 4,304
UK 62.8 19.9 0.060 0.061 29.6 22.0 0.63 0.64 13,636
Note: The number o f firm-year observations in the sample, N, corresponds to observations with non-missing 
value-added growth rate. All firm variables are measured in the first year a firm enters the sample except age, 
which is measured as o f  1995; age is the number of years since firm incorporation. Size (total assets) is in 
millions o f US dollars. Growth is the annual value-added growth rate. Leverage is measured as long-term debt 
plus current liabilities divided by total assets. Before computing these statistics we remove growth outliers (we 
use only the 5-to-95 percentile range o f growth values). See the Data Appendix for complete definitions and 
§durces o f variables.
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Tab. 1.2: Financial Development: The EU-15 over 1990-1994
Private Bank 
Credit
Market
Capitalization
Total
Capitalization
Market Value 
Traded
Accounting
Standards
Control
Premium
Mean 0.82 0.30 1.35 0.13 0.64 0.26
Median 0.85 0.23 1.45 0.09 0.62 0.31
S.D. / Mean 0.40 0.77 0.33 0.90 0.19 0.52
Min 0.32 0.10 0.51 0.03 0.36 0.00
Max 1.41 0.97 2.25 0.45 0.83 0.37
Min Country Greece Austria Greece Greece Portugal Austria
Max Country Netherlands UK UK UK Sweden UK
N 13 13 12 13 13 11
Note: We first compute the country average of each financial development measure in the period 1990-1994. Second, we 
present the Min, Max, Mean, and the Coefficient of Variation of the country averages from the first step across the EU-15. 
The two exceptions are Accounting Standards and Control Premium measures, which correspond to 1990 and 1990-2000, 
respectively. Ireland and Luxembourg are not included in this EU-15 comparison as they do not enter our firm-level 
analysis. See the Data Appendix for complete definitions and sources of variables.
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Tab. 1.3: Financial Development and Corporate Growth: Basic Estimates
Private Bank 
Credit
Market
Capitalization
Total
Capitalization
Market Value 
Traded
Accounting
Standards
Control
Premium
Financial Development 0.026** 0.033*** 0.021*** 0.070*** 0.117*** 0.041**
(0.011) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.029) (0.018)
Age -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.044*** -0.043***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Size -0.124*** -0.125*** -0.126*** -0.129*** -0.121*** -0.126***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.028)
Leverage 0.055*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.059***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011)
Tangibility 0.014* 0.013* 0.012 0.013* 0.013* 0.013
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Collateralization -0.020 -0.018 -0.018 -0.016 -0.019 -0.021
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017)
Quoted 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.010
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
Private Limited Company 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.013**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005)
Real GDP -4.304*** -4.232*** -5.331*** -4.162*** -4.756*** -2.978*
(0.599) (0.949) (0.761) (0.879) (0.466) (1.419)
N 100,535 100,535 99,871 100,535 100,533 86,866
R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15
Note: The dependent variable is the annual firm-level value-added growth rate of manufacturing firms in the period 1995- 
2003. All country-level financial development variables are predetermined except Control Premium, which covers the 1990- 
2000 period. Firm-level control variables come from the first year a firm enters the sample and remain fixed over time. Age 
is scaled down by 100 in all specifications, as is the measure of accounting standards. Size is measured as the percentage 
deviation of firm size (total assets) from the industry median firm size on a 3-digit ISIC level and is scaled down by 10,000. 
Leverage is measured as long-term debt plus current liabilities divided by total assets. Tangibility is measured as fixed 
assets divided by total assets while collateralization is defined as fixed assets plus inventories plus accounts receivables 
divided by total assets. Real GDP is country real GDP per capita in 1993 in millions of U.S. dollars. Quoted and Private 
Limited Company and are dummy variables with a base of non-quoted firms and Public Limited Companies, respectively. 
See the Data Appendix for complete definitions and sources of variables.
All specifications are linear regressions with outliers removed (using the 5-to-95 percentile range of the dependent variable). 
We always control for a constant and for 3-digit-ISIC industry-year dummies. Robust standard errors (clustered at country 
level) are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Tab. 1.4: Synchronized Industries: ANOVAS of Value-Added Growth Rates Across Coun­
tries and Years by Industry
ISIC
Year/Country Two Factor Model Robust to Country Growth
Year Factor 
SS
Synchronization 
Measure I
Synchronization
Subsample
Year Factor 
SS
Synchronization 
Measure II
Food products and beverages 15 0.12** 0.35 Medium 0.11*** 0.32
Tobacco products 16 0.58** 0.22 High 0.50*** 0.19
Textiles 17 0.09** 0.21 Medium 0.04** 0.10
Apparel 18 0.15** 0.15 High 0.08 0.08
Leather 19 0.19 0.08 Low 0.14 0.06
Wood and cork 20 0.24** 0.13 Medium 0.14 0.07
Pulp and paper 21 0.53** 0.28 High 0.43*** 0.23
Printing and publishing 22 0.11** 0.16 Medium 0.09*** 0.13
Coke and refined petroleum 23 4.65** 0.32 High 5.12*** 0.35
Chemicals 24 0.15** 0.14 Medium 0.10*** 0.09
Rubber and plastics 25 0.14** 0.27 High 0.09*** 0.16
Other non-metallic mineral products 26 0.15** 0.26 Medium 0.08*** 0.13
Basic metals 27 0.72** 0.34 High 0.67*** 0.32
Fabricated metal products 28 0.17** 0.22 Medium 0.10*** 0.13
Machinery and equipment 29 0.15* 0.12 High 0.13 0.10
Office and computing machinery 30 2.85 0.07 Low 2.42 0.06
Electrical machinery 31 0.20* 0.12 High 0.18* 0.10
Radio, television and communication equipment 32 1.16** 0.16 Medium 0.89** 0.12
Medical, precision and optical instruments 33 0.06 0.05 Low 0.06 0.05
Motor vehicles 34 0.46** 0.17 High 0.23 0.08
Other transport equipment 35 0.30 0.10 Low 0.24 0.08
Manufacturing N.E.C. 36 0.07** 0.20 High 0.04* 0.11
Recycling 37 1.29** 0.18 High 1.51*** 0.21
Note: The panel ‘Year/Country Two Factor Model’ presents first the total sum o f squares (SS) o f annual value-added growth rate across countries 
explained for a given industry by year factors in ANOVA two factor models (with year and country factors) estimated using the OECD STAN 
data; here, *, **, and *** denote significance o f  the year factors at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. ‘Synchronization Measure I’ is the fraction o f 
the total growth variation explained by year factors in these ANOVAs. The ‘Synchronization Subsample’ column assigns industries where the year 
factors do not reach the 10% level o f  statistical significance as low-synchronization industries. Next, industries where only the year factors, but 
not the country factors are significant are denoted as high- synchronization industries and the remaining group, where both types o f factors are 
statistically important, as medium- synchronization industries. The panel ‘Robust to Country Growth’ shows analogous statistics based on 
alternative ANOVAs, where one controls not only for year and country factors, but also for country aggregate growth rate (business cycle).
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Tab. 1.5: Financial Development and Corporate Growth: Industry Synchronization
Groups
Private Bank Market 
Credit Capitalization
Total Market Value 
Capitalization Traded
Accounting
Standards
Control
Premium
Financial Development
Low-synchronization based on ANOVA: 
0.010 0.020* 0.011 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.008)
Year factor WEAK 
0.042 
(0.024)
0.081*
(0.042)
0.001
(0.017)
N 6,243 6,243 6,179 6,243 6,243 5,896
R2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Medium-synchronization 
Financial Development 0.029*"
(0.010)
based on ANOVA: 
0.034*** 
(0.004)
Year factor STRONG; Country factor STRONG 
0.023*** 0.073*** 0.139*** 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.029)
0.048**
(0.020)
N 54,812 54,812 54,483 54,812 54,811 45,801
R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
High-synchronization based on ANOVA: 
Financial Development 0.026** 0.032***
(0.011) (0.002)
Year factor STRONG; Country factor WEAK 
0.021*** 0.069*** 0.091*** 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.030)
0.043**
(0.016)
N 39,480 39,480 39,209 39,480 39,479 35,169
R2 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
Financial Development 0.005
(0.012)
Synchronization Measure 1:1st 
0.018** 0.008 
(0.008) (0.007)
quartile
0.034
(0.020)
0.085**
(0.032)
0.002
(0.018)
N 10,314 10,314 10,227 10,314 10,313 9,548
R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12
Financial Development
Synchronization Measure I: 2nd quartile 
0.028*** 0.031*** 0.020*** 0.066*** 
(0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
0.116***
(0.025)
0.048**
(0.015)
N 36,074 36,074 35,814 36,074 36,074 31,559
R2 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
Financial Development 0.027*
(0.013)
Synchronization Measure I: 3 rd quartile
0.031*** 0.023*** 0.066*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
0.124***
(0.034)
0.055**
(0.018)
N 18,705 18,705 18,589 18,705 18,704 16,002
R2 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Financial Development 0.031**
(0.012)
Synchronization Measure 1: 4lh quartile
0.038*** 0.025*** 0.085*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
0.120***
(0.036)
0.041*
(0.021)
N 35,442 35,442 35,241 35,442 35,442 29,757
R2 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
Note: The dependent variable is the annual firm-level value added growth rate of manufacturing firms in the period 1995- 
2003. The top panel reports estimates based on subsamples of firms from industries assigned to groups (Low-, Medium-, 
and High-synchronization) based on p-values of year factor in ANOVAs of industry growth; see Table 4. In the bottom 
panel, we divide industries into four groups based on quartiles of the Synchomization Measure I from Table 4 and we 
estimate the finance-growth relationship for each group separately. All specifications are linear regressions with outliers 
removed (observations outside 5-to-95 percentile range of the dependent variable), include a constant and 3-digit ISIC 
industry-year dummies. See Table 3 notes for most definitions of variables. *, **, and *** denote coefficients significant at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, based on robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
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Tab. 1.6: Financial Development and Corporate Growth: Synchronized Industries
Private Bank 
Credit
Market
Capitalization
Total
Capitalization
Market Value 
Traded
Accounting
Standards
Control
Premium
Financial Development 0.027**
Basic Estimates 
0.034*** 0.022*** 0.072*** 0.119*** 0.045**
(0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.028) (0.017)
N 94,292 94,292 93,692 94,292 94,290 80,970
R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Financial Development 0.132**
Time Interaction 
0.147*** 0.076*** 0.296*** 0.434** 0.173**
(0.051) (0.008) (0.022) (0.019) (0.167) (0.072)
Financial Development * Time -0.021** -0.025*** -0.012** -0.049*** -0.065* -0.028*
(0.009) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.032) (0.012)
N 94,292 94,292 93,692 94,292 94,290 80,970
R2 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16
Robustness to Controlling for Predicted Country Value-Added Growth Implied by Initial Industry Structure
Financial Development 0.122** 0.144*** 0.073*** 0.288*** 0.419** 0.165**
(0.050) (0.009) (0.022) (0.020) (0.166) (0.066)
Financial Development * Time -0.022** -0.025*** -0.012** -0.049*** -0.066* -0.028**
(0.009) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.032) (0.012)
Predicted Growth 5.326* 4.802*** 4.013** 4.576** 2.559 6.480*
(2.836) (1.555) (1.567) (1.542) (1.852) (3.258)
N 94,292 94,292 93,692 94,292 94,290 80,970
R2 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16
Robustness to Controlling for OECD Prediction of Country GDP Growth
Financial Development 0.137** 0.147*** 0.076*** 0.293*** 0.433** 0.181**
(0.056) (0.009) (0.023) (0.020) (0.171) (0.074)
Financial Development * Time -0.021** -0.025*** -0.012** -0.049*** -0.065* -0.028*
(0.009) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.032) (0.013)
Predicted Growth -0.320 0.606** 0.015 0.455* 0.025 -0.962
(0.458) (0.250) (0.322) (0.236) (0.283) (1.262)
N 94,290 94,290 93,692 94,290 94,290 80,970
R2 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16
Note: The estimation is based on data from which we exluded the low-synchronization group of the top panel of Table 5. The 
dependent variable is the annual firm-level value added growth rate of manufacturing firms in the period 1995-2003. We measure 
country growth opportunities (predicted growth) by either (i) the averageof the realized 1995-2003 EU-15 industry-level growth 
rates weighted by the initial shares of value added of these industries in a given country or (ii) the country-specific GDP growth 
rate predicted in 1994 by OECD for the 1997-2000 period. All specifications are linear regressions with outliers removed 
(observations outside 5-to-95 percentile range of the dependent variable), include a constant and 3-digit ISIC industry-year 
dummies. See Table 3 notes for most definitions of variables. *, **, and *** denote coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively, based on robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
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Tab. 1.7: Financial Development and Corporate Growth: Sensitivity Analysis with Synr 
chronized Industries
Private Bank 
Credit
Market
Capitalization
Total Market Value 
Capitalization Traded
Accounting
Standards
Control
Premium
Financial Development 
Financial Development * Time
0.122**
-0.022**
Basic Estimates 
0.144*** 0.073***  
-0.025*** -0.012**
0.288***
-0.049***
0.419**
-0.066*
0.165**
-0.028**
N 94,292 94,292 93,692 94,292 94,290 80,970
R2 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16
Financial Development 
Financial Development * Time
Small Firms (Below Industry Median Firm Size)
0.132** 0.152*** 0.072** 0.325***  
-0.023** -0.026*** -0.011** -0.051***
0.421**
-0.070**
0.147*
-0.029**
N 47,658 47,658 47,392 47,658 47,657 39,912
R2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17
Financial Development 
Financial Development * Time
B ig Firms (Above Industry Median Firm Size)
0.107** 0.135*** 0.068*** 0.259***  
-0.021** -0.024* ♦♦ -0.012*** -0.047***
0.388**
-0.066*
0.140**
-0.028**
N 46,348 46,348 46,020 46,348 46,347 40,824
R2 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16
Financial Development 
Financial Development * Time
Robustness to Removing United Kingdom  
0.041* 0.054 0.010  
-0.008* -0.012 -0.001
0.104
-0.021
0.139*
-0.015
0.080***
-0.013**
N 81,573 81,573 80,973 81,573 81,571 68,251
R2 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
Financial Development 
Financial Development * Time
0.141**  
-0.025* ♦
Robustness to Removing Greece 
0.144*** 0.081***  
-0.025* ♦♦ -0.014***
0.288***
-0.049***
0.435**
-0.069*
0.165**
-0.028**
N 89,830 89,830 89,230 89,830 89,828 80,970
R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Financial Development 
Financial Development * Time
0.123**
-0.022**
Long-sample 
0.143*** 0.073***  
-0.025*** -0.012**
0.289***
-0.049***
0.445**
-0.069**
0.163**
-0.028**
N 91,153 91,153 91,126 91,153 91,153 77,948
R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Financial Development 
Financial Development * Time
0.121**
-0.022**
Negative-value-added-sample 
0.144*** 0.073*** 
-0.025*** -0.012**
0.288***
-0.049***
0.420**
-0.066*
0.164** 
-0.028* ♦
N 94,259 94,259 93,659 94,259 94,257 80,939
R2 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16
Financial Development 
Financial Development * Time
Rem oving Leverage as a  Control Variable 
0.121** 0.150*** 0.076***  
-0.022** -0.025*** -0.012**
0.298***
-0.049***
0.427* ♦ 
-0.067*
0.168**
-0.028**
N 94,292 94,292 93,692 94,292 94,290 80,970
R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Note: The estimation is based on data from which we exluded the low-synchronization group o f  the top panel o f  Table 5. All 
specifications control for predicted value-added country growth based on initial industry structure as in panel three o f  Table 6. 
‘Basic Estimates’ repeats the third panel o f  Table 6. We then re-estimate the coefficients for subsamples o f  firms defined based 
on size: firms smaller/bigger than the industry median firm size on a 3-digit ISIC level. ‘Robustness to Removing United 
Kingdom’ and ‘Robustness to Removing Greece’ panels report the coefficients when the UK or Greece, respectively, are 
removed from the sample o f  countries. The ‘Long-sample’ panel restricts the sample to firms with at least four years o f  value- 
added data. The ‘Negative-value-added-sample’ panel excludes those value-added growth observations where at least one o f  the 
two underlying levels o f  value added were negative. ‘Removing Leverage as a Control Variable’ excludes leverage as a control 
variable from the regressions.
A ll specifications are linear regressions with outliers removed (observations outside 5-to-95 percentile range o f  the dependent 
variable), include a constant and 3-digit ISIC industry-year dummies. See Table 3 notes for most definitions o f  variables. *, **, 
and *♦* denote coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, based on robust standard errors clustered at 
the country level.
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Tab. 1.8: Financial Development and Corporate Growth: Median Regressions for Synchro­
nized Industries
Private Bank 
Credit
Market
Capitalization
Total
Capitalization
Market Value 
Traded
Accounting
Standards
Control
Premium
Financial Development 0.033
Basic Estimates 
0.039 0.025 0.086* 0.134*** 0.045
(0.020) (0.027) (0.015) (0.047) (0.041) (0.080)
N 104,469 104,469 103,821 104,469 104,467 89,835
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Financial Development 0.144*
Time Interaction 
0.175** 0.084* 0.352** 0.494** 0.177
(0.073) (0.083) (0.047) (0.163) (0.215) (0.124)
Financial Development * Time -0.022* -0.029* -0.013 -0.057** -0.074* -0.028
(0.012) (0.015) (0.008) (0.025) (0.040) (0.024)
N 104,469 104,469 103,821 104,469 104,467 89,835
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07
Robustness to Controlling for Predicted Country Value-Added Growth Implied by Initial Industry Structure
Financial Development 0.134* 0.170* 0.081* 0.340** 0.479** 0.172
(0.078) (0.087) (0.047) (0.140) (0.226) (0.365)
Financial Development * Time -0.023* -0.029** -0.013 -0.057*** -0.075* -0.029
(0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.020) (0.043) (0.055)
Predicted Growth 5.221 5.152 3.650 4.882 2.602 6.767
(7.413) (7.641) (4.874) (5.982) (6.543) (9.799)
N 104,469 104,469 103,821 104,469 104,467 89,835
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07
Robustness to Controlling for OECD Prediction of Country GDP Growth
Financial Development 0.147* 0.173** 0.083* 0.346** 0.484** 0.184
(0.077) (0.070) (0.047) (0.146) (0.227) (0.380)
Financial Development * Time -0.022* -0.029** -0.013 -0.057** -0.073* -0.028
(0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.023) (0.040) (0.061)
Predicted Growth -0.158 0.830 0.240 0.685 0.236 -0.921
(1.191) (1.170) (1.246)' (1.481) (1.086) (2.791)
N 104,467 104,467 103,821 104,467 104,467 89,835
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07
Note: The data and equation specification are the same as in Table 6. All specifications are median regressions. In all panels we 
include the value-added-growthoutliers, which were not used in the previous tables (i.e., observations outside 5-to-95 percentile 
range of the dependent variable). See Table 3 notes for a list of all control variables and the Data Appendix for definitions of 
variables. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level based on bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the 
country level.
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VA
VAGrowth
VAShortPanel
VANegative
Age
Size
Leverage
Tangibility
Collateralization
Quoted
Private Limited Company
Private Bank Credit
Market Capitalization 
Market Value Traded 
Total Capitalization
Accounting Standards 
Control Premium
VAJSIC2
VA_ISIC2_ Growth 
VA_ISIC2_Share 
VA_Predicted_ Growth
GDP_Predi cted_Growth
Tab. l.DA.l: Definition of Variables
Amadeus Firm-level Variables 
Firm-level value added in current prices deflated by PPI. As PPI we use Eurostat’s not 
seasonally adjusted domestic output price index (in national currency) which covers total 
industry (excluding construction). Source: Amadeus.
Annual firm-level growth rate o f real value added based on VA. The formula for VA_Growth 
we use is (VA, -  VA,_|) / ABSO/2  VA, + Vi VA,.]). Source: Amadeus.
0/1 variable, equal 1 if less than five years o f value added data are available for a firm and 0 
otherwise. Source: Amadeus.
0/1 variable, equal 1 if the current or one lag value added figure used while calculating annual 
firm growth (VA Growth) was negative and 0 otherwise. Source: Amadeus.
The number of years since firm’s incorporation (STATDATE - YEARINC) scaled down by 
100. It is calculated as of 1995 and remains fixed over time. Source: Amadeus.
The percentage deviation of firm’s total assets (TOAS) from the industry median firm size on 3- 
digit ISIC level, scaled down by 10,000. It is calculated as o f the first year a firm enters the 
sample and remains fixed over time. Source: Amadeus.
Measured as a long term debt (LTDB) plus current liabilities (CULI) divided by total assets 
(TOAS). It is calculated as of the first year a firm enters the sample and remains fixed over 
time. Source: Amadeus.
Tangibility is measured as fixed assets (FIAS) divided by total assets (TOAS). It is calculated 
as of the first year a firm enters the sample and remains fixed over time. Source: Amadeus. 
Collateralization is defined as fixed assets (FIAS) plus inventories (STOK) plus accounts 
receivables (DEBT sic) divided by total assets (TOAS). It is measured as o f the first year a firm 
enters the sample and remains fixed over time. Source: Amadeus.
0/1 variable, equal 1 if the firm is publicly listed company and 0 otherwise. Source: Amadeus. 
0/1 variable, equal 1 if the firm is ‘Limited Liability Company’ (Company whose capital is 
divided into shares which cannot be offered to the general public. The liability o f its members is 
limited to the amount o f their shares.) and 0 i f  the firm is ‘Limited Company’. (Company whose 
capital is divided into shares which can be offered to the general public and whose members are 
only liable for its debts to the extent of any amount unpaid on their shares.) Source: Amadeus.
Financial Development Country-level Variables 
Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP. Average over the 
period 1990-1994. Source: The Word Bank Financial Structure and Economic Development 
Database.
Stock market capitalization to GDP. Average over the period 1990-1994. Source: The Word 
Bank Financial Structure and Economic Development Database.
Stock market total value traded to GDP. Average over the period 1990-1994. Source: The 
Word Bank Financial Structure and Economic Development Database.
The sum of (i) stock market capitalisation, (ii) bank credit to the private sector and (iii) 
domestic debt securities issued by the private sector to GDP. Average over the period 1990- 
1994. Source: Hartmann et al. (2006), Chart 1.
Index created by examining and rating companies’ 1990 annual reports on their inclusion or 
omission of 90 items in balance sheets and income statements and published by the Center for 
International Financial Analysis & Research, Inc. The maximum is 90, the minimum 0 and we 
scaled it down by 100. Source: The Center for International Financial Analysis & Research.
The control premium corresponding to 1990-2000 estimates by Dyck and Zingales (2004). We 
take the estimated country fixed effects from their Table III, column (1), and use the value of 
0.383 minus the country-level premium, where 0.383 is the maximum premium level in the 
sample corresponding to Austria.
OECD STAN Industry-level Variables 
Value added by industry (ISIC 2-digit level) and country in current prices and local currency 
deflated by country-level PPI. As PPI we use Eurostat’s not seasonally adjusted domestic 
output price index (in national currency) which covers total industry (excluding construction). 
Source: OECD STAN.
Growth rate o f real value added by industry (ISIC 2-digit level) and country. We first take 
annual growth rates (VA ISIC2, -  VA_ISIC2M) / VA_ISIC2,.] and then compute a 
compounded average of these annual growth rates. Source: OECD STAN.
Share o f real industry value added (VA ISIC2) on the total value added of a country. We use 
average over 1990-1994. Source: OECD STAN.
Country Growth Predictions 
Predicted future country growth of value added. We compute the time-averages o f EU-15 
realized growth of manufacturing industries (ISIC 2-digit level) during 1995-2002 (VA_ISIC2_ 
Growth) and weight these growth rates by the initial-period country-level shares (average over 
1990-1994) o f each industry (VA_ISIC2_Share).
The average GDP growth rate for the period 1997 to 2000 predicted as o f 1994. Source: Table 
15 of the OECD Economic Outlook No. 56. December 1994. OECD. Paris._________________
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Tab. 1.DA.2: Legal Forms in the EU-15
Country Limited Companies Limited Liability Companies
Austria /  Germany Aktiengesellschaft (AG, AG & Co KG) Gesellschaft mit beschraekter Haftung (GmbH, GmbH 
& Co KG, Einzelfirma)
Belgium Naamloze Vennootschap (NV), Socidtd Anonyme Besloten Vennootschap, (E)BVBA; Socidtd Privde a
(SA) Responsabilitd Limite, SPRL(U)
Denmark Limited Company, Company with Limited Liability 
(A/S)
Private Limited Company (ApS)
Finland OsakeyhtiO a julkinen (OYJ) OsakeyhtiO (OY)
France Socidtd Anonyme (SA) Socidtd a Responsabilitd Limite (SARL)
Greece SA Limited liability company (EPE), Sole shareholder 
limited liability company
Italy Societa Per Azioni (SPA) Societa a Responsabilita Limitata (SRL, SCARL)
Netherlands Naamloze Vennootschap (NV) Besloten Vennootschap (BV)
Portugal Sociedade An6nima (SA) Sociedade por Quotas Responsibilidada Limitada 
(LDA)
Spain Sociedad An6nima (SA) Sociedad Limitada (SL)
Sweden AB - Public Limited AB - Private Limited
United Kingdom Guarantee; Public, A.I.M.; Public, investment trust; 
Public, not quoted; Public, quoted; Unlimited
Private
Note: In order to ensure comparability o f sampled firms across countries, we include only companies from the two broad categories: 
Limited Companies (companies whose capital is divided into shares which can be offered to the general public and whose members 
are only liable for its debts to the extent o f any amount unpaid on their shares) and Limited Liability Companies (companies whose 
capital is divided into shares which cannot be offered to the general public. The liability o f its members is limited to the amount of 
their shares). We exclude partnerships (at least one partner is liable for the firm's debts), sole proprietorships (there is only one 
shareholder), and cooperatives. We follow Bureau van Dijk’s grouping o f the firms’ types. See Klapper et al. (2006) for a similar 
approach.
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2. WHICH FIRMS BENEFIT MORE FROM FINANCIAL
DEVELOPMENT?
(joint with Stepan Jurajda)
2.1 Introduction
There is growing interest in the differential effect of financial development on firms 
of different age and size as well as on firm entry (Guiso et al., 2004a; Beck et al., 
2004). This literature applies the Rajan and Zingales (1998) identification strategy 
to estimate the effect of country-level financial development across industries with 
different predicted need for external finance and asks whether this effect differs across 
firms of different size. Recently, this line of research also focuses on the effect of 
financial development on firm entry (by firm size) and on the impact on post-entry 
growth of surviving entrants (Klapper et al., 2006; Aghion et al., 2007).
Specifically, Guiso et al. (2004a) use the Amadeus database of European firms 
to compare the Rajan-Zingales firm-growth effects for companies above and below 
400 employees and find somewhat larger impacts of financial development on smaller 
firms. Beck et al. (2004) focus on an industry’s share of firms with fewer than 20 
employees and suggest that financial development is particularly helpful in support­
ing growth of small firms in both developed and developing countries. Klapper et 
al. (2006) use the Amadeus data to study the effect of a country’s business environ­
ment and institutions on entry of new firms. They find that firm entry is higher in 
industries predicted to be in more need of external finance in countries that have a 
higher level of financial development. Klapper et al. (2006) also suggest, similar to
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other existing studies, that entrants are on average larger in countries with a lower 
level of financial development. Finally, Aghion et al. (2007) study a database of 
firm entry and growth rates by industry and size group across 16 industrialized and 
emerging economies. They find that financial development boosts entry of small 
firms in industries predicted to be more dependent on external finance. They also 
find a positive effect on post-entry growth of surviving entrants six years after entry.
In this paper, we study the post-entry growth of recent entrants and compare 
their experience with that of the incumbents—a strategy advocated by Aghion et 
al. (2007, p.764), although not feasible in their study due to data limitations. Sim­
ilar to Guiso et al. (2004a) and Klapper et al. (2006), we use the Amadeus data 
(described in Section 2.4) and study European companies. However, we depart from 
this literature in that we do not apply the Raj an and Zingales (1998) identification 
strategy, although we do use the method of difference-in-differences on which their 
approach is based.
The Raj an and Zingales (1998) strategy was developed to avoid the fundamental 
identification problem of measuring the effect of finance on growth, which would call 
for isolating the part of the variation in financial development that is unrelated to 
unobservable current and future growth opportunities.1 Raj an and Zingales assume 
that different industries have a different, technologically determined need for external 
finance. They form a proxy for this need based on several assumptions and regress 
industry growth from a sample of countries on country and industry fixed effects as 
well as on the interaction between a proxy of industry external finance dependence
1 Few studies are able to solve this identification problem. Finding a valid instrument for country- 
level financial development is difficult, as is securing large enough samples in order to avoid small- 
sample biases of instrumental variable estimators. Guiso et al. (2004b) solve the identification 
problem by looking within a country and focusing on historically predetermined variation in local 
financial development. They suggest that small firms grow faster in regions of Italy that feature 
more developed credit markets, which is consistent with small firms being more constrained than 
large firms in their operation and growth through access to external finance. Theirs is an important 
finding, but it addresses only within-country differences in financial development.
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and a measure for country financial development. Their regressions suggest that 
industries predicted to be in greater need of external finance grow faster in countries 
with more developed financial markets, conditional on all (potentially unobservable) 
country- and industry-specific factors driving growth.
However, their quantification of external finance need is based on the assump­
tion that cross-industry differences in the need for external finance are the same 
across countries; this in turn requires that industry technology as well as shocks 
to growth opportunities, which drive the need for production expansion and use of 
external finance, are not country-specific, but global. Thus, their method may not 
be applicable when industry growth opportunities differ or when there is significant 
technology heterogeneity across countries (Schott, 2003).
In this paper, we therefore develop an alternative approach stemming from the 
motivation for studying firms of different size and age that spurred the empirical 
literature described above. Finance theory surveyed in Levine (1997) contends that 
financial development can foster corporate growth because financial intermediaries 
play a key role in overcoming market frictions due to moral hazard and asymmetric 
information. These frictions give rise to financial constraints and represent a funda­
mental source of external finance costs, which ought to be lowered through financial 
development. Efficient financial institutions provide external finance even to infor­
mationally opaque businesses, tha t is to firms with little information available on 
their economic and financial status.
There is much survey evidence suggesting that small and young firms from both 
developed and developing countries are constrained in their access to external fi­
nance. (We discuss this literature in Section 2.2, where we also argue that evidence 
based on non-subjective data is needed to complement the survey-based findings.) 
Applying the logic of finance theory, it is therefore likely that company size or age 
serve as effective proxies for the extent of market frictions, particularly the extent of
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information asymmetries, that firms face.2 If small and young firms are on average 
more financially constrained than larger and older companies, they should benefit 
disproportionately from the development of financial institutions and markets. In 
this study, we test this notion by asking whether differences in financial develop­
ment across EU-15 economies affect growth rates of firms differently for young and 
old firms as well as for firms of different size. Specifically, we measure the growth 
effect of the interaction between a firm’s age (size) and a country’s level of financial 
development.
This approach helps to uncover the mechanism of the finance-growth effect in a 
novel way. In the Raj an-Zingales framework, the mechanism is based on external 
sources of finance being more costly than internal ones. Hence, lowering the overall 
costs of external finance benefits disproportionately those firms that face higher 
need of external finance (for industry-specific, presumably technological reasons). In 
contrast, in our study the mechanism consists of lowering the relative costs of external 
finance for businesses that are more informationally opaque because of their size or 
age. Our mechanism is therefore closely tied to the underlying fundamental source 
of external finance costs: information asymmetry. It corresponds to the screening 
and evaluation process performed by financial intermediaries deciding upon granting 
external finance.
Relying on a large firm-level data set covering EU-15 firms with more than 100 
employees or more than 20 million Euro of total assets between 1995 and 2003, 
the Amadeus database, we regress firms’ average value-added growth rates on an 
interaction of firms’ size or age with several dimensions of country-level financial
2 Young firms are affected by information asymmetry because they have short history. The reason 
why size is related to information asymmetry could be that the costs for financial intermediaries of 
evaluating a request for external financing by a small company may exceed the benefits. It is not 
clear how the extent of moral hazard varies with firm size; see Martin and Sayrak (2003) for a recent 
survey. The banking literature usually relates opaqueness to firm age and size; recent examples axe 
Berger et al. (2001) and Berger et al. (2002).
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infrastructure. We hesitate to use a linear specification of the interaction of financial 
development indicators with firm size and age because it is not clear that information 
asymmetry decreases proportionately with firms’ age or size and because we wish to 
impose few functional form restrictions. Hence, we interact financial development 
with indicators of a firms’ position in quintiles of the firm size or age distribution.3 
Our regressions further condition on a set of firm-level pre-determined controls and 
a full set of country and industry dummies. We therefore ask whether, for example, 
Greek financial institutions differ significantly from those of the UK in their ability 
to overcome information asymmetry (identify profitable projects) of young and/or 
small companies relative to their ability to provide external finance for projects of 
older and/or larger companies.
We find little significant difference in the effect of financial development between 
medium-sized and large firms in our data. On the other hand, using the oldest 
companies as the benchmark group, there is strong evidence of a disproportionate 
positive effect of financial development on all except perhaps the youngest firms. 
Specifically, we recover an inverted-U shape of the interaction between age and fi­
nancial development, such that firms of approximately median age appear to benefit 
the most from financial development. Next, we explore several explanations for the 
age shape of the financial-development growth effect. Our key explanation is that 
freshly incorporated companies in less financially developed countries adjust to the 
state of financial systems by having unusually high shares of equity capital in total 
assets. In other words, in less financially developed environments the entry process 
is selective such that among potential startups only those endowed with high equity 
capital shares do enter. These entrants therefore do not need as much external fi­
nance in early stages of company existence, which helps to explain why, in our basic
3 Similar to the approach of Beck et al. (2004) or Rajan and Zingales (1998), ours is therefore a 
group-level interaction approach. However, our groups are formed based on firm-level information 
(firm size or age), whilst the Raj an-Zingales literature relies on interactions based on group-level 
(industry) average characteristics.
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specifications, very young firms appear to benefit less from financial development. 
Indeed, we find that among those youngest companies that have low shares of equity 
capital in total assets, there is a strong disproportionate effect of financial develop­
ment. We conclude that financial development fosters growth of young companies 
even within a set of some of the most developed countries of the world.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In the next section we relate our ap­
proach to the existing literature. Section 3 presents our methodology while Section 4 
describes the data. Section 5 covers the empirical analysis and Section 6 summarizes 
the findings.
2.2 Relationship to the Existing Literature
In firm surveys, small and young companies in both the developed and developing 
world report having less access to external finance than larger and older companies.4 
Survey responses are also used to ask about the effect of financing obstacles on firm 
growth. For example, Beck et al. (2005) suggest that the effect that the difference in 
financial development across a wide set of both developed and developing countries 
has on a firms’ growth is strongest for the smallest companies. It is widely held that 
the main reason why small and young firms report lower access to external financ­
ing and benefit disproportionately from financial development is their information 
opaqueness. Firm survey evidence is thus consistent with the notion that financial 
development reduces the negative effects of information asymmetry and offers an ef­
fective way of promoting small firm growth—an important conclusion from a policy 
standpoint.5
4 Age and size explain a large share of the variation in firms’ self-reported financing obstacles in 
the World Business Environment Survey, which covers much of the developing world (Beck et al., 
2006). Similarly, the presence of financial constraints is negatively related to firm age in the survey 
of Italian firms studied by Angelini and Generale (2005).
5 See also Bergell and Udell (1998) for an early discussion of small-firm finance and Beck and 
Demirgug-Kunt (2006) for a recent survey of this topic.
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Yet, it is imperative that these conclusions based on firms’ subjective assessments 
are compared to those reached with non-subjective data. For example, it is not clear 
that firms of different age compare their unsatisfied need for external finance against 
the same benchmark; it could be that such firms differ in their ability to evaluate 
the potential gains from using additional external finance.6 Further, the estimation 
of growth consequences of self-assessed financial constraints is plagued by potential 
reverse causality problems if firms that fail to grow (and remain small) because of 
internal problems tend to blame financial intermediaries for failing to provide external 
finance.
Unfortunately, it is fundamentally difficult to form a valid firm-level indicator of 
financial constraints. These constraints are difficult to measure because they arise 
from the interaction of the quality of a financial system, a firm’s inherently unob­
servable growth opportunity, and financing-related firm-level indicators, which firms 
can adjust based on expected financing needs.7 On the other hand, it is possible to 
compare the growth experience of firm types that are likely to differ in how sensi­
tive they are to the efficiency of financial systems across different levels of financial 
development. Such difference-in-differences strategy is at the core of the Raj an and 
Zingales (1998) approach, where the firm types correspond to industries with differ­
ent external finance need. In our study, the firm types correspond to age and size 
groups that likely face different degrees of information asymmetry. Each strategy 
helps to uncover a different finance-growth mechanism, as discussed in the Introduc­
tion. Our estimates are therefore not directly comparable to those in the existing 
literature estimating the Rajan-Zingales mechanism, including, e.g., Aghion et al.
6 Along similar lines, investment-cash flow sensitivities could be higher for smaller and/or younger 
firms in comparison to larger and more mature firms because (i) financial constraints are more 
binding for small and young firms or (ii) such firms learn from their cash flow about their uncertain 
growth prospect.
7 Hajivassiliou and Savignac (2007) illustrate the endogeneity of traditional firm proxies for 
financing constraints based on firm wealth or accumulated profits.
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(2007) or Guiso et al. (2004a).8
On the other hand, one can compare the focus of the existing studies to ours. We 
study the differences in the effect of financial development across firms of different size 
and age combinations. The only study focusing on the effect of financial development 
on young firms is Aghion et al. (2007) who use the Raj an-Zingales methodology 
to estimate the effect on growth of surviving entrants after three to seven years 
of company existence. In our study, we follow the growth experience of surviving 
entrants at all age levels and contrast it with that of the incumbents (i.e., older 
companies).
A key study in the literature differentiating the finance-growth effects by firm 
size is Beck et al. (2004). They use cross-industry, cross-country data from 44 
countries and 36 manufacturing industries and focus on the interaction between 
financial development indicators and US industries’ share of employment by firms 
with less than 20 employees. They employ industry-induced variation in firm size, 
as such variation is likely to be related to industry technology differences and not 
to firm-specific unobservables,9 and find that industries with a higher share of very 
small firms in the US grow faster when served by more developed financial systems.
Although we also compare the growth experience of firms of different size across 
countries at different levels of financial development, our findings are not comparable 
to those of Beck et al. (2004) for three reasons. First, they focus on very small firms 
(with less than 20 employees) in developing countries, while we study firms with at 
least 100 employees or more than 20 million Euro of total assets (see Section 2.4 for 
data description) in some of the most developed countries.
8 One would like to combine both strategies and differentiate firms by both their industry level 
of external finance dependence and their degree of information asymmetry approximated by age 
or size. An ideal approach would work with age- and size-specific estim ates of external finance 
dependence. We leave such estimation for future research.
9 Their use of industry-level data is no doubt also the consequence of the lack of reliable firm-level 
data for the wide set of countries they analyze.
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Second, they rely on industry-level indicators of firm size while we work with firm- 
level size directly. Their use of industry data may not be innocuous to the estimation 
of the size-related differences in the growth effect of financial development. Beck et 
al. (2004) choose to concentrate on an industry’s share of very small firms. They 
therefore do not explore the size shape of the finance-growth relationship and effec­
tively assume that the same specific size threshold (having 20 employees) explains 
the severity of size-related market frictions in all industries. Further, the existence 
of substantial dispersion of firm size within industries implies that their industry 
growth-rate averages are based on firms of all sizes. Even two industries that exhibit 
a similar share of very small companies do not necessarily share a similar firm size 
distribution. In other words, any strategy that uses an industry indicator for firm 
size implies size miss-classification for a significant share of firms, which ultimately 
underlie industry-level growth rates. In contrast, our use of firm-level measures of 
size and growth improves precision and allows us to trace out the finance-growth 
effect differences across firms of different size. Using firm-level data also allows us 
to compare estimates based on different sources of size variation: within- as well as 
across-industry.10
Third, a potential problem with the Beck et al. (2004) approach is that it is 
not clear that countries at widely different levels of economic development, such as 
those included in their sample of 44 economies, will share similar size structure of 
their industries in absence of differences in financial development—an assumption 
invoked in their approach.11 In this study, we compare the growth experience of 
firms across a set of highly comparable economies. We analyze firms operating in 
the EU-15 ‘single market’ under harmonized product market regulation. The high
10 Across-industry variation in size is likely to be driven by technology and hence unrelated to firm 
unobservables. We therefore test for the importance of using across- as opposed to within-industry 
size variation. It is less clear that industry differences in age are driven by technology.
11 The evidence on similarity of industry firm size across countries is based on the most developed 
economies (e.g., Kumar et al., 1999).
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degree of similarity of the analyzed firms in terms of both growth opportunities and 
technology contrasts with much of the existing finance-growth literature. It assists 
in correctly measuring the finance-growth relationship. For example, using industry 
fixed effects to control for common industry growth shocks is highly realistic within 
the EU-15 group.12 Fortunately for our empirical exercise, significant differences 
persisted in financial system development across the EU-15 economies at the time 
of the start of the ‘single market’, despite extensive product market integration, as 
documented by, e.g., Guiso et al. (2004a) or Allen et al. (2006).
2.3 M ethodology
Our goal is to investigate differences in the effect of financial development on corpo­
rate growth across firms of different age or size. Applying the difference-in-differences 
framework, we ask about these differences using linear regressions of average firm 
value-added growth rates on (i) a set of firm-level control variables including age and 
size, (ii) country and industry fixed effects, and (iii) the interaction of a country’s 
level of financial development with selected firm-level characteristics: age and/or 
size. In line with the existing literature, we therefore control for all observable as 
well as unobservable industry- and country-level determinants of growth.
We view the establishment of the EU ‘single market’, which harmonized product 
market regulation, as an opportunity to compare the growth performance of firms 
that increasingly face similar growth opportunities—those of the harmonized EU-15- 
wide market. Investment that would allow firms to benefit from these opportunities 
is likely to take place in the early stages of the ‘single market’ formation. Hence, 
our indicators of financial development are measured as of the beginning of the
12 For recent evidence on EU business cycle synchronization see Camacho, et al. (2005). In Bena 
and Jurajda (2007), we confirm the presence of ‘synchronized’ EU-15 growth patterns at industry 
level.
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‘single market’ in 1993.13 Similarly, our firm-level controls are measured as close to 
this benchmark as possible—as of the beginning of the firm data. Put simply, we 
control for the starting position of firms entering the ‘single market’ and measure 
the difference that initial financial development makes for their growth.
A basic regression specification, which asks whether firms of different age or size 
grow at different rates across financial systems of differential depth, is of the following 
form:
G i j k  =  ol +  ( F D i  * Z i j k ) + Z i j k r j  +  t * +  5 j  +  X ^ ^  +  (2 .1)
where G^k denotes the time-averaged growth rate of the real value added of firm 
k in industry j  in country i, and where FDi corresponds to a measure of country 
financial development. The variable Z^k represents firm size (age) and is entered 
as both a base effect and in the financial-development interaction. Country and 
industry dummies are denoted as 7i and Sj, respectively, and we also condition on 
a set of firm-specific initial-period characteristics Xijk including firm age (size), firm 
financial indicators such as leverage, tangibility and collateralization, as well as an 
indicator for quoted companies and a set of indicators for company concentration of 
ownership and legal form.
However, Equation (2.1) implicitly assumes that the degree of information asym­
metry varies proportionately with firms’ age or size, which may be a restrictive 
assumption. In order to impose as little structure as possible on the key interaction 
relationship of our regressions, we therefore use a semi-parametric specification that 
interacts a country’s level of financial development with a step-function in firm’s age 
or size. More specifically, we interact FDi with a set of indicators for the firm’s 
position in one of the quintiles or deciles of the age or size distribution, measured
13 We investigate the sensitivity to the timing of the measurement of financial development in 
Section 2.5.2.
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again as of the beginning of our data:
Gijk = ol-\- (3V (FD{ * hjkv) +  Vv +  l i  +  5j +  -X^ -fc£ +  e ^ ,  (2-2)
v —1
where the set of binary indicator variables 7 ^  denotes the position of a firm in 
one of the quintiles (deciles) of the firms’ age or size distribution, depending on the 
question we ask, while the fixed effects r)v capture the average growth rate of firms 
of the corresponding size or age group.
2.4 D ata
We work with data from a set of countries where industries face highly synchronized 
shocks and share a highly similar technology content of industrial classification—the 
countries of the EU’s ‘single market’—during the 1995-2003 period, which covers 
the first years of the market’s operation before its extension to post-communist 
countries. Firm-level financial statements and descriptive data, which allow us to 
compare the growth experience of highly similar firms residing in different countries, 
come from the Amadeus database. Country-level measures of financial development 
come primarily from the World Bank. We introduce these data sources in this section 
and complement the description with detailed tables in the Data Appendix.
2.4.1 Firm-Level Data
We use firm-level data from the Amadeus (Analyse MAjor Databases from EUropean 
Sources) database, created by Bureau Van Dijk from standardized commercial data 
collected by about 50 vendors across Europe. Among the key advantages of the 
data from our perspective is that they cover both listed and unlisted firms of a 
wide variety of size and age categories and that they provide corporate descriptive 
statistics including growth together with a detailed source-of-finance accounts. In 
principle, the database should cover most public and private limited companies,14
14 There axe exceptions to the rule. For example, small and medium size German firms are not 
legally forced to disclose (Desai et al., 2003).
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although coverage varies by country and generally improves over time. The firm and 
industry coverage of these data is an order of magnitude better compared to other 
existing firm samples as argued by Gomez-Salvador et al. (2004).
These data have been tapped in the finance-growth literature only recently, by 
Guiso et al. (2004a) to estimate Rajan-Zingales type regressions relying on US mea­
sures of industry external finance dependence, and by Klapper et al. (2006) to study 
firm entry. Our selection of the analysis-ready sample follows the choices made by 
these two studies. Similar to Guiso et al. (2004a), we use the ‘TOP 250 thousand’ 
module of the Amadeus data ,15 which we downloaded in December 2006. Follow­
ing Klapper et al. (2006) we use only unconsolidated statements to avoid double 
counting, and we also exclude all legal forms other than the equivalent of public and 
private limited liability corporations due to the uneven coverage of partnerships, pro­
prietorships and other minor legal forms. Definitions of key variables and a listing 
of the included legal forms of firms by country are provided in the Data Appendix, 
in Tables 2.DA.1 and 2.DA.2, respectively.
The dataset is drawn from EU-15 countries that were part of the European Inter­
nal Market in 1995: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. Simi­
lar to Guiso et al. (2004a), we exclude Luxembourg, because its financial sector is 
statistically anomalous, and we lose Ireland due to missing firm-level information. 
Firm coverage in the Amadeus data is incomplete before 1995 and after 2003 so we 
use only observations from 1995-2003.16 Another reason why we do not use pre-1995
15 Firms selected as TO P 250,000 had to meet at least one of the following inclusion criteria: For 
UK, Germany, France, and Italy operating revenue at least 15 million euros, total assets at least 30 
million euros, or the number of employees at least 150. For all other countries operating revenue 
at least 10 million euros, total assets at least 20 million euros, or the number of employees at least 
100 .
16 Some firms are not present in the data for the whole period. In order to avoid potential 
biases from the combination of differential improvements in firm coverage across countries with 
time-changing aggregate growth rates, we replace the firm-level average growth rates available in
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data is that Finland, Austria and Sweden joined the EU only in that year.
Following Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Guiso et al. (2004a), we focus on 
manufacturing industries (NACE 15 to 37). We exclude firms with missing total 
assets as well as non-active firms. We also omit from the analysis growth observations 
falling outside of the 5-to-95 percentile range of firms’ value added growth rate and 
firms with significant state ownership.17 Since Greek firms do not report value added, 
we used sales as a surrogate for them .18
Table 2.1 shows the final number of firm average value-added growth observations 
used in the study for each country,19 together with simple firm-level descriptive 
statistics corresponding to these observations.20 Next, Appendix Figures 2.A.1 and 
2. A .2 present the EU-15-wide as well as the country-specific distribution of firm age 
and size, respectively. The firm size distribution is skewed, as expected. The firm 
coverage varies across countries; specifically, firm size in Germany is affected by non­
reporting of small firms. Nevertheless, the data provide extensive coverage of most 
of the EU-15 economies and represent the best firm-level EU data source available
the data with residuals from a regression of all observed firm-level annual growth rates on year 
dummies. Further, in order to lower noise in the average growth rates, we rely only on companies 
that report value added for at least 5 years.
17 Specifically, we drop firms in which the state is as an ultimate owner of at least 10 percent of 
shares or a direct owner of at least 10 percent of shares. There is virtually no sensitivity to the 
choice of the percentage threshold.
18 See Guiso et al. (2004) for the use of sales instead of value added. We check for the sensitivity 
of excluding Greece from the analysis in Section 2.5.2.
19 The presence of negative value-added growth rates complicates taking a compounded average. 
The reported growth rates therefore correspond to simple time averages of annual real value-added 
growth rates of the sampled companies taken over the 1995-2003 period.
20 The primary reason why only about 15 thousand firms remains in our data from the TOP 
250 thousand Amadeus module is that more than two-thirds of all firms in Amadeus are from 
non-manufacturing sectors. Our sample is further reduced as we only use companies with limited 
liability legal form that are reported as active and are incorporated in one of the EU15 countries. 
Finally, to enter our sample, a firm has to report the year of incorporation and its total assets have 
to be at least USD 1,000.
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to date.
2.4.2 Financial Development Indicators
Data on financial development are drawn from the World Bank’s Financial Structure 
and Economic Development Database (March 2005 version) described in detail in 
Beck et al. (2000). To make our results comparable with those in the literature we 
use a number of measures of finance activity to proxy financial development. We start 
with the traditional measures of activity in the credit and stock markets, namely the 
ratio of private credit to GDP (PCDMBANKOFINSTGDP) and the ratio of stock 
market capitalization and stock market total value traded to GDP (STMCAPGDP 
and STMTVTGDP, respectively). We also rely on a measure of total country-level 
finance activity equal to the sum of (i) stock market capitalization, (ii) bank credit 
to the private sector and (iii) domestic debt securities issued by the private sector. 
This summary measure (Total Capitalization) is taken from Hartmann et al. (2006) 
and is expressed, again, as a fraction of country-level GDP. All proxies for financial 
development are averaged over the years 1990-1994, that is, as of the establishment 
of the ‘single market’.21
In addition to volume-of-finance-activity measures of financial development, we 
also use a proxy for the institutional quality of financial markets. Specifically, we 
follow Beck et al. (2004) and use an indicator of the ‘quality of accounting standards’ 
(ACCOUNT), produced by International Accounting and Auditing Trends (Center 
for International Financial Analysis Sz Research, Inc.). This indicator rates compa­
nies’ 1990 annual reports on the basis of their inclusion or omission of 90 items in 
the balance sheets and income statements and ranges from 0 to 90.
All five indicators of financial development are summarized across our EU coun­
21 We rely on time averages to avoid year-to-year fluctuations. In Section 2.5.2, we check for the 
sensitivity to using measures of financial development based on a later period.
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tries in Table 2.2.22 It is clear that despite the extensive integration of EU-15 national 
product markets up to 1994, there is still substantial diversity in the degree of finan­
cial development across the EU-15. The coefficient of variation is particularly high 
for our measures of stock-market activity. The bottom panel of Table 2.2 presents 
correlations (with statistical significance levels) among our different measures of fi­
nancial development. The correlations suggest that these measures, although closely 
related, are nevertheless meaningfully different.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Basic Estimates
Our analysis of average firm-level value-added growth rates covering 1995-2003 asks 
about age- and size-related differences in the effect of financial development on cor­
porate growth following the introduction of the EU-15 ‘single market’. We estimate 
linear growth regressions conditioning on country and industry fixed effects, firm- 
specific controls, and the interaction of country financial development with a step 
function in firm size and/or age, as described in Equation (2.2) in Section 2.3. More 
specifically, we use industry dummies based on the 3-digit ISIC classification and rely 
on the following set of firm-level controls: age, size, leverage, tangibility, collateral­
ization, share of equity capital on total assets (equity endowment) and indicators of 
being quoted, legal form type and ownership concentration; these controls are mea­
sured as of the first year a firm enters the sample. We drop firm observations falling 
outside of the 5-to-95 percentile range of value-added growth. The semi-parametric 
step-function interaction specifications are based on quintiles of the age or size distri­
bution and allow for a non-proportional relationship between information asymmetry 
and firm size or age; they define the base (comparison) group as consisting of com­
panies in the top 20% of the size or age distribution. We expect the growth rates of
22 A detailed definition of each measure is provided in the Data Appendix Table 2.DA.1.
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smaller and younger firms to be more sensitive to financial development because of 
information asymmetries.23
The basic set of results is presented in Table 2.3, which lists coefficients of interest: 
both firm age and size quintile base effects and the interactions of these base step 
functions with national financial development indicators. Each column corresponds 
to the choice of a particular indicator of financial development. The base size effect 
(at the bottom of the table), which consists of four size quintile steps, is precisely 
estimated and suggests, as expected, that smaller firms, in terms of total assets, on 
average grow substantially faster than larger companies. The size-growth gradient 
appears to be somewhat convex—the group of smallest companies grows particularly 
fast. Similarly, we recover a downward sloping age-growth gradient as the estimated 
base age step-function coefficients suggest that youngest companies grow on average 
faster than older ones.
The upper half of Table 2.3 presents the interactions with financial development. 
We estimate a decidedly non-linear shape of the age-financial development interac­
tion. The youngest companies in our data appear not to benefit from the development 
of financial systems more than the oldest companies. On the other hand, companies 
located towards the center of the age distribution benefit disproportionately. The 
inverted-U age shape of the financial-development growth effect is remarkably similar 
across our different measures of financial development.24
In contrast to the age interaction with financial development indicators, the inter­
23 One may expect very large and/or old firms to have access to international sources of finance 
and thus be less sensitive to differences in the development of national financial markets, which 
provides additional motivation for the use of the interaction of financial development with a step 
function in size or age. We can alternatively use median-age and median-size firms as the base 
group. Such specification checks whether country unobservables as well as financial development 
levels affect large and old companies differently from those at the median age and size. We have 
compared the main results presented in this paper to those (unreported) ones where we alternatively 
use the near-median firms as the base group. The two batteries of results were fully consistent.
24 This finding is consistent with estimates reported by Aghion et al. (2007, p. 764).
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action of company size (groups) is not significant in Table 2.3, irrespective of the type 
of financial development measure we use. Not only are the interaction coefficients 
statistically insignificant, they are also small, negative and similar in magnitude 
across the company size groups. In short, we detect no size-related differences in the 
growth effect of financial development.
2.5.2 Initial Robustness Checks
To provide initial robustness checks, we estimate several simple variants of the growth 
regressions of Table 2.3. First, we use decile steps in age or size instead of the 
quintile-step specification. Figure 2.1 visually presents both size- and age-financial 
development interactions (graphs on the left), as well as the base size and age effects 
(graphs on the right). The top (bottom) two graphs show parameter estimates corre­
sponding to the size (age) groups. The decile age-finance interactions underscore the 
presence of an inverted-U age shape of the effect of financial development. Similarly, 
the decile specifications confirm the earlier finding of little evidence for the presence 
of a differential growth effect of finance across firms of different size, ceteris paribus.
Second, we estimate the age and size interactions separately. Table 2.3 condi­
tioned on both age and size interactions simultaneously because of the obvious corre­
lation between size and age. In an alternative specification, we re-estimate Equation 
(2.2) with only one of the interactions at a time. Such specification is potentially 
questionable because it is not clear to what extent the age interaction is merely a 
proxy for the size interaction and vice versa. However, we obtain coefficients that 
are near identical to those presented in Table 2.3. (These results are presented in 
Appendix Table 2.A.I.) The finding of no finance-size interaction is therefore robust 
to allowing age-related size differences to help estimate the size interaction, which is 
reassuring. These results also suggest that, in the subsequent analysis, we can focus 
on specifications with only the age-finance interactions.
Third, we replace the semi-parametric step-function interactions with fully para­
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metric specifications. Estimates based on linear (Equation (2.1)) and cubic inter­
actions for either age or size are presented in Appendix Table 2.A.2. The results 
based on linear interactions between financial development and firm size or age are 
confusing and suggestive of misspecification. The coefficient estimates suggest that 
larger firms benefit less from financial development compared to smaller companies, 
but we cannot precisely estimate the underlying base effect of company size on its 
growth, which is disturbing given the well-established negative relationship between 
a firm’s size and its rate of growth.25 The estimates of the linear age interaction coef­
ficients are mostly positive, which contradicts much of the survey evidence discussed 
in Section 2.2. Clearly, these puzzling results are the consequence of forcing the 
interaction relationship to be linear. This is confirmed by the cubic specification es­
timates, which strongly support the presence of an inverted-U age interaction effect, 
and which also show little consistent evidence of significant size-related differences 
in the effect of financial development.
Fourth, a natural extension of our basic approach is to ask about the impor­
tance of the combination of small size and young age for the interplay between 
information asymmetries and financial development. Hence, we also estimate a size- 
age-financial development interaction. We use a relatively parsimonious specification 
of this ‘triple’ interaction in that we allow the quintile age-financial development in­
teraction to be different for companies of below-median and above-median size. As 
before, the base comparison group consists of the oldest companies. The estimates 
(presented in Appendix Table 2.A.3) suggest that a similar inverted-U age-financial 
development interaction is present for both small (below median size) and large 
(above median size) companies. Again, company size appears to play little role.
Fifth, we also use an alternative estimation technique. In Appendix Table 2.A.4, 
we present results based on a median regression. Up to now, we have avoided the
25 For example, Dunne et al. (1989) show that employment growth rates of US manufacturing 
firms decline with both company age and size.
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influence of value-added growth outliers, present in any company-level financial data, 
by symmetrically excluding extreme values of growth rates from our linear ‘mean’ 
regressions. Here, we therefore alternatively employ median regressions, which are 
robust to outliers by design and allow us to use all available growth rate data (that 
is, even observations of average growth rates falling outside the 5-to-95 percentile 
range). The estimated coefficients are quantitatively highly similar to those pre­
sented in Table 2.3. The only cost of using a median regression is that we lose 
statistical significance of the inverted-U interaction parameters in most of the esti­
mated specifications.26 We conclude that our basic results are robust to a battery of 
robustness checks motivated by data-related as well as econometric questions.27
2.5.3 Interpreting the Basic Estimates
Our initial robustness checks confirm both the lack of the size interaction effect and 
the inverted-U shape of the age-related differences in the growth effects of finan­
cial development. The age interaction coefficients in Table 2.3 imply economically 
substantial differences in corporate growth: Moving from the minimum to the max­
imum value of our volume-of-finance-activity measures increases the average annual 
growth rate of a firm of median age (corresponding to the third quintile of the age 
distribution) compared to an otherwise comparable firm of age above the 80th age
26 The clustered standard errors we report are bootstrapped.
27 We have performed several additional robustness checks, in addition to those presented in the 
Appendix, with little effect on the parameters of interest: (i) We replaced industry fixed effects 
with industry-country dummies, (ii) We replaced financial-development indicators averaged over 
1990-1994, i.e., before significant progress in EU financial integration, with those averaged over 
1995-1998, i.e., before the introduction of the common currency in most of the EU-15 economies.
(iii) We excluded Greece, the country for which only sales but no value added data was available.
(iv) We used alternative definitions of the dependent variable: First, we replaced mean value-added 
growth rates with median value-added growth rates. Second, we used sales instead of value added 
to define company growth.
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percentile by about 2 percentage points.28
How can one interpret these findings? First, what is the meaning of no differences 
in the effect of financial development between medium-sized and large firms? Our 
results are consistent with medium-sized firms being small not because of inadequate 
access to external finance, but because of having already reached their optimum size 
or because of internal problems. It could be that important size-related information 
asymmetries arise only for very small firms that do not satisfy our sample inclusion 
criteria, i.e., firms with fewer than 100 employees and less than 20 million Euro of 
total assets. Alternatively, it could be that our results are affected by the use of 
firm-level size measures; we explore this possibility in the next Section.
Second, what could be the underlying process that results in the inverted-U age 
shape of the financial development effect? Taking our estimates at face value, what 
does it mean tha t the highest benefits from financial development are experienced 
by median-aged firms—about 18 years after incorporation? One possibility is that 
the youngest firms are so informationally opaque that they have no access to ex­
ternal finance even in the most developed financial systems. As firms age, they 
gain access to external financing and, as a consequence, get closer to realizing their 
full growth potential. More financially developed systems start providing external 
financing earlier in company life. Such mechanism would result in the inverted-U 
age shape we estimate.29 Alternatively, the inverted-U age shape could correspond
28 For example, when considering the total capitalization interaction coefficient, the 2.6 
percentage-point effect corresponds to comparing a 20 year old firm to a 40 year old company 
across the UK and Greece. The estimated difference in growth effects is about twice as large when 
we replace volume-of-finance-activity measures with our proxy for institutional development— the 
accounting standards index.
29 A theoretical model that would generate this pattern is one in which: (i) corporate growth 
increases with a firm’s external finance use, (ii) the debt capacity of the firm increases as its 
opaqueness decreases, and (iii) more developed financial institutions are more efficient at overcoming 
information asymmetries. The model of Tirole (2006), p. 171, section 4.4, would have most of these 
features if one were to identify the m odel’s distinction between observable and unobservable outside
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to other age-related variables affecting access to external financing, not information 
asymmetry. Below, we therefore ask in more detail what could explain the lack of 
a disproportionate financial-development growth effect for the youngest companies; 
this analysis also helps us to eliminate some of the alternative interpretations of the 
age profile of the finance-growth nexus.
2.5.4 Comparing Within- to Across-industry Size Variation
The size-finance interactions in Table 2.3 axe based on variation in firms’ size that 
is driven by both across-industry technological differences and within-industry firm- 
level size differences. However, using within-industry differences in firm size as a 
source of identification raises an important concern. Companies that do not grow 
because of internal problems, and so remain smaller relative to a typical firm in their 
industry, may not be able to benefit from financial development. In other words, 
to interpret the estimates based on within-industry size variation as corresponding 
to information asymmetry, one assumes that deviations of company size from the 
respective industry mean size are unrelated to firms’ unobservables directly affecting 
growth, but are related to firms’ access to external finance. It is therefore important 
that we compare results based on within-industry size variation to findings based on 
across-industry (technology related) size variation, which is unlikely to be related to 
firm unobservables.
In Table 2.4, we estimate across-industry size interactions similar in spirit to those 
estimated by Beck et al. (2004). Specifically, the top panel of Table 2.4 presents 
a set of linear size-financial development interaction coefficients based on the EU- 
15-wide industry median size measured at the ISIC 3-digit industry level. That is, 
we replace the firm’s size measure with company size typical of the firm’s industry. 
All specifications include country and industry fixed effects and they also condition 
on firm-level controls used in specifications reported in Table 2.3. The estimated
growth opportunity with the distinction between high and low financial development, respectively.
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interaction coefficients of interest are always negative, but never reach conventional 
levels of statistical significance. Even though these regressions employ company- 
level data, they implicitly measure the relationship between industry size (interacted 
with financial development) and industry growth rates. One potential problem with 
this approach is that even unusually small or large firms, relative to the industry 
typical size, are used to estimate the relationship between industry size and industry 
growth rate. To check for the importance of this measurement error, we exclude 
unusually small and unusually large firms, relative to industry typical size, from 
the estimation. These results, which rely only on firms that fall within the 40-60 
percentile industry-specific size range, are presented in the second set of coefficients 
in the top panel of Table 2.4. The estimated parameters suggest that there is little 
relationship between corporate growth rates and the interaction of industry size with 
country financial development.
In the bottom part of Table 2.4, we re-introduce within-industry variation in firm 
size by interacting financial development with firm-specific size. However, we do so 
only for the companies that fall within the 40-60 percentile size range used in the pre­
vious specification.30 Although baaed on firm-specific information (on both size and 
growth), such regressions correspond mainly to across-industry size comparisons. In 
the linear interaction specification, we obtain positive size interaction estimates that 
are, however, very imprecise. When using our basic step-function interaction speci­
fication, we obtain noisy estimates that are qualitatively similar to those presented 
in Table 2.3.
In sum, we find no evidence of a differential effect of financial development on 
firms of different size, irrespective of the type of size variation we employ. The fact 
that solely across- and solely within-industry comparisons lead to the same conclusion 
is reassuring. The notion that size-related unobservables are not causing our size- 
finance interactions based on within-industry size differences to be insignificant is
30 We obtain highly similar evidence when using a 30-70 percentile range instead.
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further supported by unreported regressions, in which we repeat the basic estimation 
of the size interaction coefficients from Table 2.3 after omitting our set of firm- 
level controls from the regressions. The interaction parameters of interest are not 
materially affected, which, to the extent that company observables and unobservables 
are correlated, is consistent with unobservables having only negligible effect on our 
estimation.31
2.5.5 Age and Intangibles
An important concern with the interpretation of the financial development inter­
action estimates as corresponding to information asymmetries has to do with the 
potentially different reliance of young firms on intangible assets. If financial develop­
ment reduces the need for collateral or tangible assets, this may disproportionately 
improve access to external finance for those companies that use intangibles heavily. 
If young firms use intangibles more than old ones do, then our estimates thus far 
could correspond to the effect of intangibles, not to a reduction in the importance of 
information asymmetries with financial development.
To check for this alternative interpretation, we proceed in two steps. First, we 
estimate regressions (available upon request) of company tangibility on our basic set 
of firm-level control variables including size and age. We find that younger (as well 
as smaller) companies actually display a statistically significantly higher share of 
tangible assets.32 Second, in Table 2.5 we compare the age shape of the financial de­
velopment effect across firms with low (below median) and high (above median) share
31 Similar comparisons have been employed in the analysis of gender or racial discrimination, e.g., 
by Hirsch and Schumacher (1992). See also Altonji et al. (2005) for estim ation of binary treatment 
effects that use the extent of selection on observed characteristics as a guide to the extent of selection 
on unobservables.
32 It could be that those young companies that are constrained in their access to finance (presum­
ably because of information asymmetries), use a high share of tangible assets in order to improve 
their access to external finance.
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of tangible assets.33 We recover the familiar inverted-U age interactions with finan­
cial development for both groups of companies. In fact, by allowing the estimation 
to differentiate between low- and high-tangibility companies, the disproportionate 
growth benefit from financial development of median-aged companies compared to 
the oldest firms is highly similar across the two groups that differ in their share of 
tangible assets. The estimates are also highly comparable to those presented in Table 
2.A .I.34
2.5.6 Within-Industry Relative Age
Our regressions are estimated based on simple (absolute) measures of firms’ age 
or size. Specifically, our basic regressions interact financial development indicators 
with years since company incorporation and with company total assets expressed in 
a common currency. To interpret these basic estimates as corresponding to the effect 
of information asymmetries, one implicitly assumes that the degree of information 
asymmetry varies with size and age to the same (potentially non-linear) degree in 
different industries. However, if financial intermediaries use a different technology 
to evaluate projects of firms in different industries, i.e., industry-specific screening 
techniques, it is possible that the size (age) benchmark against which one measures 
the degree of information asymmetry differs across industries. A firm, which is young 
in absolute terms, could still be relatively old within its industry.
It may be that what matters for information asymmetry is the deviation of a given 
firm from the typical industry-specific size or age. We therefore form an alternative 
measure of age and size based on relative within-industry differences, where each
33 We also allow the base quintile age growth gradient to be different for companies of below- 
median and above-median tangibility and we directly control for the growth gap among low- and 
high-tangibility firms.
34 In order to check to what extent young age proxies for more than different asset intangibility, 
we also estimated the age-financial development interaction jointly with an interaction of financial 
development with an asset tangibility measure. The age-financial development interaction was 
similar.
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firm’s size or age is expressed as the percentage deviation from the industry median 
size or age.35 The relative measure results in substantially different size and age 
rankings, i.e., the classification of firms into age or size groups. When assigning firms 
to quintiles of the firm size (age) distribution, we assign 28% (18%) of companies to 
a different quintile when using the absolute instead of the relative within-industry 
measure.
In Table 2.6, we ask whether those firms that are ranked differently based on the 
absolute and the relative within-industry age measure experience differential effects 
of financial development. The top panel of the Table presents the base age step 
function together with the interaction between the age step function and financial 
development indicators, similar to that presented in Table 2.3. In addition, we ask 
whether the age-finance interaction is different for those firms that are ranked as 
younger based on the within-industry comparison compared to the simple (absolute) 
age quintile ranking. If these relatively young firms are subject to strong information 
asymmetry despite being old in absolute terms, we would expect that the peak of 
the inverted-U shape for these firms will occur at higher absolute age level. In other 
words, in order to gain access to external finance, these firms must get older in 
terms of the industry-specific age ranking, even if they appear old in an all-industry 
comparison. This is indeed what we find in the top panel of Table 2.6, where the 
size of the median-age step in the financial-development interaction is lower while 
the next, fourth quintile step is much higher for the relatively young companies.
The bottom panel of the Table then asks the same question for the relatively 
old firms, i.e., those companies that appear young based on absolute age, but are 
relatively old in terms of their industry age distribution. For these companies, we 
would expect that the peak of the inverted-U interaction will occur earlier. The
35 Clearly, the base size (age) growth effects in our main specifications are already based on 
relative within-industry measures since conditioning on industry dummies transforms the data into 
deviations from industry averages.
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results confirm our expectations in that there is little of a disproportionate effect for 
these firms in the fourth absolute age quintile, which happens to be the fifth and 
last age quintile for them in terms of within-industry age rankings. Furthermore, 
the inverted-U shape for the relatively old firms is relatively flat across the second 
and third absolute age quintile, instead of having a strong peak at the third quintile 
step.
In sum, we find this evidence supportive of the notion that relative within- 
industry age rankings, as opposed to absolute age comparisons, are related to access 
to external finance. Given that financial intermediaries are well known to segment 
their operations by industries, we find this evidence suggestive of within-industry 
relative age (company history) being related to the degree of information asymme­
try .36
2.5.7 Equity Endowment o f Youngest Companies
Our initial expectation, based on finance theory and survey evidence, was that there 
would be disproportionately high effect of financial development on growth of the 
youngest companies because they are strongly affected by information asymmetries. 
It is therefore important to understand why we find less evidence for a dispropor­
tionate effect of financial development on the youngest companies compared to those 
of near-median age. In this Section, we investigate an explanation based on selec­
tive entry due to financial system development. The hypothesis is that startups 
in less financially developed economies expect that after incorporation it may be 
hard (or take longer) to raise additional external finance; hence, these startups are 
likely to incorporate only if they can marshal an unusually high amount of initial 
equity (in comparison to otherwise similar startups in more financially developed 
systems). Such selective entry of firms endowed with high equity capital shares in
36 In unreported specifications, we find little effect of controlling for firms’ relative within-industry 
size position.
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less financially developed countries would then make the youngest companies in less 
financially developed economies temporarily less sensitive to their respective financial 
environments, which is consistent with our estimated interactions coefficients.
To provide evidence on this hypothesis, we ask whether the share of equity capital 
on total assets, which we refer to as equity endowment, differs for otherwise similar 
newly incorporated companies across different financial systems. The top panel of 
Table 2.7 reports estimates of interest from regressions of company equity endow­
ment on our set of firm characteristics, including age and a dummy for being within 
one year of incorporation. We also interact our indicators of financial development 
with the dummy for freshly incorporated firms. As always, we control for a set of 
industry and country fixed effects. Conditional on the differences in equity endow­
ment of all firms across different financial systems, which are absorbed in the country 
dummies, we ask whether the age gradient of equity endowment differs across coun­
tries. Specifically, we focus on the equity endowment difference between the startups 
and all older companies. The coefficients on the interaction between the startup 
indicator (Incorporation) and financial development are all negative and some are 
statistically significant, while the base startup effect is positive and significant, as 
expected. (These findings are not affected by the specification of the base age effect.) 
In comparison to older companies, startups feature an unusually high share of equity 
on total assets, but this gap between startups and older firms is smaller in more 
financially developed economies, consistent with our hypothesis.
The implications of such adjustment to national financial development for our 
estimation of age-related growth effect differences are clearly visible in the second 
panel of Table 2.7, where we present estimates from our standard firm growth regres­
sions. The novelty is that we now allow the age-finance interaction to be different 
for firms with equity endowment below the 30th percentile of the equity endowment 
EU-15-wide distribution. In simple terms, we interact the age-finance interaction 
with a dummy indicator for having low equity endowment, i.e., a dummy for higher
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external finance use.37 The results are striking. Focusing on the youngest compa­
nies with low share of equity capital on total assets, i.e., recently incorporated firms 
that are likely to need external finance to grow, we find a strong and statistically 
significant age-finance interaction coefficient. The difference in the age shape of the 
financial development effect related to equity endowment disappears over company 
life, such tha t by median age (i.e., about 18 years after incorporation) company 
equity endowment is not related to financial development growth effects. (This is 
consistent with our hypothesis of better access to external finance among the older 
companies.) The estimated disproportionate growth effect for the youngest firms 
with low equity endowment is sometimes as large or larger than that recorded at the 
peak of the inverted-U age-finance interaction estimated earlier. Hence, it is likely 
that the reason why we are not able to find strong disproportionate growth effects of 
financial development for all youngest companies has to do with the selective entry 
of more equity-endowed firms in less financially developed countries.
2.5.8 Firm Entry and Exit
One other potential explanation for the finding of no disproportionate effect of fi­
nancial development on the youngest companies is related to the effects of financial 
development on firm entry. A poor financial system may prevent firms from reaching 
their optimal size and the measurement of such corporate growth effect is the object 
of our analysis. However, a poor financial system may also prevent entry of prof­
itable companies. Our analysis of firm growth is therefore complementary to that of 
Klapper et al. (2006) and Aghion et al. (2007), who study the effect of county-level 
financial institutions on entry of new firms. Applying the Rajan-Zingales identifi­
cation strategy at industry level, they find, among other results, that firm entry is 
higher in industries predicted to be in more need of external finance in countries
37 Firms with low equity endowment rely on external finance availability as only a small fraction 
of their total assets is financed through equity.
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that have a higher level of financial development. Klapper et al. (2006) also suggest, 
similar to other existing studies, that entrants are on average larger in countries with 
a lower level of financial development.38
Similar to Aghion et al. (2007), our study focuses on the growth effects of fi­
nancial development after firm entry (incorporation). It is therefore important that 
we consider the implications for our estimation of the potentially different (unob­
servable) growth potential of firms entering in countries that differ in their degree of 
financial development. The differences in firm entry processes across countries could 
induce differences in unobservable entrant quality in our sample. As a hypothetical 
example, if entering companies in the highly financially developed UK environment 
are on average of lower growth potential than entrants in less financially developed 
Greece, then the higher effect of financial development on growth of young companies 
may be obscured by this sample selection on unobservable growth potential.39
However, we believe that this issue does not significantly affect our estimation. 
First, our estimation controls for the difference in growth rates of firms of different 
sizes; hence, to the extent that growth potential at entry is proxied by size at entry 
(as in Beck and Demirgug-Kunt, 2006), our estimation is unlikely to be affected by 
the higher fraction of larger entrants in less financially developed countries.
Second, we use the ‘TOP 250 thousand’ module of the Amadeus data, which 
means that we do not study the growth of very small entrants. More specifically, 
our data cover firms with an operating revenue of at least 10 million Euro or total 
assets above 20 million Euro or more than 100 employees (or any combination of 
these conditions). The fact that we analyze post-entry growth of firms of a certain
38 Alfaro and Charlton (2006) provide similar evidence. Beck and Demirgiig-Kunt (2006) survey 
the literature on the interplay between financial systems and firm size distribution.
39 Aghion et al. (2007) estim ate the finance-growth relationship using firm growth six years after 
entry. This strategy addresses the issue of selective entry on unobservable growth potential to the 
extent that entrants in highly financially developed countries with low growth potential have not 
survived until the sixth year.
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minimum size ought to minimize selection effects that remain after conditioning on 
size, i.e., growth potential differences of entrants of identical size across different 
financial systems.40
Third, to provide first-step evidence on the importance of the size-related sample 
selection criteria for dealing with potentially different unobservables at firm entry, 
we re-estimated our main specifications after excluding from the data all firms in 
the bottom quintile of the EU-15-wide firm size distribution. This corresponds to 
imposing even stricter firm selection criteria in terms of size than those used by 
the ‘TOP 250 thousand’ module of the Amadeus data. The estimates, available on 
request, were highly similar to those presented in Table 2.3, suggesting that potential 
differences in firm quality at entry axe not related to firm size, given the use of the 
‘TOP 250 thousand’ data module.
So far we have discussed the implications of firm entry being affected by financial 
development for our estimation. By the same token, however, it is also possible 
that a selective exit of companies from our sample related to the level of financial 
development affects our estimation. For example, it could be that a highly developed 
financial system “weeds out,”through competitive pressure, companies that would 
survive in a less financially developed environment.41 In this regard, we note that 
our estimation is based on average (or median) growth rates during our sample 
period. As a result, companies that disappear from our data towards the end of the 
sample frame are still represented in the data. We have also re-estimated our main
40 Our presentation of the argument about selectivity is based on the unobservable quality of 
projects (growth potential). A similar line of argument could be built around the degree of infor­
mation opaqueness, such that a Greek entrant may be expected to feature a lower level of opaqueness 
compared to the average entering UK company.
41 Indeed, our preliminary analysis suggests that a firm is more likely to exit from Amadeus 
databases between 1997 and 2003 if it operates in a more financially developed environment and 
that this exit ‘gap’ is larger across countries for younger and smaller companies. However, given 
that there is little information on the reason for exit from the database (e.g., bankruptcy, merger, 
non-reporting), we hesitate to draw conclusions.
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specifications based on two alternative samples, which differ in the degree of survival- 
related sample selection. First, we omitted all companies that disappear from the 
Amadeus database before the end of our data in 2003. Such additional sample 
selection ought to magnify any sample selection bias, but we obtain results (available 
upon request), which are fully consistent with those based on our main sample. 
Second, we additionally include companies that have less than 5 annual value-added 
observations available in the Amadeus database during our sample period.42 Again, 
there was little difference in the estimates when compared to our main results.
2.6 Conclusion
We employ the difference-in-differences strategy to measure the ability of national 
financial systems to foster corporate growth through tackling financial frictions prox- 
ied by firm size and age. We study the effects of financial development on firm growth 
conditional on firms having reached a certain minimum size (having at least 100 em­
ployees or more than 20 million Euro of total assets), such that we capture these 
effects after the initial selection of projects at entry has taken place. Our estima­
tion contrasts the growth performance of comparable companies operating within 
the EU-15 ‘single market’, where they face harmonized product market regulation 
and common industry structure of growth opportunities, but where they must cope 
with significantly different national financial systems. Our estimates are robust to ex­
cluding potentially endogenous firm-specific variables and using alternative sources of 
variation in firm size. We have also ruled out several interpretations of our estimates 
based on age- and size-specific covariates interacting with financial development.
Using both across-industry and within-industry comparisons, we find little evi­
dence of a differential effect of financial development on firms of different size, con­
ditional on firms being of a certain minimum size. Since we do not study very small
42 Such companies were not used in all of our estimation so far, see note n. 16.
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firms, our findings are not inconsistent with the notion that financial market de­
velopment benefits very small firms disproportionately, as suggested recently by the 
study of firm entry by Klapper et al. (2006). Taken at face value, our evidence 
implies that medium-sized firms are medium-sized for reasons unrelated to financial 
system development. This would weaken the credit-constraint rationale for the sup­
port provided by the EU to medium-sized enterprises as the EU classifies into the 
SME category those firms with fewer than 250 employees and balance sheet totals 
below 43 million Euro, i.e., many of the small firms present in our data.
Our main finding is that firms of approximately median age benefit more from 
financial development in comparison to old firms. In fact, we estimate an inverted- 
U shape for the age-financial development interaction, which is consistent with 
very young firms having relatively little access to the financial systems of EU-15 
economies. However, we uncover an alternative and more appealing explanation 
for the lack of disproportionate growth effects of financial development among the 
youngest companies. We find that freshly incorporated firms in less financially devel­
oped countries typically have unusually high shares of equity capital in total assets.
The literature on firm entry (e.g., Klapper et al., 2006) detected that entrants are 
on average larger in countries with a lower level of financial development. Our new 
evidence points to important differences in the capital structure of startups across 
different financial development levels—differences that are consistent with difficult 
access to external finance for youngest companies in less developed countries. Star­
tups in less financially developed economies expect that after incorporation it may 
be hard to raise additional external finance; hence, they incorporate only if they 
can marshal an unusually high amount of initial equity. This temporarily ‘protects’ 
these entrants from the lack of external financing implied by less developed financial 
systems. Consequently, when focusing on those youngest companies that have low 
shares of equity capital, there is a disproportionate positive effect of financial devel­
opment, consistent with the notion that more developed financial systems are better
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at tackling age-related information asymmetry. Financial development therefore ap­
pears to offer an effective way of promoting the growth of young firms even within a 
set of comparable highly developed economies.
Using volume-of-finance-activity measures43 we find that moving from the least 
to the most developed financial system within the EU-15 results in a value-added 
growth rate advantage of a median-aged firm over a firm positioned in the top quintile 
of the age distribution of about 2 percentage points. The age-related difference in the 
effects of institutional quality, proxied here by a measure of accounting standards, 
is at least as large. Similar growth effects are experienced by those very young 
companies that are not rich in equity capital.
Finally, we also provide some evidence that information asymmetry is related not 
only to absolute age of firms, but also to their relative, within-industry age. Such 
finding is consistent with the existence of industry-specific screening techniques used 
by financial institutions to evaluate requests for external finance. The age benchmark 
against which one measures the degree of information asymmetry may be different 
across industries.
43 We note that our use of volume-of-finance indicators of financial development implies that 
our findings are consistent with the notion that deeper financial markets are more efficient in 
overcoming information asymmetry. Wurgler (2000) and Braun (2006) imply that deeper financial 
systems display better allocative efficiency.
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Fig. 2.1: Financial Development (FD) and Corporate Growth: Age and Size Decile Groups
Note: The left two graphs of the Figure report estimates obtained by interacting 
financial development measures with a step function based on (i) a firms position in 
deciles of the firm size distribution (top left graph) and (ii) the corresponding age 
effect (bottom left graph). The two graphs on the right report the respective base 
effects. Age (the number of years since a firms incorporation as of 1995) is scaled 
down by 100 while Size (total assets) is in millions of US dollars. See Table 3 notes for 
a list of additional firm-level control variables and the Data Appendix for definitions 
of variables. All specifications are linear regressions with outliers removed (using 
the 5-to-95 percentile range of the dependent variable). We also remove firms with 
less than 5 years of value-added data available. We always control for 3-digit-ISIC 
industry and country dummies.
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EU-15: Firm Age Distribution
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Fig. 2.A.1: EU-15: Firm Age Distribution
Note: Age (the number of years since firm incorporation as of 1995) is measured 
along the horizontal axis. The upper horizontal axis of each graph indicates deciles 
of the EU-15-wide age distribution. Before plotting the histograms we remove growth 
outliers (we use only the 5-to-95 percentile range of average firm value-added growth 
rate) and firms with less than 5 years of value-added data available. See the Data 
Appendix for complete definitions and sources of variables.
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EU-15: Firm Size Distribution
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Fig. 2.A.2: EU-15: Firm Size Distribution
Note: Size (total assets in millions of US dollars as of the first year a firm enters 
the sample) is measured along the horizontal axis. The upper horizontal axis of 
each graph indicates deciles of the EU-15-wide size distribution. Before plotting the 
histograms we remove growth outliers (we use only the 5-to-95 percentile range of 
average firm value-added growth rate) and firms with less than 5 years of value- 
added data available. See the Data Appendix for complete definitions and sources 
of variables.
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A ppendix B: Tables
Tab. 2.1: Corporate Descriptive Statistics by Country: Firm D ata over 1995-2003
Mean
Size
Median S.D. Mean
Age
Median S.D. Mean
Growth
Median S.D. N
Austria 120.4 45.8 308.1 19.3 1 0 . 0 22.4 0 . 0 2 1 0.013 0.167 1 2 2
Belgium 71.4 15.3 243.8 22.4 17.0 2 0 . 1 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 1 0.096 1,367
Finland 57.2 15.0 177.4 20.5 1 0 . 0 22.7 0.048 0.037 0 . 1 1 0 499
France 109.1 19.5 765.6 29.3 23.0 25.0 0.024 0.014 0.086 1,488
Germany 381.0 78.1 1632.1 33.2 19.0 33.9 0 . 0 0 2 -0.007 0.087 473
Greece 23.5 9.0 62.8 16.3 14.0 14.1 0.062 0.050 0.089 658
Italy 49.3 17.8 324.7 2 0 . 1 16.0 15.7 0.030 0 . 0 2 0 0.083 4,599
Netherlands 204.8 28.5 878.2 35.7 30.0 28.5 -0 . 0 0 1 -0.015 0.088 174
Portugal 54.7 17.6 208.0 27.5 2 2 . 0 21.7 0.004 -0 . 0 1 0 0.083 2 1 1
Spain 46.0 15.5 168.0 2 1 . 6 18.0 17.0 0.053 0.047 0.082 2,375
Sweden 70.2 11.9 345.6 33.3 28.0 25.6 0.045 0.039 0.093 983
UK 89.4 18.8 379.6 28.7 2 2 . 0 25.1 0.057 0.052 0.109 2,230
Note: The number of firm observations in the sample, N, corresponds to observations with non-missing average value- 
added growth rate. Size (total assets) is in millions of US dollars. Age is the number of years since firm incorporation. 
Growth is the average real value-added growth rate over 1995-2003. Size is measured as of the first year a firm enters the 
sample while Age is as of 1995. Before computing these statistics we remove growth outliers (we use only the 5-to-95 
percentile range of average firm value-added growth rate) and firms with less than 5 years of value-added data available. 
See the Data Appendix for complete definitions and sources of variables.
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Tab. 2.2: Financial Development: The EU-15 over 1990-1994
Private Bank 
Credit
Market Total 
Capitalization Capitalization
Market Value 
Traded
Accounting
Standards
Basic Statistics
Mean 0 . 8 6 0.31 1.35 0.13 0.64
Median 0.89 0 . 2 2 1.45 0.07 0.63
S.D. / Mean 0.38 0.80 0.33 0.94 0 . 2 0
Min 0.32 0 . 1 0 0.51 0.03 0.36
Max 1.41 0.97 2.25 0.45 0.83
Min Country Greece Austria Greece Greece Portugal
Max Country Netherlands UK UK UK Sweden
N 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Correlations
Private Bank Credit 1 . 0 0
Market Capitalization 0.57* 1 . 0 0
Total Capitalization 0.71** q 7 9 *** 1 . 0 0
Market Value Traded 0.64** 0.90*** 0.80*** 1 . 0 0
Accounting Standards 0.60** 0.57* 0.67** 0.51* 1 . 0 0
Note: We first compute the country average of each financial development measure in the period 1990- 
1994 (the exceptions is Accounting Standards, which correspond to 1990). Second, we present the Mean, 
Median, Coefficient of Variation, Min, and Max of the country averages from the first step across EU-15 
countries. Denmark, Ireland, and Luxembourg are not included in this EU-15 comparison as they do not 
enter our firm-level analysis. The reported country-level financial development variables are used as 
explanatory variables in our regressions. See the Data Appendix for complete definitions and sources of 
variables.
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Tab. 2.3: Financial Development (FD) and Corporate Growth: Age and Size Quintile 
Groups
Private Bank 
Credit
Market
Capitalization
Total
Capitalization
Market Value 
Traded
Accounting
Standards
FD * Age Q1 -0.004 0.009** 0.002 0.010 0.009
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.025)
FD * Age Q2 0.013** 0.015*** 0.007** 0.030*** 0.044**
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.018)
FD * Age Q3 0.020** 0.023*** 0.015*** 0.042*** 0.088***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.018) .
FD * Age Q4 0.010** 0.007** 0.007** 0.014** 0.040***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.010)
FD * Size Q1 -0.020 -0.007 -0.007 0.013 -0.038
(0.033) (0.021) (0.012) (0.036) (0.096)
FD * Size Q2 -0.021 -0.010 -0.009 -0.008 -0.065
(0.023) (0.014) (0.010) (0.023) (0.062)
FD * Size Q3 -0.018 -0.008 -0.006 -0.011 -0.050
(0.013) (0.008) (0.006) (0.014) (0.036)
FD * Size Q4 -0.008 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.019
(0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.024)
Age Q1 0.027*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.018
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.016)
Age Q2 0.006 0.012*** 0.007* 0.012*** -0.013
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.012)
Age Q3 -0.007 0.001 -0.011** 0.003 -0.050***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.012)
AgeQ4 -0.007* -0.002 -0.008** -0.001 -0.026***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007)
Size Q1 0.100*** 0.086*** 0.094*** 0.082*** 0.110
(0.030) (0.012) (0.020) (0.013) (0.066)
Size Q2 0.057** 0.043*** 0.052*** 0.040*** 0.082*
(0.020) (0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.043)
Size Q3 0.036** 0.023*** 0.030** 0.022*** 0.054*
(0.012) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.025)
Size Q4 0.014** 0.008** O.foll* 0.007** 0.020
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.016)
N 14,874 14,874 14,874 14,874 14,874
ad justed R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
Note: The dependent variable is the time average of annual firm-level real value-added growth rates 
of manufacturing firms in the period 1995-2003. The Table reports estimates obtained by interacting 
financial development measures with two step functions, one based on a firm’s position in quintiles of 
the Arm age distribution, the other based on quintiles of the firms’ size. Estimates are based on the 
absolute measure of firm age (the number of years since a firm’s incorporation as of 1995) scaled 
down by 100 and the absolute measure of firm size (total assets in millions of US dollars). All country- 
level financial development variables are predetermined.
We also include (non-reported here) firm-level control variables: Leverage, measured as long-term 
debt plus current liabilities divided by total assets; Tangibility, measured as fixed assets divided by 
total assets; Collateralization, defined as fixed assets plus inventories plus accounts receivables 
divided by total assets; Trade credit, measured as accounts payables divided by total assets; and 
Equity endowment, measured as equity capital divided by total assets. Tangibility, Collateral, and 
Trade Credit are measured as the percentage deviation from the respective industry median on a 3- 
digit ISIC level and are scaled down by 10,000. Age and Size (as well as all other firm-level control 
variables) come from the first year a firm enters the sample and remain fixed over time.
We also include indicators for ownership concentration, a dummy for quoted firms, and a dummy for 
firms that have a Private Limited Company legal form. See the Data Appendix for complete 
definitions and sources of variables. All specifications are linear regressions with outliers removed 
(using the 5-to-95 percentile range of the dependent variable). We also remove firms with less than 5 
years of value-added data available. We always control for 3-digit-ISIC industry and country 
dummies, not shown. Robust standard errors (clustered at country level) are reported in parentheses; 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Tab. 2.4: Financial Development (FD) and Corporate Growth: Using Across-Industry Size 
Variation
Private Bank 
Credit
Market
Capitalization
Total
Capitalization
Market Value 
Traded
Accounting
Standards
FD * Industry Size -0.419
All Firms 
-0.509 -0.271 -1.150 -2.059
(0.548) (0.382) (0.265) (0.777) (1.548)
Firm Size -0.003 -0.004* -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
N 14,740 14,740 14,740 14,740 14,740
adjusted R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
FD * Industry Size
Firms Near Industry Median Size 
-0.294 0.459 0.144 0.783 -0.006
(0.706) (0.557) (0.411) (1.212) (1.915)
Firm Size -0.757 -0.743 -0.751 -0.740 -0.753
(0.453) (0.456) (0.455) (0.455) (0.455)
N 3,006 3,006 3,006 3,006 3,006
adjusted R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
FD * Firm Size
Firms Near Industry Median Size 
0.014 0.796 0.520 1.217 0.793
(0.700) (0.734) (0.466) (1.355) (2.305)
Firm Size -0.764 -0.993** -1.453* -0.893** -1.276
(0.654) (0.463) (0.741) (0.430) (1.556)
N 3,006 3,006 3,006 3,006 3,006
adjusted R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
FD * Firm Size Q1
Firms Near Industry Median Size 
-0.008 -0.016 -0.009 -0.032 -0.025
(0.017) (0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.035)
FD * Firm Size Q2 -0.011 -0.032*** -0.022*** -0.058** -0.053
(0.022) (0.007) (0.007) (0.019) (0.061)
FD * Firm Size Q3 -0.006 -0.012 -0.004 -0.022 -0.029
(0.018) (0.009) (0.010) (0.017) (0.038)
FD * Firm Size Q4 -0.002 -0.019** -0.010 -0.040** -0.014
(0.020) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.062)
Firm Size Q1 0.016 0.015 0.023 0.015 0.027
(0.018) (0.009) (0.016) (0.008) (0.025)
Firm Size Q2 0.016 0.018** 0.038*** 0.015 0.042
(0.018) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.039)
Firm Size Q3 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.014
(0.017) (0.007) (0.016) (0.006) (0.027)
Firm Size Q4 0.002 0.007 0.015 0.006 0.010
(0.014) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.039)
N 3,006 3,006 3,006 3,006 3,006
adjusted R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Note: The top panel o f the Table reports estimates from linear specifications, in which we interact 
financial development variables with industry median firm size (on ISIC 3-digit level). In all specifications 
we control for the set o f firm-level control variables used in Table 3. The second set o f results is 
analogous to the first one, except that we only use companies falling into the 40-60 percentile range of 
industry-specific size distributions. This sub-sample is then used in the bottom panel, where we interact 
financial development with firm-level size. Firm size is measured using total assets in millions o f US 
dollars as o f  the first year a firm enters the sample and remains fixed over time. All specifications are 
linear regressions with outliers removed (using the 5-to-95 percentile range o f the dependent variable). We 
also remove firms with less than 5 years o f value-added data available.
We always control for 3-digit-ISIC industry and country dummies, not shown. Robust standard errors 
(clustered at ISIC 3-digit-level in the first two panels, clustered at firm level in the third panel, and 
clustered at country level in the last panel) are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Tab. 2.5: Financial Development (FD) and Corporate Growth: Age Quintile Groups by 
Tangibility (TAN)
Private Bank 
Credit
Market
Capitalization
Total
Capitalization
Market Value 
Traded
Accounting
Standards
FD * Age Q1 * TAN low -0.003 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 1 2 0.035
(0.017) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0.006) (0.019) (0.058)
FD * Age Q2 * TAN low 0 .0 2 0 ** 0.015*** 0.006 0.032** 0.076**
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0.026)
FD * Age Q3 * TAN low 0.035** 0.042*** 0.025*** 0.082*** 0.144***
(0.013) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.044)
FD * Age Q4 * TAN low 0.029** 0.030*** 0.023*** 0.060*** 0 . 1 1 1 ***
(0 .0 1 0 ) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.032)
FD * Age Q1 * TAN high -0.006 0 .0 2 0 ** 0 . 0 0 1 0.026 0.016
(0.013) (0.007) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0.019) (0.047)
FD * Age Q2 * TAN high 0.015 0.026*** 0 . 0 1 1 0.054*** 0.054
(0 .0 1 2 ) (0.004) (0.007) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0.041)
FD * Age Q3 * TAN high 0.036** 0.038*** 0.024*** 0.072*** 0.138***
(0 .0 1 2 ) (0.004) (0.003) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0.041)
FD * Age Q4 * TAN high 0.016** 0 .0 1 2 ** 0.007 0 .0 2 0 * 0.066***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 2 0 )
TAN low 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 2
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age Q1 * TAN low 0.043** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.017
(0.014) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.039)
Age Q2 * TAN low 0.015* 0.025*** 0 .0 2 1 *** 0.026*** -0 . 0 2 0
(0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0 .0 2 0 )
Age Q3 * TAN low -0 . 0 1 0 0.004 -0.017** 0.007** -0.078**
(0.009) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.029)
Age Q4 * TAN low -0.019** -0.006* -0.027*** -0.004 -0.069***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 2 1 )
Age Q1 * TAN high 0.038*** 0.027*** 0.032** 0.030*** 0.023
(0.007) (0.006) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0.004) (0.030)
Age Q2 * TAN high 0.017* 0.019*** 0.014 0 .0 2 1 *** -0.008
(0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.026)
Age Q3 * TAN high -0 . 0 1 0 0.005 -0.015*** 0.007* -0.074**
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.026)
Age Q4 * TAN high -0.009 -0 . 0 0 0 -0.006 0 . 0 0 1 -0.041**
(0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.015)
N 14,874 14,874 14,874 14,874 14,874
adjusted R2 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 2
Note: The Table reports estimates o f a triple-interaction specification, in which we multiply the interaction of 
financial development measures with a step function based on firms’ position in quintiles o f the firm age 
distribution by a dummy variable for ‘Low tangibility’ firms (those with below-median tangibility) or by a 
dummy variable for 'High tangibility1 firms (those with above-median tangibility). Estimates are based on the 
absolute measure o f firm age (the number o f years since a firm’s incorporation as o f 1995) scaled down by 100. 
See Table 3 notes for a list o f additional firm-level control variables and the Data Appendix for definitions of 
variables. All specifications are linear regressions with outliers removed (using the 5-to-95 percentile range of 
the dependent variable). We also remove firms with less than 5 years o f value-added data available. We always 
control for 3-digit-ISIC industry and country dummies, not shown. Robust standard errors (clustered at country 
level) are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.
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Tab. 2.6: Financial Development (FD) and Corporate Growth: Absolute vs. Relative Age 
Quintile Groups
Private Bank Market Total Market Value Accounting
Credit Capitalization Capitalization Traded Standards
Industry-wise Relatively Younger Firms
FD * Age Q2 * Relat_Young -0.012 -0.011 -0.007 -0.029 -0.018
(0.011) (0.020) (0.005) (0.050) (0.010)
FD * Age Q3 * Relat_Young -0.009 -0.015* -0.004 -0.037* -0.006
(0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.018) (0.007)
FD * Age Q4 * ReIat_Young 0.014*** 0.036*** 0.009*** 0.072*** 0.018***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004)
FD * Age Q5 * Relat_Young 0.001 0.010 0.001 0.023 -0.001
(0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.017) (0.006)
FD * Age Q1 -0.006 0.012 0.000 0.019 0.019
(0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.040)
FD * Age Q2 0.017 0.022*** 0.009 0.046*** 0.060
(0.010) (0.004) (0.006) (0.011) (0.033)
FD * Age Q3 0.036** 0.041*** 0.025*** 0.080*** 0.139***
(0.013) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.042)
FD * Age Q4 0.021** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.030*** 0.083***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.021)
Age Q1 0.041*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.024
(0.010) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.027)
AgeQ2 0.016* 0.022*** 0.018** 0.023*** -0.010
(0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.023)
AgeQ3 -0.010 0.005 -0.016** 0.007** -0.075* *
(0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.027)
Age Q4 -0.014** -0.003 -0.016** -0.001 -0.054**'
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.015)
N 14,874 14,874 14,874 14,874 14,874
adjusted R2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Industry-wise Relatively Older Firms
FD * Age Q1 * Relal_01d -0.019** -0.027** -0.009** -0.066** -0.024**
(0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.024) (0.008)
FD * Age Q2 * Relat_01d -0.005 -0.010 -0.004 -0.014 -0.009
(0.007) (0.009) (0.003) (0.015) (0.008)
FD * Age Q3 ♦ Relat_Old -0.011 -0.019** -0.006* -0.040** -0.014*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.013) (0.007)
FD * Age Q4 ♦ Relat_Old -0.027** -0.039** -0.015** -0.083** -0.035**'
(0.003) (0.011) (0.002) (0.026) (0.004)
FD* A geQ l -0.006 0.013* 0.001 0.022 0.019
(0.013) (0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.040)
FD * Age Q2 0.017 0.Q22*** 0.009 0.045*** 0.061
(0.011) (0.004) (0.006) (0.011) (0.034)
FD * Age Q3 0.037** 0.042*** 0.025*** 0.081*** 0.141***
(0.013) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.042)
FD * Age Q4 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.016*** 0.047*** 0.090***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.022)
AgeQ l 0.042*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.025
(0.010) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.027)
AgeQ2 0.016* 0.022*** 0.017* 0.023*** -0.011
(0.009) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.023)
AgeQ3 -0.010 0.004 -0.016** 0.007** -0.075**
(0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.027)
Age Q4 -0.015** -0.003 -0.017** -0.002 -0.054**'
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.015)
N 14,874 14,874 14,874 14,874 14,874
adjusted R2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Note: The Table reports estimates of a triple-interaction specification, in which we multiply the interaction of 
financial development measures with a step function based on firms’ position in quintiles o f the absolute firm age 
distribution by a dummy variable for 'Relatively Younger1 firms (top panel) or by a dummy variable for 'Relatively 
Older1 firms (bottom panel). 'Relatively Younger1 is an indicator of a firm being assigned to a lower quintile of firm 
age distribution when using the relative measure of firm age (the percentage deviation of a firm’s age from the 
industry median firm age on a 3-digit ISIC level) compared to the quintile obtained by using the absolute firm age 
distribution. Analogously, 'Relatively Older1 is an indicators of a firm being assigned to a higher quintile of firm 
age distribution when using the relative measure o f firm age compared to the quintile obtained by using the 
absolute firm age distribution. See Table 3 notes for a list of additional firm-level control variables and the Data 
Appendix for definitions of variables.
All specifications are linear regressions with outliers removed (using the 5-to-95 percentile range of the dependent 
variable). We also remove firms with less than 5 years of value-added data available. We always control for 3- 
digit-ISIC industry and country dummies, not shown. Robust standard errors (clustered at country level) are 
reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Tab. 2.7: Financial Development (FD) and Equity Endowment (EE)
Private Bank Market Total Market Value Accounting
Credit Capitalization Capitalization Traded Standards
Financial Development and Equity Endowment: Newly Incorporated Firms
FD * Incorporation -0.047 -0.058** -0.030 -0.136** -0.106
(0.028) (0.022) (0.017) (0.053) (0.083)
Incorporation 0.065** 0.047*** 0.069** 0.046*** 0.098
(0.026) (0.015) (0.026) (0.013) (0.060)
Age -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.100***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
N 14,740 14,740 14,740 14,740 14,740
adjusted R2 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
Financial Development and Corporate Growth: Age Quintile Groups by Equity Endowment
FD * Age Q1 * Low EE 0.016 0.035*** 0.010* 0.079*** 0.017
(0.012) (0.010) (0.006) (0.017) (0.013)
FD * Age Q2 * Low EE 0.018** 0.024** 0.011** 0.051** 0.022**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.018) (0.009)
FD * Age Q3 * Low EE 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.007 -0.004
(0.007) (0.009) (0.003) (0.018) (0.008)
FD * Age Q4 * Low EE -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 -0.006 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005)
FD * Age Q1 -0.015 -0.002 -0.004 -0.011 0.006
(0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.034)
FD * Age Q2 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.016 0.029
(0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.016) (0.031)
FD * Age Q3 0.032** 0.035*** 0.024*** 0.067*** 0.139***
(0.012) (0.008) (0.003) (0.015) (0.041)
FD * Age Q4 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.014*** 0.038*** 0.085***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.020)
Low EE 0.007** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.008***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
A g eQ l 0.045*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.030
(0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.025)
Age Q2 0.022** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.005
(0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.021)
Age Q3 -0.007 0.005 -0.014*** 0.008** -0.074**
(0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.027)
Age Q4 -0.013** -0.003 -0.015** -0.001 -0.052***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.014)
N 14,874 14,874 14,874 14,874 14,874
adjusted R2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Note: Top panel: The dependent variable is the fraction o f  firm’s equity capital on total assets— Equity 
endowment (EE). Incorporation is a binary variable equal to unity if  a firm enters the sample with age 0 or 
1. Bottom panel: The dependent variable is the time average o f annual firm-level real value-added growth 
rates o f  manufacturing firms in the period 1995-2003. The panel reports estimates o f  a triple-interaction 
specification, in which we multiply the interaction o f  financial developmentmeasures with a step function 
based on firms’ position in quintiles o f  the firm age distribution by a dummy variable for 'Low equity 
endowment' firms (those with below 30th percentile o f  Equity endowment). Estimates are based on the 
absolute measure o f  firm age. In both panels, Equity endowment is measured as o f  the first year a firm 
enters the sample and remains fixed over time. See Table 3 notes for a list o f  additional firm-level control 
variables and the Data Appendix for definitions o f  variables.
All specifications are linear regressions with outliers removed (using the 5-to-95 percentile range o f the 
dependent variable). We also remove firms with less than 5 years o f  value-added data available. We always 
control for 3-digit-ISIC industry and country dummies, not shown. Robust standard errors (clustered at 
country level) are reported in parentheses;*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.
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Tab. 2.A.1: Financial Development (FD) and Corporate Growth: Age/Size Quintile
Groups
Private Bank Market Total Market Value Accounting
Credit Capitalization Capitalization Traded Standards
Firm's Position in Quintile of the Size Distribution
FD * Size Q1 -0 . 0 2 2 -0.005 -0.007 0.017 -0.038
(0.034) (0 .0 2 1 ) (0.013) (0.037) (0.099)
FD * Size Q2 -0 . 0 2 2 -0.008 -0.009 -0.005 -0.062
(0.023) (0.013) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0.023) (0.063)
FD * Size Q3 -0.019 -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 -0.046
(0.013) (0.008) (0.006) (0.014) (0.037)
FD * Size Q4 -0.007 0 . 0 0 1 -0 . 0 0 1 0.003 -0.015
(0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.024)
Size Q1 0 .1 0 2 *** 0.086*** 0.094*** 0.081*** 0.109
(0.030) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 2 1 ) (0.013) (0.067)
Size Q2 0.056** 0.041*** 0.050** 0.039*** 0.079*
(0 .0 2 0 ) (0.009) (0.016) (0.008) (0.043)
Size Q3 0.036** 0 .0 2 2 *** 0.028** 0 .0 2 1 *** 0.051*
(0 .0 1 2 ) (0.006) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0.006) (0.026)
Size Q4 0.013* 0.007** 0.009 0.006** 0.017
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.016)
N 14,740 14,740 14,740 14,740 14,740
adjusted R2 0 . 2 0 0 . 2 0 0 . 2 0 0 . 2 0 0 . 2 0
Firm's Position in Quintile of the Age Distribution
FD* A geQ l -0.006 0 . 0 1 1 0 . 0 0 0 0.018 0.019
(0.013) (0.007) (0.008) (0.018) (0.040)
FD * Age Q2 0.016 0 .0 2 1 *** 0.009 0.044*** 0.060
(0 .0 1 0 ) (0.004) (0.006) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0.034)
FD * Age Q3 0.035** 0.039*** 0.025*** 0.075*** 0.139***
(0.013) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.042)
FD * Age Q4 0 .0 2 2 *** 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.035*** 0.081***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0 .0 2 1 )
AgeQl 0.041*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.024
(0 .0 1 0 ) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.027)
Age Q2 0.016* 0 .0 2 2 *** 0.017** 0.023*** -0 . 0 1 0
(0.009) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.023)
Age Q3 -0 . 0 1 0 0.005 -0.016*** 0.007** -0.074**
(0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.027)
Age Q4 -0.014** -0.003 -0.015** -0 . 0 0 1 -0.051***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.014)
N 14,874 14,874 14,874 14,874 14,874
adjusted R2 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 2
Note: The top panel reports estimates obtained by interacting financial development measures with a 
step function based on a firm’s position in quintiles of the firm size distribution while the bottom 
panel reports estimates obtained by interacting financial development measures with a step function 
based on a firm’s position in quintiles of the firm age distribution. Age (the number of years since a 
firm’s incorporation as of 1995) is scaled down by 100 while Size (total assets) is in millions of US 
dollars. See Table 3 notes for a list of additional firm-level control variables and the Data Appendix 
for definitions of variables. All specifications are linear regressions with outliers removed (using the 5- 
to-95 percentile range of the dependent variable). We also remove firms with less than 5 years of 
value-added data available. We always control for 3-digit-ISIC industry and country dummies, not 
shown. Robust standard errors (clustered at counhy level) are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Tab. 2.A.2: Financial Development (FD) and Corporate Growth: Parametric Specification
Private Bank Market Total Market Value Accounting
Credit Capitalization Capitalization Traded Standards
Size: Linear Specification
FD * Size 0.002 -0.023*** -0.004 -0.025* -0.040
(0.014) (0.007) (0.006) (0.014) (0.025)
Size -0.006 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.023
(0.013) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.017)
N 14,740 14,740 14,740 14,740 14,740
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Size: Cubic Specification
FD * Size 0.072*** -0.023 0.018 0.038 -0.033
(0.024) (0.016) (0.012) (0.032) (0.066)
FD * Size2 -0.018** 0.005* -0.004 -0.019*** 0.015
(0,007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.017)
FD * Size3 0.001** -0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Size -0.101*** -0.027*** -0.062*** -0.045*** -0.015
(0.023) (0.008) (0.020) (0.008) (0.044)
Size2 0.021*** 0.004*** 0.012** 0.010*** -0.004
(0.007) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.011)
Size3 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 14,740 14,740 14,740 . 14,740 14,740
adjusted R2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Age: Linear Specification
FD * Age 0.043*** -0.002 0.022*** 0.008 0.017
(0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.023) (0.038)
Age -0.103*** -0.063* *♦ -0.097*** -0.065*** -0.076* *♦
(0.012) (0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.026)
N 14,740 14,740 14,740 14,740 14,740
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Age: Cubic Specification
FD * Age 0.336*** 0.169** 0.197*** 0.402** 0.917***
(0.087) (0.085) (0.052) (0.170) (0.273)
FD * Age2 -0.794*** -0.492** -0.479*** -1.171** -2.354***
(0.243) (0.229) (0.144) (0.458) (0.739)
FD * Age3 0.487*** 0.329* 0.299*** 0.798** 1.472***
(0.185) (0.168) (0.109) (0.339) (0.545)
Age -0.468*** -0.263*** -0.475*** -0.262*** -0.812***
(0.074) (0.036) (0.075) (0.033) (0.182)
Age2 0.872*** 0.424*** 0.907*** 0.422*** 1.812***
(0.211) (0.100) (0.216) (0.092) (0.496)
Age3 -0.469*** -0.207*** -0.500*** -0.208*** -1.065***
(0.164) (0.075) (0.168) (0.070) (0.367)
N 14,740 14,740 14,740 14,740 14,740
adjusted R2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Note: The top two panels report estimates obtained by interacting financial development measures 
with firm size while the bottom two panels report estimates obtained by interacting financial 
development measures with firm age. Age (the number of years since a firm’s incorporation as of 
1995) is scaled down by 100 while Size (total assets) is in millions of US dollars. See Table 3 notes 
for a list of additional firm-level control variables and the Data Appendix for definitions of variables. 
All specifications are linear regressions with outliers removed (using the 5-to-95 percentile range of 
the dependent variable). We also remove firms with less than 5 years of value-added data available. 
We always control for 3-digit-ISIC industry and country dummies, not shown. Robust standard errors 
(clustered at firm level) are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Tab. 2.A.3: Financial Development (FD) and Corporate Growth: Age Quintile Groups by 
Firm Size
Private Bank 
Credit
Market
Capitalization
Total
Capitalization
Market Value 
Traded
Accounting
Standards
FD * Age Q1 * Small -0.005 0 . 0 1 1 0 . 0 0 1 0.036 0.016
(0.024) (0.017) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0.029) (0.071)
FD * Age Q2 * Small 0 . 0 1 2 0 .0 2 0 ** 0 . 0 1 1 0.052*** 0.035
(0.018) (0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.054)
FD * Age Q3 * Small 0.026* 0.028*** 0.017*** 0.063*** 0.108**
(0.014) (0.004) (0.004) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0.037)
FD * Age Q4 * Small 0.014 0.009* 0.008* 0.027** 0.051
(0 .0 1 2 ) (0.005) (0.004) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0.033)
FD * Age Q1 * Big -0 . 0 0 0 0 .0 1 1 * 0.009* 0 . 0 1 0 -0 . 0 0 0
(0.015) (0.006) (0.005) (0.013) (0.037)
FD * Age Q2 * Big 0 .0 2 2 ** 0.016*** 0.007 0.036*** 0.074**
(0 .0 1 0 ) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.027)
FD * Age Q3 * Big 0.025* 0.033*** 0 .0 2 2 *** 0.055*** 0.085*
(0.013) (0.007) (0.005) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0.041)
FD * Age Q4 * Big 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.027*** 0.067***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.014)
Big -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.032***
. (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Age Q1 * Small 0.050** 0.042*** 0.045** 0.041*** 0.035
(0 .0 2 0 ) (0.008) (0.017) (0.007) (0.048)
Age Q2 * Small 0.024 0.027*** 0 .0 2 0 * 0.027*** 0 . 0 1 0
(0.014) (0.004) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0.004) (0.036)
Age Q3 * Small -0.003 0.008** -0.006 0.009** -0.054*
(0 .0 1 1 ) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.025)
Age Q4 * Small -0 . 0 1 1 -0.003 -0 . 0 1 0 -0.003 -0.034
(0 .0 1 1 ) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.023)
Age Q1 * Big 0.014 0 .0 1 0 ** 0 . 0 0 0 0 .0 1 2 ** 0.014
(0.014) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.025)
Age Q2 * Big -0.005 0.007* 0 . 0 0 2 0.007* -0.036*
(0.009) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.019)
Age Q3 * Big -0 . 0 1 1 -0 . 0 0 2 -0 .0 2 2 *** 0 . 0 0 1 -0.048*
(0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.026)
Age Q4 * Big -0 .0 1 2 *** -0 . 0 0 2 -0.015** -0 . 0 0 1 -0.041***
(0.003) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0.005) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 1 0 )
N 14,874 14,874 14,874 14,874 14,874
adjusted R2 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
Note: The Table reports estimates o f a triple-interaction specification, in which we multiply the 
interaction of financial development measures with a step function based on firms’ position in quintiles 
of the firm age distribution by a dummy variable for 'Small' firms (those with below-median total assets) 
or by a dummy variable for 'Big' firms (those with above-median total assets). Estimates are based on 
the absolute measure o f firm age (the number o f years since a firm’s incorporation as o f 1995) scaled 
down by 100. See Table 3 notes for a list o f additional firm-level control variables and the Data 
Appendix for definitions o f variables. All specifications are linear regressions with outliers removed 
(using the 5-to-95 percentile range of the dependent variable). We also remove firms with less than 5 
years o f value-added data available. We always control for 3-digit-ISIC industry and country dummies, 
not shown. Robust standard errors (clustered at country level) are reported in parentheses; *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
2. Which Firms Benefit More from Financial Development? 95
Tab. 2.A.4: Median Regressions
Private Bank 
Credit
Market
Capitalization
Total
Capitalization
Market Value 
Traded
Accounting
Standards
FD* AgeQl -0.009 0.004 -0.007 0.001 0.015
(0.021) (0.045) (0.019) (0.055) (0.044)
FD * Age Q2 0.018 0.021 0.008 0.047 0.070*
(0.015) (0.027) (0.014) (0.033) (0.039)
FD * Age Q3 0.013 0.017 0.011* 0.028 0.077***
(0.011) (0.022) (0.006) (0.023) (0.022)
FD * Age Q4 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.010 0.049***
(0.009) (0.027) (0.005) (0.017) (0.017)
FD * Size Q1 -0.007 0.007 -0.002 0.037 0.019
(0.045) (0.116) (0.035) (0.115) (0.105)
FD * Size Q2 -0.004 0.004 -0.002 0.023 -0.010
(0.025) (0.069) (0.021) (0.062) (0.071)
FD * Size Q3 -0.009 0.001 -0.001 0.011 -0.012
(0.017) (0.045) (0.014) (0.054) (0.051)
FD * Size Q4 0.009 0.012 0.004 0.026 0.049*
(0.012) (0.022) (0.009) (0.036) (0.028)
AgeQl 0.031 0.023* 0.034 0.024*** 0.015
(0.019) (0.013) (0.025) (0.007) (0.032)
Age Q2 0.002 0.009 0.005 0.010*** -0.030
(0.012) (0.007) (0.018) (0.003) (0.026)
Age Q3 0.000 0.004 -0.005 0.006** -0.041***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.003) (0.015)
Age Q4 -0.001 0.000 -0.005 0.001 -0.030**
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.012)
Size Q1 0.102** 0.094*** 0.099* 0.090*** 0.084
(0.041) (0.029) (0.050) (0.017) (0.071)
Size Q2 0.047** 0.042** 0.045 0.041*** 0.050
(0.023) (0.019) (0.031) (0.010) (0.047)
Size Q3 0.031** 0.023* 0.024 0.022*** 0.032
(0.015) (0.013) (0.021) (0.008) (0.033)
Size Q4 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.009* -0.020
(0.010) (0.007) (0.014) (0.004) (0.018)
N 16,081 16,081 16,081 16,081 16,081
pseudo R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Note: Data and equation specification are the same as in Table 3. All specifications are median 
regressions. We include the value-added-growth outliers, which were not used in the previous tables 
(i.e., observations outside 5-to-95 percentile range of the dependent variable). See Table 3 notes for a 
list of additional firm-level control variables and the Data Appendix for definitions of variables. We 
remove firms with less than 5 years of value-added data available. *, **, and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, based on bootstrapped standard errors (reported in 
parentheses) clustered at the country level.
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VA
VA_Growth
VA_Avg
VA_Med
Age
Size
Leverage 
Tangibility (TAN)
Collateralization
Equity Endowment (EE) 
Quoted
Private Limited Company 
Independence
Incorporation
PCDMBANKOFINSTGDP
STMCAPGDP 
STMTVTGDP 
Total Capitalization
ACCOUNT
Tab. 2.DA.1: Definition of Variables
Firm-level Variables
Firm-level value-added in current prices deflated by PPI. As PPI we use Eurostat’s not 
seasonally adjusted domestic output price index (in national currency) which covers total 
industry (excluding construction). Source: Amadeus.
Annual firm-level growth rate of real value-added based on VA. The formula for VA_Growth 
we use is (VA* -  VA^) / ABS('/3 VAt + lA VA,_|). In our estimations, we use residuals from 
regression o f all observed firm-level annual growth rates (VA Growth) on year dummies. 
Source: Amadeus.
Simple average o f the annual real firm-level value-added growth rates (VA_GTOwth) over the 
years a firm is available in the database for the period 1995-2003. Source: Amadeus.
Median of the annual real firm-level value-added growth rates (VA_Growth) over the years a 
firm is available in the database for the period 1995-2003. Source: Amadeus.
The number o f years since firm’s incorporation (STATDATE - YEARINC) scaled down by 
100. It is calculated as o f 1995 and remains fixed over time. Source: Amadeus.
Firm’s total assets (TOAS) in millions o f US dollars. We use IMF-IFS annual average 
exchange rates to convert total assets into US dollars. It is calculated as of the initial-period 
(the first year a firm enters the sample) and remains fixed over time. Source: Amadeus. 
Measured as a long term debt (LTDB) plus current liabitities (CULI) divided by total assets 
(TOAS). It is calculated as o f the initial-period (the first year a firm enters the sample and 
remains fixed over time). Source: Amadeus.
Tangibility is defined as fixed assets (FIAS) divided by total assets (TOAS). We use the 
percentage deviation of firm’s tangibility from the industry median firm tangibility on 3-digit 
ISIC level, scaled down by 100. It is calculated as o f the initial-period (the first year a firm 
enters the sample and remains fixed over time). Source: Amadeus.
Collateralization is defined as fixed assets (FIAS) plus inventories (STOK) plus accounts 
receivables (DEBT) divided by total assets (TOAS). We use the percentage deviation of 
firm’s collateralization from the industry median firm collateralization on 3-digit ISIC level, 
scaled down by 100. It is calculated as o f the initial-period (the first year a firm enters the 
sample and remains fixed over time). Source: Amadeus.
Firm’s equity capital (CAPI) scaled by total assets (TOAS). It is calculated as of the initial- 
period (the first year a firm enters the sample) and remains fixed over time. Source: Amadeus.
0/1 variable, equal 1 if the firm is publicly listed company and 0 otherwise. Source: Amadeus.
0/1 variable, equal 1 if the firm is ‘Limited Liability Company’ (Company whose capital is 
divided into shares which cannot be offered to the general public. The liability o f its members 
is limited to the amount of their shares.) and 0 if the firm is ‘Limited Company’ (Company 
whose capital is divided into shares which can be offered to the general public and whose 
members are only liable for its debts to the extent of any amount unpaid on their shares.) 
Source: Amadeus.
Set of four 0/1 variables capturing firm's concentration of ownership structure (INDEPIND). 
INDEPIND_A equal 1 for a firm with no recorded shareholder with an ownership over 
24.99% (either direct or total) and 0 otherwise. INDEPIND_B equal 1 for a firm with no 
recorded shareholder with an ownership percentage (direct or total) over 49.99%, but having 
one or more shareholders with an ownership percentage over 24.99% and 0 otherwise. 
INDEPIND_C equal 1 for a firm with a recorded shareholder with an ownership (direct or 
total) over 49.99% (also equal to 1 when firm indicates that the company has an Ultimate 
Owner) and 0 otherwise. INDEPIND_U equal 1 for a firm not falling into the categories A, B, 
or C indicating an unknown degree of independence. Source: Amadeus.
0/1 variable, equal 1 if the firm enters the sample with Age 0 or 1. Source: Amadeus.
Financial Development Country-level Measures 
Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP. Average over 
the period 1990-1994. Source: The Word Bank Financial Structure and Economic 
Development Database.
Stock market capitalization to GDP. Average over the period 1990-1994. Source: The Word 
Bank Financial Structure and Economic Development Database.
Stock market total value traded to GDP. Average over the period 1990-1994. Source: The 
Word Bank Financial Structure and Economic Development Database.
The sum of (i) stock market capitalisation, (ii) bank credit to the private sector and (iii) 
domestic debt securities issued by the private sector to GDP. Average over the period 1990- 
1994. Source: Hartmann et al. (2006), Chart 1.
Index created by examining and rating companies’ 1990 annual reports on their inclusion or 
omission of 90 items in balance sheets and income statements and published by the Center for 
International Financial Analysis & Research, Inc. The maximum is 90, the minimum 0 and we 
scaled it down by 100. Source: The Center for International Financial Analysis & Research, 
Inc.______________________________________________________________________________
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Tab. 2.DA.2: Legal Forms in the EU-15
Country Limited Companies - Limited Liability Companies
Austria /  Germany Aktiengesellschaft (AG, AG & Co KG) Gesellschaft mit beschraekter Haftung (GmbH, GmbH
& Co KG, Einzelfirma)
Belgium Naamloze Vennootschap (NV), Socidtd Anonyme Besloten Vennootschap, (E)BVBA; Socidtd Privde a
(SA) Responsabilitd Limite, SPRL(U)
Denmark Limited Company, Company with Limited Liability Private Limited Company (ApS)
(A/S)
Finland Osakeyhtio a Julkinen (OYJ) OsakeyhtiO (OY)
France Soci6td Anonyme (SA) Socidtd a Responsabilitd Limite (SARL)
Greece SA Limited liability company (EPE), Sole shareholder
limited liability company
Italy Societa Per Azioni (SPA) Societa a Responsabilita Limitata (SRL, SCARL)
Netherlands Naamloze Vennootschap (NV) Besloten Vennootschap (BV)
Portugal Sociedade Andnima (SA) Sociedade por Quotas Responsibilidada Limitada
(LDA)
Spain Sociedad Andnima (SA) Sociedad Limitada (SL)
Sweden AB - Public Limited AB - Private Limited
United Kingdom / Guarantee; Public, A.I.M.; Public, investment trust; Private
Ireland Public, not quoted; Public, quoted; Unlimited
Note: In order to ensure comparability o f sampled firms across countries, we include only companies from the two broad categories: 
Limited Companies (companies whose capital is divided into shares which can be offered to the general public and whose members 
are only liable for its debts to the extent o f any amount unpaid on their shares) and Limited Liability Companies (companies whose 
capital is divided into shares which cannot be offered to the general public. The liability o f its members is limited to the amount o f 
their shares). We exclude partnerships (at least one partner is liable for the firm's debts), sole proprietorships (there is only one 
shareholder) and cooperatives. We follow Bureau van Dijk’s grouping of the firms’ types. See Klapper et al. (2006) for a similar 
approach.
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3. THE EFFECT OF CREDIT RATIONING ON THE SHAPE OF 
THE COMPETITION-INNOVATION RELATIONSHIP
3.1 Introduction
Product market competition is the driving force of innovation. Competing firms in­
vest in R&D in order to innovate and achieve higher market shares or higher total 
factor productivity growth.1 The competition-to-productivity argument guided re­
forms ranging from the EU’s ‘Single-Market Programme’ and product market reforms 
in other developed countries to the economic transition of many emerging economies 
in Central and Eastern Europe or Asia.2 However, competition pressure may not 
be sufficient for reaching high innovation levels and therefore innovation-enhancing 
policies implemented through an increase in competition may fail.
The three most frequently cited obstacles to innovation by firms in the European 
Community Innovation Surveys are high cost of innovation, lack of financing, and 
economic risk.3 According to the surveys, large firms are more innovative than small 
firms by a factor of three to four when innovativeness is measured by R&D spend­
ing. A smaller proportion of large firms also reports lack of financing among the 
most significant obstacles to innovation. These survey findings are consistent with
1 See Aghion, Harris, Howitt, and Vickers (2001); Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen (1999); 
Nickell (1996); or, more recently, Griffith, Harrison, and Simpson (2006).
2  See Buigues, Ilzkovitz, and Lebrun (1990) for the EU; Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) for OECD 
countries; Bolton and Roland (1992), Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami (2004), Djankov and Murrell 
(2002), Li (1999), or Roland (2001) for emerging economies.
3  See Jaumotte and Pain (2005a, 2005b).
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small firms finding it more difficult to raise external finance,4 fund R&D projects, 
and therefore innovating less. Access to external finance may be one of the key 
determinants of innovation success. As innovation activities typically involve intan­
gible assets, are complex, and carry high risk, the quality of the financial system is 
likely to be important for securing outside financing for high-technology companies, 
especially in their early stage, and therefore for achieving high innovation levels.5
To understand what role external finance plays in R&D, I develop a theory of 
innovation tha t examines how the interaction between competition and financial 
constraints determines R&D activity and test the predictions of my theory empiri­
cally. Specifically, I extend the dynamic model of the step-by-step innovation race of 
Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005), who analyze how competition 
affects aggregate innovation activity. In Aghion et al. (2005), firms innovate by 
spending effort that is unbounded, and they incur no financial cost while innovating. 
Their analysis thus omits finance, potentially a very important element in a theory 
of innovation. The novel feature I add to the current theory of competition and 
innovation is that firms innovate by investing cash in R&D and, due to. financial 
frictions, face financial constraints limiting their ability to raise external finance and 
therefore to invest.
In the model of the step-by-step innovation race, competition drives incentives 
to innovate by technology leaders and followers. Specifically, the innovation incen­
tives of technology leaders and followers depend upon the difference between post-
4  See Beck and Demirgiig-Kunt (2006) and Beck, Demirgiig-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) for 
evidence that the effect financial development has on a firm’s growth is strongest for the smallest 
companies. Berger and Udell (2006) devise a framework to study the financing of small and medium 
enterprises.
5  In their analysis of the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the London Stock Exchange, 
Arcot, Black, and Owen (2007) show that AIM has become an important source of funding for 
early-stage high-technology companies internationally. They argue that the key driver behind 
AIM’s success and growth is the fact that AIM is embedded in the cluster of skills, experience, and 
resources which has been built up in the City over many years.
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and pre-innovation rents. If competition reduces pre-innovation rents, it increases 
the incremental payoff from innovating and encourages R&D investments aimed at 
‘escaping competition’. In contrast, if competition reduces post-innovation rents, it 
discourages innovation (this is the so-called Schumpeterian effect). When I intro­
duce financial constraints into this framework, competition interacts with financial 
constraints so that two new ways in which competition affects innovation activity 
emerge: the ‘lack-of-internal funds effect’ and the ‘strategic effect’. Intuitively, the 
two effects work as follows.
First, competition—through altering profits and hence internal funds—limits the 
amount firms can invest in R&D on their own. Therefore, in the absence of friction- 
less financial market, firms may not invest optimally, i.e., according to the difference 
between post- and pre-innovation rents determined by competition, as their internal 
funds may be insufficient. The non-trivial dual effect of competition on innovation 
incentives through rents and, at the same time, internal funds and the degree of 
credit rationing has not been explored to date. I develop this idea into a structural 
model of the wedge between the optimal unconstrained and constrained-feasible R&D 
investment in which the fundamental parameter is competition.
Second, competition—by affecting how much firms can invest in R&D as well as 
how much they would like to invest—determines which firms are constrained and 
which are not. In industry equilibrium, firms choose their R&D strategies depending 
on whether their competitors are constrained or not. Constrained competitors are 
forced to invest less in R&D, which increases the post-innovation rents of uncon­
strained firms, and hence gives them extra innovation incentives. In other words, 
unconstrained firms react strategically to the fact that their competitors are con­
strained by increasing their R&D investment. As a result, there is a new channel 
through which competition sets incentives to innovate; in addition to the direct effect 
through rents, there is an indirect strategic effect.
I show that the effect of competition on aggregate innovation intensity differs de­
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pending on whether firms have frictionless access to external finance or are subject 
to financial constraints. In the presence of constraints, the wedge between the first- 
best and financially-constrained aggregate innovation intensity is positive at both 
intense and very relaxed levels of competition. When I compare the steady state 
equilibria of industries with very intense and extremely intense (very relaxed and 
extremely relaxed) competition levels, the wedge is larger in industries with more 
extreme competition levels. The intuition behind these results is as follows. When 
intensely competing firms employ the same technology, they aim at high R&D in­
vestments in order to ‘escape competition’ by innovating and securing monopoly 
rents as technology leaders. At the same time, the intensely competing firms have 
low internal funds so the wedge between the preferred and feasible R&D investment 
is large when external finance is not available. A different intuition explains the 
surprising positive wedge when competition is relaxed. Technology laggards have 
stronger incentives to invest in R&D when their post-innovation rents, i.e., the rents 
achieved after matching current technology leaders, is high. This is when competi­
tion between firms operating the same technology is relaxed. Without frictionless 
access to external finance, the laggards’ profits might be too low to allow high R&D 
investment induced by relaxed competition and the positive wedge arises. These 
results are consistent with the interpretation provided by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Pe­
tersen (1988, 2000) and contested by Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) for a positive 
correlation between cash flow and investment.6 More interestingly, my model can be 
used to guide empirical tests in this area: R&D-cash flow sensitivity is particularly 
strong when competition is very intense and very relaxed.
The theory of innovation closest to my model is that of Aghion, Dewatripont, 
and Rey (1999) who analyze the incentive effects of competition and financial market
6  Cleary, Povel, and Raith (2007) conduct an extensive theoretical and empirical analysis of the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity problem and explain why the two literatures arrive at opposite 
results. Riddick and W hited (2008) document how difficult it is to assess the cost of external 
finance based on a firm’s saving behavior.
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discipline on growth when firms are non profit-maximizing. They model the finance- 
incentive channel as a corporate governance mechanism of financial markets that 
elicits innovation activity from slacking managers by enforcing financial contracts and 
denying renegotiation.7 However, their analysis leaves out the effect of competition 
on the degree of credit rationing, the central argument of my model. In contrast to 
Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1999), I show that finance has real consequences for 
innovation even if firms are profit-maximizing. In another related study, Povel and 
Raith (2004) build on an extensive industrial organization literature8 to analyze the 
interaction of financing and output market decisions in a static duopoly framework 
in which one firm is financially constrained and can borrow to finance production 
costs. They derive debt as an optimal contract and find that, compared with a 
situation in which both firms are unconstrained, the financially constrained firm 
produces less while its unconstrained rival produces more. The mechanism of my 
model is different from Povel and Raith (2004) in that I use a dynamic model of 
innovation race in which competition drives R&D investments of individual firms, 
the firms’ investments determine the aggregate industry structure, and the industry 
structure feeds back into firms’ individual decisions.9 The focus of my analysis is 
to compare steady state equilibria when competing firms have frictionless access to 
external finance with those when firms are financially constrained.
To empirically test the predictions of my theory, I examine whether the competition- 
innovation pattern varies across countries with different levels of financial develop­
7  Koke and Renneboog (2005) investigate the effect of corporate governance and competition 
on productivity growth empirically. Giroud and Mueller (2007, 2008) verify that firms in non­
competitive industries benefit relatively more from good corporate governance.
8  The effect of exogenously imposed debt on product market decisions is studied in, e.g., Brander 
and Lewis (1986) or Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996). More recently, FaUre-Grimaud (2000) and 
Maurer (1999) use models where financial contracting is optimally determined together with product 
market decisions.
9  Akdogu and MacKay (2008) empirically investigate how industry structure affects firms’ in­
vestment decisions by changing the value of the real options they face.
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ment.10 Financial development plays a key role in overcoming market frictions, which 
represent a fundamental source of external finance cost and give rise to financial con­
straints.11 Financial development proxies the presence of financial constraints at the 
country level. Applying a differ ence-in-differences methodology on cross-industry, 
cross-country European data from the period 1995-2004,1 ask whether, for example, 
Italian financial institutions differ significantly from those of the UK in their ability 
to provide external finance to firms in industries with very intense and very relaxed 
competition levels relative to their ability to provide external finance to firms in 
industries with intermediate competition levels.
Using industries with intermediate competition levels as the benchmark group, 
there is strong evidence of a disproportionate positive effect of financial development 
on R&D investment in industries where competition is very intense. The correspond­
ing evidence for industries where competition is relaxed is weaker, but I still find that 
R&D investment is disproportionately lower in countries with low financial develop­
ment compared to countries with highly developed financial systems. In other words, 
the competition-innovation relationship has an inverted-U shape in less financially 
developed systems relative to the benchmark pattern observed in countries with 
highly developed financial systems.
These findings add to an extensive literature on the finance-growth nexus12 and 
suggest a new mechanism for how financial development promotes growth. Financial 
development helps corporate growth as better financial systems allow financing of 
firms that invest in R&D projects independently of their industry’s current prof­
itability determined by competition.
1 0  Aghion et al. (2005) investigate the shape of the relationship between competition and inno­
vation and find an inverted-U pattern using a two-digit SIC industry panel of 354 industry-year 
observations based on an unbalanced panel of 311 UK firms.
11 See the survey by Levine (1997).
12 See King and Levine (1993), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Fisman and Love (2004), or Bena and 
Jurajda (2007).
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The paper proceeds as follows. The next section develops the theory of innova­
tion based on competition and financial constraints and derives testable predictions. 
Section 3.3 explains the empirical model and presents results. Section 3.4 concludes. 
Proofs are in the Appendix.
3.2 A Theory of Innovation Based on Com petition and Financial
Constraints
3.2.1 Model
Using a dynamic model of a step-by-step innovation race between financially con­
strained firms, I analyze how product market competition affects innovation activity. 
The economy has a continuum of industries indexed by i € [0,1]. Each industry is a 
duopoly with respect to production and innovation. The duopolists participate in an 
innovation race and maximize the expected discounted sum of profits from supplying 
their goods to consumers over an infinite horizon. Time is continuous and the unit 
mass of identical and infinitely-lived consumers have preferences
U = J  |  J  In Yi(t)di — L(i) 1 e~n dt,
where Yi(t) is the output of industry i at date t , L(t) is labor supplied at date t, 
and 1 > r > 0 is the rate of time preference. The micro-model of the interaction 
between duopolists is analogous to that of Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and 
Howitt (2002). The logarithmic preferences imply that, in equilibrium, consumers 
spend a constant proportion of income on the output of each industry i at all dates 
t. The demand functions facing the two firms in any industry i depend on the degree 
of substitutability between the two goods duopolists produce. Each firm takes the 
wage as given and produces output using labor as the only input according to a 
constant-returns-to-scale production function. The unit costs of production of the 
two firms are independent of the quantities produced.
There is an infinite sequence of technology levels A: =  0 ,1 ,2 , Each firm engages
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in R&D in order to acquire the next technology level. The technological advantage 
decreases the firm’s unit cost of production relative to its competitor. The state 
of an industry is described by the pair of technology levels (k, k — m) of a current 
industry leader and a laggard, m  is the laggard’s technological gap. To obtain a 
closed-form solution, I assume that the technological gap between the firms cannot 
exceed one level.13 At any date t , an industry is in one of two states: neck-and-neck, 
m =  0; or unleveled, m  = 1.
The equilibrium profit of each firm depends on the relative unit production cost 
of the two firms, the degree of substitutability between the two goods, and the 
nature of product market competition. Similarly to Aghion et al. (2005), I follow 
the reduced-form approach and define 7Ti (tt_i) to be the profit flow of the leader 
(the laggard) in the unleveled state and 7To to be the profit flow of each firm in the 
neck-and-neck state, where 7Ti > 7To > 7r_i > 0 and IT =  7Ti — 7r_i > 0. Note that the 
monopoly rent brought about by technological leadership II is independent of the 
leader’s technology level k .u
The intensity of competition is modeled as the degree to which the two firms in 
the neck-and-neck state are able to collude against consumers, which is captured by 
parameter A G [ |,  l] in the profit flow 7r0 =  7r_i +  (1 — A)II.15 If competition is 
intense, A =  1, each firm earns profit flow 7r_i equal to the laggard’s profit flow in 
the unleveled state. In the opposite case, if competition is relaxed, A = | ,  each firm 
earns profit flow 7r_i +  | l l  as the two firms share, in the same proportion, a collusion
1 3  The knowledge spillover between the leader and the laggard is such that if the firm, which 
is already one step ahead, innovates, the lagging firm automatically learns the leader’s previous 
technology. Aghion et al. (2005) use the same assumption. Aghion et al. (2001) analyze the case 
when ra >  1  and show that the main conclusions are qualitatively equivalent to the one-lag model.
1 4  As discussed in Aghion, Harris, and Vickers (1997), in a variety of product market competi­
tion settings— including Bertrand and Cournot— firms’ equilibrium profit flows depend only on the 
technological gap and not on the technology level.
1 5  An increase in the degree of substitutability between the two goods leads to an analogous 
reduced-form parameterization of profit flow 7Tq.
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rent equal to the monopoly rent derived from technological leadership EL16
Moving one technological step ahead happens at the rate determined by the 
amount of cash invested in R&D. In the unleveled state, if the laggard invests y  
in R&D he innovates and catches up with the leader with a Poisson hazard rate 
(‘innovation intensity’) y / y  4- h. Parameter 1 > h > 0 captures the intensity of 
the innovation spillover effect.17 The leader does not invest in R&D as she derives 
no advantage by innovating. In the neck-and-neck state, by investing x  in R&D 
each firm moves one technological step ahead (becomes the leader) with innovation 
intensity y/x.
Finally, I assume that the firms have no access to external finance. In both 
states, no firm can invest more than its current profit, x < tto and y < 7r_i.18 This 
assumption is strong for two reasons. Firms cannot transfer cash across states of the 
industry, and they do not have access to any risk-sharing technology (financial sys­
tem) that allows cash transfers across industries. To study the model including these 
characteristics is interesting, but not the focus of this paper. This paper answers the 
question: W hat is the consequence of financial constraints for innovation activity? 
Therefore, I contrast the first-best equilibria derived when financial constraints are 
not present (e.g., when firms decide their R&D investments based on their incentives
1 6  For simplicity, in the version of the model presented here, the monopoly rent derived from 
technological leadership II is independent of competition (i.e., the advantage of a cost reduction 
achieved by innovation does not depend on competition). As argued in Boone (2008), more intense 
competition (brought about by more aggressive interaction among existing firms) makes more 
efficient firms benefit disproportionately more relative to less efficient firms, which means that 
II increases with competition. This reinforces the model’s predictions: The wedge between the 
first-best and financially-constrained aggregate innovation intensity is even higher.
1 7  The predictions of the model about the effect of financial constraints on innovation activity 
do not depend on whether the innovation spillover effect is present or not. As existing literature 
typically studies this class of models including the innovation spillover, I solve the model when 
h >  0 .
1 8  I assume the simplest form of financial constraints. No results are changed if firms can only 
invest a fraction of their profits: x <  ano and y  <  /?7r_i, where a  G (0,1], (3 €  (0,1].
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only) with corresponding equilibria under no access to external finance.
3.2.2 Unconstrained Equilibrium
I analyze the symmetric stationary Markov equilibrium. Proposition 3.2.1 presents 
the equilibrium R&D investment x  (y ) in the neck-and-neck (the unleveled) state 
which solves each neck-and-neck firm’s (the laggard’s) optimization problem ignoring 
the financial constraints.
Proposition 3.2.1: 1. In the neck-and-neck state, each firm invests
x = [y/(h  -I- r )2 -1- A ll -  (h +  r)^j .
2. In the unleveled state, the laggard invests
y — [ y (h +  r )2 -I- A ll -  y /(h  + r)2 + U + x 'j .
In the next Corollary, I present comparative static properties of equilibrium R&D 
investments x  and y with respect to the intensity of competition, technological lead­
ership rent, innovation spillover intensity, and rate of time preference.
Corollary 3.2.2: 1. In the neck-and-neck state, each firm’s R&D investment sat­
isfies
dx n dx ^ dx n , dx
0A ’ an ’ ’ dr
2. In the unleveled state, the laggard’s R&D investment satisfies
In the neck-and-neck state, an increase in competition decreases current profit 
7To and increases the incremental payoff from innovating for fixed tt\ . Therefore, the 
incentive to innovate and the R&D investment of each firm in the neck-and-neck 
state increases with competition—the ‘escape-competition’ effect (Aghion, Harris,
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and Vickers, 1997).19 In contrast, the laggard’s R&D investment decreases with 
competition. This is because for a given technological leadership rent II, the laggard’s 
incentive to innovate increases with profit tvq he gets when he catches up with the 
leader. As profit 7To decreases if competition intensifies, more intense competition 
lowers the incremental payoff from successful innovation and disincentivizes R&D 
investment (the so-called Schumpeterian effect).
In both states, the firms’ R&D investments increase with the technological lead­
ership rent and decrease with the innovation spillover intensity and rate of time 
preference. The former result obtains because the difference between the value of 
being the leader and the laggard increases with the technological leadership rent. 
The latter result obtains because an increase in the innovation spillover intensity 
(the rate of time preference) crowds out incentives to innovate by investing in R&D 
in both states (lowers payoffs from innovating through heavier discounting).
As the economy has a continuum of industries of mass one and each industry 
is either in the unleveled or in the neck-and-neck state, the aggregate innovation 
intensity is the weighted sum of the two firms’ innovation intensities in the neck- 
and-neck state and the laggard’s innovation intensity in the unleveled state, I  = 
‘IXyJx +  (1 — A) (yjy +  h ) . Weights A and (1 — A) are the fractions of industries in the 
two states, respectively. Fraction A is endogenous as it depends on the firms’ R&D 
investments in the two states. Corollary 3.2.3 presents the steady state20 equilibrium 
aggregate innovation intensity as a function of R&D investments x and y , as well 
as its comparative static properties with respect to the intensity of competition and
1 9  In the extreme case, when A =  1, the profit of each firm in the neck-and-neck state is 7To =  tt_i 
and the incremental payoff from a successful innovation is II. In contrast, when A =  ^, the profit 
of each firm in the neck-and-neck state is ttq =  7r_i +  | l l  as each firm already enjoys a collusion 
rent equal to half of the technological leadership rent. In this case, the incremental payoff from 
successful innovation is only 5 II.
2 0  In the steady state, the flow of industries from the neck-and-neck state to the unleveled state 
matches the opposite flow, 2\%fx =  (1 — A) (y/y  +  h).
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innovation spillover intensity.
Corollary 3.2.3: 1. The aggregate innovation intensity is
I  = ±y/x{y/y + ti)
2>/i +  >Jy + h'
2. When the innovation spillover effect is absent, the aggregate innovation inten­
sity decreases with competition: ^  < 0 when h = 0.
3. When the innovation spillover intensity is sufficiently high, the competition- 
aggregate innovation relationship has an inverted-U shape: ^  > 0 for A G 
[2? ^ peak) and < 0 for A E (Apeaki l]*
4. The aggregate innovation intensity has an inverted-U shape with respect to 
the innovation spillover intensity: > 0 for h E [0, hpeak) and |^  < 0 for
A E (hpeak, l].21
Aggregate innovation intensity I  is established as an endogenous combination of 
the ‘escape-competition’ and the Schumpeterian effects that drive firm-level R&D 
investments in the two states. If there is no innovation spillover effect (h =  0), most 
industries are in the unleveled state in which only the Schumpeterian effect operates, 
and the aggregate innovation intensity always decreases with competition. A positive 
innovation spillover effect (h > 0) makes more industries switch from the unleveled 
to the neck-and-neck state and the Schumpeterian effect no longer dominates. When 
the innovation spillover intensity is sufficiently high, the fraction of industries that 
are in the neck-and-neck state is high enough for the ‘escape-competition’ effect to 
win over the Schumpeterian effect. The ‘escape-competition’ effect wins earlier if 
competition is low as, in this case, the laggards invest a lot in R&D which pushes 
the fraction of industries that are in the neck-and-neck state further up. As a result, 
the aggregate innovation intensity increases with competition at low competition
2 1  Explicit formulas for threshold quantities A peak and hpeak are in Appendix C.
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levels while it decreases with competition at high competition levels.22
Interestingly, despite the fact that the firms’ R&D investments are decreasing in 
the innovation spillover intensity in both states, the aggregate innovation intensity 
has an inverted-U shape with respect to h. This result obtains because higher innova­
tion spillover intensity reduces the firms’ incentives to invest in R&D in both states, 
but the laggard innovates more often for any R&D investment level. At low levels of 
innovation spillover intensity, most industries are in the unleveled state where only 
the laggards invest in R&D. In this case, if the innovation spillover intensity increases, 
the negative effect on the laggards’ incentives to invest in R&D is dominated by their 
extra innovating due to a higher innovation spillover. As a result, the aggregate inno­
vation intensity increases if the innovation spillover effect increases from an initially 
low level. At high levels of innovation spillover intensity, more industries are in the 
neck-and-neck state where both firms invest in R&D and—as they employ the same 
technology—do not innovate due to the innovation spillover effect. Therefore, if the 
innovation spillover intensity is high and increases, the negative effect on incentives 
to invest in R&D dominates and the aggregate innovation intensity decreases.
3.2.3 Binding Financial Constraints
In the previous section, I solved for the equilibrium in the absence of financial con­
straints. Proposition 3.2.4 characterizes the parameter space for which the uncon­
strained equilibrium of Proposition 3.2.1 does not exist as the financial constraints 
are violated, i.e., x > 7Tq or y > 7r_i.
Proposition 3.2.4: 1. In the neck-and-neck state, each firm’s R&D investment ex­
ceeds profit, x > 7To, if and only if
7Ti . 7Ti . - . 2An — 7Ti7r_i < — and —  < A and h -f r <
2 2n 2vVi -  An'
2 2  This confirms Aghion et al.’s (2005) competition-innovation inverted-U result. Interestingly, 
the necessary condition for the inverted-U is h >  0. I verified that the same necessary condition is 
present in Aghion et al. (2005).
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The necessary condition for x > 7Tq is A > A, where A is the competition level 
at which the financial constraint of a firm in the neck-and-neck state is just 
satisfied
_  7Ti +  (h-f-r) ^y /(/T+T)2~+~27i7 -  (h +  r)^
A =  m
2. In the unleveled state, when h =  0 and r  =  0, the laggard’s R&D investment 
exceeds profit, 3/ >  7r_i, if and only if
(  2 - v / 2 \  (  2 - V 2  A
I 7T_i <  — - — 7Ti I or I n- i  =  — ^— 7Ti and A < 1 I or
3 - \ / 3  ( n - T r - r ) 2^_ _ Tl and A < ^  j .
When h +  r > 0, the necessary condition for y > 7r_i is A < A, where A is the 
competition level at which the laggard’s financial constraint is just satisfied
_  (n — 7r—1)2 4- 4(h +  r)2 [n -  27T-1 -  2(h + r)^/WTi]
~ ~  4 ( v/5rrT+ft +  r ) 2n
Since firms’ R&D investments are increasing in the technological leadership rent 
in both states, a high-enough leadership rent is sufficient for the firms’ financial 
constraints to become binding. In contrast, the effect of competition on financial 
constraints is opposite in the two states. A firm in the neck-and-neck state becomes 
financially constrained if competition is intense enough, while the laggard’s financial 
constraint is binding when competition is relaxed. This follows from the fact that 
the R&D investment of a firm in the neck-and-neck state (of the laggard) increases 
(decreases) with competition and therefore it hits the limit set by the profit at a high 
(low) competition level. In Proposition 3.2.4, I present the threshold competition 
intensities A (A) at which the financial constraint of the laggard (of a firm in the 
neck-and-neck state) is just satisfied.
Quantities A and A split all admissible competition levels into three regions:
(i) The relaxed competition region, A G [ |,  A], in which the laggard is financially 
constrained; (ii) The intermediate competition region, A E (A, A), in which the 
unconstrained equilibrium of Proposition 3.2.1 exists; (iii) The intense competition
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region, A G [A, 1], in which the firms in the neck-and-neck state are constrained. 
The necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of these three competition 
regions, i.e., \  < A < A < 1, is stated in Appendix C while proving Proposition 
3.2.4.
An increase in the innovation spillover intensity (in the rate of time preference) 
makes the financial constraints binding for a smaller set of competition levels in both 
states (A decreases and A increases). This is because, for given profits 7Ti, 7r_i and 
competition level A, a higher innovation spillover intensity (rate of time preference) 
decreases the firms’ R&D investments in both states. Similarly, an increase in 7Ti 
(or a decrease in 7 r _ i )  makes the set of competition levels for which the financial 
constraints are binding larger.23
To summarize, the effect of a competition increase (decrease) on the degree to 
which firms’ financial constraints are binding is non-trivial. Technology laggards 
become less (more) constrained while firms operating similar technology become 
more (less) constrained. These results are illustrated in Figure 3.1.
3.2.4 Financially Constrained Equilibrium
In this section, I describe the firms’ equilibrium R&D investments and the equilib­
rium aggregate innovation intensity in the presence of financial constraints. Propo­
sition 3.2.5 presents the equilibrium R&D investments which solve the optimization 
problem of a firm in the neck-and-neck state and the optimization problem of the 
laggard when their financial constraints are binding.
Proposition 3.2.5: Consider the model under the set of parameters {7Ti, 7r_i, h,r}  
such that |  < A < A < 1.
1. In the relaxed competition region, A G [ |,  A], the laggard’s R&D investment 
is yc — 7T i , while each firm in the neck-and-neck state invests x u.
2 3  See the proof of Proposition 3.2.4 in Appendix C for a complete comparative static analysis of 
threshold intensities A  and A .
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2. In the intense competition region, A G [A, 1], the laggard’s R&D investment 
is yu, while each firm in the neck-and-neck state invests xc =  7To.24
In Corollary 3.2.6,1 compare R&D investments xu and yu with their counterparts 
derived in the case of no financial constraints (Proposition 3.2.1).
Corollary 3.2.6: Consider the model under the set of parameters {tti, 7r_i, h, r } such 
that |  < A < A < 1.
1. In the relaxed competition region, A G [ | 5 A ] j  each firm’s R&D investment in 
the neck-and-neck state satisfies
x u > x  for A G i ,  A ] and xu =  x  at A =  A.
2. In the intense competition region, A G [A, 1], the laggard’s R&D investment 
satisfies
yu > y for A G (A, l] and yu = y at A =  A.
Relative to the model of section 3.2.2 with no financial constraints, the laggard’s 
R&D investment has to be lower in the relaxed competition region as his financial 
constraint binds. This decreases the probability that the laggard catches up with the 
leader, and that means the industry is in the unleveled state with a higher probability 
at any point in time, which increases (decreases) the value of being the leader (the 
laggard) for given 7Ti, 7r_i, h , and r. For the same reason, the incremental payoff 
from becoming the leader (the laggard) if a firm is currently in the neck-and-neck 
state increases (decreases) and therefore its R&D investment is higher, x u > x. At 
the threshold competition intensity A, the R&D investment of each firm in the neck- 
and-neck state is the same as in the case with no financial constraints, xu =  x. The 
laggard’s incentive is to maximize the probability of leaving the unleveled state, his 
financial constraint is binding, and his R&D investment is limited at yc =  7r_i for all 
A e  [i,A ],
2 4  Explicit formulas x u and yu are in Appendix C.
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The presence of financial constraints changes the way competition affects the 
firms’ R&D investments. Within the relaxed competition region, a higher competi­
tion level does not make the laggard invest less in R&D. His financial constraint is 
binding and he invests all his profit—the Schumpeterian effect of higher competition 
does not unfold. In contrast, the ‘escape-competition’ effect of the neck-and-neck 
state is stronger in comparison to the case with no financial constraints, as the in­
cremental payoff achieved when a firm becomes the leader is higher.
A similar intuition works when firms in the neck-and-neck state are constrained. 
Relative to the no-financial-constraints model, the R&D investment of each firm in 
the neck-and-neck state has to be lower within the intense competition region as 
their financial constraints are binding. Lower neck-and-neck state R&D investment 
means that the industry is in this state with a higher probability at any point in 
time. For given 7Ti, 7r_i, h, and r, this increases the incremental payoff of the laggard 
from switching into the neck-and-neck state and therefore induces him to invest 
more in R&D, yu > y. At the threshold competition intensity A, the laggard’s R&D 
investment is the same as in the case with no financial constraints, yu = y. The 
laggard’s extra incentive to switch to the neck-and-neck state and to increase his 
R&D investment above y is lower the higher the competition level. This is because 
intense competition reduces 7To and makes the neck-and-neck state less desirable. The 
value of a firm in the neck-and-neck state is lower, the bigger the deviation of its R&D 
investment from the optimal unconstrained level. Therefore, the financial constraints 
in the neck-and-neck state are binding and the equilibrium R&D investment of each 
firm is limited at x c = no for all A G [A, 1].
In contrast to the case without financial constraints, a higher competition level 
within the intense competition region is associated with lower R&D investments of 
firms in the neck-and-neck state. These firms want to invest a lot to escape very high 
competition but, as no decreases with competition, they have only a small amount of 
cash available, which makes the effect of a competition increase particularly strong.
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The wedge between the no-financial-constraints and the financially-constrained R&D 
investment is larger the closer the competition level is to its maximum level. The 
presence of financial constraints in the neck-and-neck state reverses the ‘escape- 
competition’ effect.
Quantities x u, x c, yu, and yc are presented in Figure 3.2. The R&D investment 
of a firm in the neck-and-neck state (the laggard) in the relaxed competition region, 
x u (yc), is depicted using the red (light) solid lines in the top (bottom) right graph 
of Figure 3.2. The same two graphs depict the R&D investment of a firm in the 
neck-and-neck state (the laggard) in the intense competition region, xc (yu). Finally, 
for ease of comparison, the blue (dark) dashed lines depict the corresponding optimal 
R&D investments in the no-financial-constraints model.
Corollary 3.2.7 presents the steady state equilibrium aggregate innovation inten­
sity as a function of R&D investments xu and yc (xc and yu) in the relaxed (intense) 
competition region. It also compares the aggregate innovation intensity with the one 
derived in the case of no financial constraints (Corollary 3.2.3).
Corollary 3.2.7: Consider the model under the set of parameters {7Ti, tt_i, h , r} such 
that \  < A < A < 1.
1. In the relaxed competition region, A E [ |, A], the aggregate innovation inten- 
sity is and satisfies
'{xu,yc} < I  for A E i ,  A^ and I{Xu,yc} = I  at A =  A.
2. In the intense competition region, A E [A, 1], the aggregate innovation inten- 
sity is / KiV„} =  ^ + ^ 2  and satisfies
/{xc,„„} <  I  for A € (A, 1] and =  /  at A =  A.
The aggregate innovation intensities I{Xu,yc} and I{Xc,Vu} are derived using the 
steady state condition that the flow of industries from the neck-and-neck state to 
the unleveled state matches the opposite flow. The flows are determined by the firms’
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R&D investments {xu, yc} and {xc, yu} in the relaxed and the intense competition 
region, respectively. The aggregate innovation intensities I{Xu,yc} and I{Xc,yu) are 
strictly below the unconstrained aggregate innovation intensity inside both extreme 
competition regions and are equal to it at the threshold competition levels A and A.
Quantities J, I{Xu>yc}, and I{XcyVu} are displayed in the top left graph of Figure 
3.2. The blue inverted-U line which depicts the aggregate innovation intensity of 
the model with no financial constraints has three segments: The solid middle part, 
where the unconstrained equilibrium of Proposition 3.2.1 exists; and the two dashed 
parts, which depict the aggregate innovation intensity of Corollary 3.2.3 ignoring 
financial constraints. The aggregate innovation intensities of the model with financial 
constraints are depicted in the same graph using solid red lines in both constrained 
regions: I{Xu,yc} for A € [ |,  A] and I{Xc,Vu) for A G [A, 1].
When I compare the steady state equilibria of industries with very intense and 
extremely intense (very relaxed and extremely relaxed) competition levels, the wedge 
between the unconstrained and the financially constrained aggregate innovation in­
tensity is larger in the industries with extreme levels. The competition-innovation 
relationship has a more pronounced inverted-U shape in the presence of financial 
constraints. The wedge is especially marked if the competition level is close to its 
maximum. In this case, the R&D investments of both firms in the neck-and-neck 
state are severely constrained by their low profits. The result of low R&D investments 
is that many industries are in the neck-and-neck state, thus many industries invest 
only a small amount in R&D, and the aggregate innovation intensity is very low. 
Without access to external finance the firms axe trapped in the neck-and-neck state 
and the economy is in high competition, low profit, and low innovation equilibrium.
The negative direct effect of financial constraints on aggregate innovation inten­
sity is partially offset by the fact that the unconstrained firm strategically increases 
its R&D investment if it faces a constrained competitor. To illustrate the magnitude 
of this effect, the top left graph of Figure 3.2 also depicts (red dashed lines) the
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aggregate innovation intensities under the assumption tha t the unconstrained firm 
does not change its R&D investment in response to the fact that its competitor is 
constrained.25
Finally, to facilitate intuition on how the firms’ R&D investments are combined 
into the aggregate innovation intensity in industry equilibrium, the bottom left graph 
of Figure 3.2 shows the equilibrium probabilities of an industry to be in the neck- 
and-neck state as a function of competition.
3.2.5 Testable Predictions
The main aggregate-level prediction follows from Corollary 3.2.7, which states that 
the effect of competition on aggregate innovation intensity differs depending on 
whether firms have frictionless access to external finance or are subject to finan­
cial constraints. In the presence of constraints, there is a positive wedge between 
the first-best and financially-constrained aggregate innovation intensity at both in­
tense and very relaxed levels of competition. In addition, when I compare the steady 
state equilibria of industries with very intense and extremely intense (very relaxed 
and extremely relaxed) competition levels, the wedge is larger in industries with 
more extreme competition levels. Empirically, one can contrast the competition- 
innovation pattern across economies with/without financial constraints, e.g., across 
countries with highly- and less developed financial systems. Specifically, the slope of 
the competition-innovation pattern in less financially developed systems is steeper 
relative to the benchmark observed in countries with highly developed financial sys­
tems for very relaxed as well as intense competition levels. The slope is the same at 
intermediate competition levels (see the top left graph of Figure 3.2). This prediction 
is tested in section 3.3.
2 5  The red dashed lines show the aggregate innovation intensity determined as follows. For A  € 
[ | ,  A ] , the laggard invests yc =  7r_i and each firm in the neck-and-neck state invests x  (part one 
of Proposition 3.2.1). For A G [A, 1 ], each firm in the neck-and-neck state invests x c =  7r0  and the 
laggard invests y  (part two of Proposition 3.2.1).
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In addition, there are multiple micro-level predictions tha t are testable if one is 
able to (i) empirically distinguish the neck-and-neck from the unleveled industries;
(ii) measure innovation at the firm level; and (iii) identify financially constrained 
firms. First, the model has predictions about firms in industries with low productiv­
ity dispersion (firms in the neck-and-neck state) and high competition (the intense 
competition region according to the notation of my model). When firms in such 
industries have frictionless access to external finance, higher competition is associ­
ated with higher innovation (part one of Corollary 3.2.2), while the opposite holds if 
the same firms are financially constrained (part two of Proposition 3.2.5). Second, 
the model has predictions about relatively low-productive firms in industries with 
high productivity dispersion (laggards in the unleveled state) and low competition 
(the relaxed competition region of my model). When firms in such industries have 
frictionless access to external finance, higher competition is associated with lower 
innovation (part two of Corollary 3.2.2), while innovation does not change with com­
petition if the same firms are financially constrained (part one of Proposition 3.2.5).
I test the firm-level predictions in Bena (2008) using European Patent Office data 
matched with financial statements from the Amadeus database for the period 1997- 
2005.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
In this section I explain the empirical model, describe the data, and present the 
results from testing whether the aggregate predictions of the theory are consistent 
with real data.
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3.3.1 Methodology
Consistent with the theory, my empirical approach maintains that the primary chan­
nel through which competition affects innovation is economic rent.26 Rents are de­
termined by competition, but they also depend on productivity which is driven by 
innovation (Griffith, Harrison, and Simpson, 2006). Therefore, trying to disentangle 
the effect of competition on innovation empirically raises a fundamental identifi­
cation problem: one needs to isolate the part of variation in competition that is 
unrelated to innovation. I address the endogeneity by using a set of instruments 
that provides an exogenous variation in the degree of competitiveness across indus­
tries and countries. The instruments indicate (ex-ante) the industry-country pairs 
expected to be affected by introduction of the EU’s product market reform (‘single 
market’ launched in 1993) because of the pre-existing barriers to competition. The 
corresponding empirical model is
R k D ict =  ax +  Pi - <p (M arginict) +  Vi +  7c  +  St +  Cict (3.1a) 
M arginid  =  ot2 +  RMP!C • 02 +  rji +  yc <5* +  £icti (3.1b)
where M arginict denotes a price-cost margin of industry i in country c in year t, and 
RSzDid denotes total R&D expenditures. Function cp() stands for non-linear semi- 
parametric specifications, as my model predicts a non-linear pattern. Marginict is 
an endogenous variable in the innovation equation (3.1a). Vector SMP'ic contains
2 6  Existing empirical work also uses economic rent: Gorodnichenko, Svejnar, and Terrell (2007), 
Griffith, Harrison, and Simpson (2006), Nickell (1996), or Nickell, Nicolitsas, and Dryden (1997). 
Alternatives to the price-cost margin (economic rent) are measures of market concentration (con­
centration ratios, Herfindahl-Hirschman index, number of firms), the elasticity of a firm’s profit 
with respect to its cost level (Boone, van Ours, and van der Wiel, 2007), and the relative profit 
difference (Boone, 2008). Contrary to first-hand intuition, Sutton (2007) shows that, under general 
assumptions, an increase in competition leads to higher concentration and a lower number of firms 
surviving in the market. This is due to the reallocation effect: If competition increases, more effi­
cient firms gain at the expense of less efficient firms (intensive margin), and less efficient firms leave 
the market (extensive margin). Boone’s measures correct for the reallocation effect but require 
detailed firm-level data that are unavailable in a large cross-section.
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L  instruments excluded from (3.1a). Industry, country, and year dummies that 
control for industry-, country-, and annual-specific unobservable exogenous factors 
in both equations are denoted as rji, 7C, and 8t, respectively. The inclusion of dummy 
variables transforms the data relative to industry-, country-, and annual means and 
the main coefficient of interest Pi is identified by comparing affected (not affected) 
industries in a subset of countries with the same industries that are not affected (are 
affected) in the counterpart countries.
The empirical measures of competition and innovation used in (3.1a) have the­
oretical counterparts as follows. According to the model, the empirical measure of 
competition, Marginict, has an expected value of 2A7ro +  (1 — A) (it\ +  7r_i) and is 
strictly decreasing in theoretical measure of competition A in both the unconstrained 
as well as financially constrained equilibrium. Similarly, the empirical measure of in­
novation activity, RSzDict, has an expected value of 2Xx -I- (1 — A)y and is strictly 
increasing in A in the unconstrained equilibrium. Therefore, when there are no 
financial constraints the model predicts that R&cDict decreases with Marginid] in 
other words, more intense competition as measured by the price-cost margin leads to 
a higher innovation activity as measured by R&D investment. In the financially con­
strained equilibrium, the empirical measure of innovation, R&Dict, has an expected 
value of 2Xxu +  (1 — A)yc in the relaxed competition region (strictly increasing in 
A), while it has an expected value of 2Xxc +  (1 — A)yu in the intense competition 
region (strictly decreasing in A). Moreover, there is a wedge between the first-best 
and financially constrained empirical measure of innovation activity, RhD ia, when 
the empirical measure of competition, Marginid, is both high (intense competition 
region) and low (relaxed competition region).
To test the main prediction of the model, I investigate the competition-innovation 
pattern across countries with different levels of financial development. As the qual­
ity of the financial system is important in overcoming market frictions and securing 
outside financing for intangible and high-risk projects (like R&D), financial develop­
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ment proxies the severity of financial constraints at the country level. My main set 
of results comes from the parsimonious full-interaction specification
R&Dict =  a i  +  ^  P i ' V  (Marginid)  • F D 3C +  rji +  7c +  +  C<ct, (3.2)
j e { H , L }
which replaces equation (3.1a). Term Ylje{H,L} Pi ' viM arginict) • FD{ stands for 
the interaction of the industry price-cost margin with the indicator variables equal to 
unity for countries with above/below median values of financial development measure 
(FD ft and FD%, respectively). In the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998), the 
interaction term together with the country- and industry-level fixed effects helps 
to overcome the endogeneity between innovation and financial development. The 
interaction term contains only that part of the variation in financial development 
that is unrelated to unobservable current and future growth opportunities which drive 
current innovation activity at the country- and industry level. Regression (3.2) asks 
whether the above/below median development of financial markets alters the way 
in which product market competition affects innovation activity conditional on all 
country-, industry-, and year-specific factors. The indicators of financial development 
are measured as of the beginning of the EU’s ‘single market’.
I estimate the empirical model using the generalized method of moments (Hansen, 
1982) and instrumental variables estimators.27 The correlation of instruments with 
the price-cost margin is examined by the fit of the first-stage regression (3.16). I 
use Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) statistics: The R 2 of the first-stage regression 
with the included instruments ‘partialled-out’ and the F-test of the joint significance
2 7  GMM estimators are more efficient in the presence of heteroskedasticity and no worse asymp­
totically than IV estimators if heteroskedasticity is not present (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman, 
2003). Also, while the consistency of the IV coefficient estimates is not affected by the presence 
of heteroskedasticity, the classic IV estimates of the standard errors are inconsistent and the usual 
forms of diagnostic tests for endogeneity and overidentifying restrictions are invalid if heteroskedas­
ticity is present. On the other hand, IV is preferable to GMM in small samples if the error is 
homoskedastic. My results are very similar regardless of what estimation method I use, which is 
reassuring.
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of excluded instruments. As I have multiple endogenous regressors in specification
(3.2) I also report the statistic proposed by Shea (1997): The ‘partial-i?2’ mea­
sure that takes the intercorrelation among instruments into account. Typically, I 
have more excluded instruments than endogenous regressors (equations (3.1a) and
(3.2) are overidentified), which allows testing moment conditions.28 In the case of 
the GMM and heteroskedastic-robust IV estimator I report the J  statistic; in the 
case of the standard IV estimator I report Sargan’s statistic (Sargan, 1958). As 
Margiriict and R h D ict are stable over time (annual factors explain almost no varia­
tion, see ANOVAs in Table 3.A.6), the error terms in equations (3.1a), (3.16), and
(3.2) are likely to exhibit some degree of autocorrelation. Therefore, my preferred 
estimator is a GMM estimator with autocorrelation-consistent or heteroskedastic- 
and-autocorrelation-consistent standard errors.
3.3.2 Data 
Industry-Level Variables
The industry-country-level variables: price-cost margin and R&D expenditures come 
from Eurostat’s Structural Business Statistics database. This database is based on 
detailed data on all enterprises and is available at NACE 3-digit level for the manu­
facturing sector of all EU countries. For robustness, I use capital expenditures as an 
alternative to R&D in all specifications. Capital expenditures are highly correlated 
with R&D and better covered across industries and countries. Typically, capital ex­
penditures regressions are based on more than twice as many observations compared 
to analogous R&D specifications. See Table 3.1 for coverage and basic descriptive 
statistics and Table 3.DA.1 for the exact definition of the variables.
2 8  Define vector ZiCt =  [SM P-C r]i 7 C 5*] that contains all exogenous variables (excluded and 
included instruments). Under the assumption E[ZiCfCict\ =  0, excluded instruments give L moment 
conditions gict(P) =  Z'ict • Qct =  Z'ict ' (R& A ct -  X ict • /?), where X ict =  [(p(Marginict) rji 7 C <5t] 
consists of both endogenous and exogenous regressors in (3.1a). The case with equation (3.2) is 
analogous.
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EJJ ‘Single Market Programme11nstrumental Variables
The list of country-sectors most affected by the introduction of the EU’s ‘Single 
Market Programme’ (SMP) in 1993 (EU-wide product market reform) comes from 
Buigues, Ilzkovitz, and Lebrun (1990), part of the Cecchini report.29 The list was 
composed mainly on the basis of the following structural criteria: (i) The level of non­
tariff barriers (standards, frontier formalities, limited access to public procurement, 
differences in VAT and excise duties, etc.), which measures the degree of protection 
of the sectors; (ii) The dispersion of prices for identical products between EU member 
states, which measures the level of fragmentation of the EU market; (iii) The rate 
of penetration by imports, which measures the share of domestic demand accounted 
for by imports.
The indicators were constructed for 120 industrial sectors out of which 40 sectors 
were identified as ones where non-tariff barriers impede intra-EU trade. The selected 
40 sectors represent about 50 percent of industrial value-added in the EU (ranges 
from 55 percent in Germany to 39 percent in Spain). Finally, national experts were 
requested to verify the pertinence of the list of 40 sectors relevant at the EU level for 
their own countries. Table 3.4 provides basic characteristics of the industry-country 
pairs affected by the reform while Table 3.DA.1 lists the affected industries and 
follows Buigues, Ilzkovitz, and Lebrun (1990) in classifying them into six groups.
Financial Development Indicators
Data on financial development are drawn from the World Bank’s Financial Structure 
and Economic Development Database (March 2005 version) described in detail in 
Beck, Demirgiig-Kunt, and Levine (2000). To make my results comparable with those 
in’the literature I use a number of measures of finance activity to proxy financial 
development. I start with traditional measures of activity in the credit and stock 
markets, namely the ratio of private credit to GDP and the ratio of stock market
2 9  These instruments were recently used by Griffith, Harrison, and Simpson (2006).
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capitalization and stock market total value traded to GDP. All proxies for financial 
development are averaged over the years 1990-1994, that is, as of the establishment 
of the ‘single market’.30
In addition to volume-of-finance-activity measures of financial development, I also 
use a proxy for the institutional quality of financial markets. Specifically, I follow 
Beck et al. (2004) and use the indicator of the ‘quality of accounting standards’, 
produced by International Accounting and Auditing Trends (Center for International 
Financial Analysis h  Research, Inc.). This indicator rates companies’ 1990 annual 
reports on the basis of their inclusion or omission of 90 items in the balance sheets 
and income statements and ranges from 0 to 90.
All four indicators of financial development are summarized across the EU coun­
tries in Table 3.2. Despite the extensive integration of EU national product markets 
up to 1994, there is still substantial diversity in the degree of financial development 
across the EU. The coefficient of variation is particularly high for the measures of 
stock market activity. The middle panel of Table 3.2 presents correlations (with 
statistical significance levels) among different measures of financial development. 
The correlations suggest that these measures, although closely related, are neverthe­
less meaningfully different. The bottom panel of Table 3.2 classifies EU countries 
into high/low financial development groups based on above/below median values of 
each financial development measure. Table 3.3 summarizes price-cost margin and 
R&D/capital expenditures in low-, medium-, and high-competition-level industries 
separately for high/low financial development country groups.
3.3.3 Results
Table 3.5 reports estimates of equation (3.1a) with linear specification obtained using 
OLS, IV, and GMM estimators. Regardless of the method used, there is a signifi­
cant negative relationship between price-cost margin and R&D/capital expenditures,
3 0  I rely on time averages to avoid year-to-year fluctuations.
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which means a positive relationship between competition and R&D/capital expen­
ditures. The IV and GMM coefficients are larger than the ones obtained by OLS. 
Table 3.5 confirms the prediction of the model and is consistent with results obtained 
by Griffith, Harrison, and Simpson (2006). Specifications (2) and (3) of Table 3.5 
are rejected using the Hansen J-test but the preferred ones, (4) and (5), are not. 
The instruments in the first-stage regression are highly significant.31
Table 3.6 reports estimates of high/low financial development full-interaction 
specification (3.2) obtained using the GMM estimator with autocorrelation-consistent 
and heteroskedastic-and-autocorrelation-consistent standard errors. Table 3.6 also 
reports analogous estimates obtained using the GMM estimator with standard errors 
clustered at the country-industry level. These results reveal that the negative rela­
tionship between competition and R&D/capital expenditures comes mainly from less 
financially developed countries, whereas there is no significant pattern in the high 
financially developed country group.
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 report the results from the test of the main model’s prediction. 
The slope of the competition-innovation pattern in less financially developed systems 
is steeper relative to the benchmark observed in countries with highly developed 
financial systems for intense (Table 3.7) as well as relaxed competition levels (Table 
3.8). The estimates in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 are obtained using analogous regressions 
to the ones in Table 3.6. The only difference is that in Table 3.7 I only interact 
the bottom 25 percent of the price-cost margin variable (i.e., the industry-country 
cells with very intense competition levels) with financial development. In line with 
the model, the coefficients in front of the interaction term between the price-cost 
margin and the low FD country group dummy are positive and significant in all 
specifications, while it is never significant and sometimes negative for the interaction 
term with the high FD country group dummy. In less financially developed countries, 
within the most competitive industries an increase in competition leads to a reduction
3 1  See Table 3.A .7 for the full first-stage regression results.
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in R&D/capital expenditures. In the most financially developed countries, there is 
no significant effect of competition on R&D/capital expenditures within the most 
competitive industries.
Table 3.8 focuses on the upper 50 percent of the price-cost margin variable, i.e., 
the industry-country cells with relaxed competition. In contrast to Table 3.7, the 
coefficients in front of the interaction term between the price-cost margin and the 
low FD country group dummy are negative and significant in all specifications. The 
coefficients in front of the interaction term with the high FD country group dummy 
are typically negative, but only marginally significant. In less financially developed 
countries, within the relaxed competition industries an increase in competition leads 
to an increase in R&D/capital expenditures.
The results of Tables 3.7 and 3.8 are depicted in Figure 3.3. The competition- 
innovation relationship recovered empirically for high/low FD country groups closely 
mimics the theoretical competition-innovation pattern of the unconstrained/financially 
constrained regime depicted in Figure 3.2.
In non-reported regressions, I tried different threshold levels of the profit-cost 
margin variable to define intense and relaxed competition regions. These alternative 
specifications led to results analogous to those reported in Tables 3.7 and 3.8. To 
illustrate the robustness of results to threshold definitions and to further explore 
the difference in the competition-innovation relationship between high and low FD 
country groups, Figure 3.4 depicts fitted lines obtained from high/low financial de­
velopment full-interaction specifications analogous to the ones reported in the top 
panel of Table 3.6 but estimated separately on all quintiles of the price-cost margin 
variable.
3.3.4 Robustness checks
Tables 3.A.1 and 3.A.2 show robustness to autocorrelation and clustering. The esti­
mates are fully robust to autocorrelation but the estimates’ significance is lost when
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I cluster standard errors at the industry-country level. This loss of significance is 
of minor concern, if one assumes that industry-country-level variables (R&D/capital 
expenditures and price-cost margin) represent—in each year—the equilibrium of the 
model developed in the first half of the paper.
Tables 3.A.3, 3.A.4, and 3.A.5 report estimates of specifications in which instead 
of high/low financial development country group full-interaction specifications I in­
teract the price-cost margin with continuous measures of financial development. For 
all practical purposes, the results are unchanged and robust to this alternative type 
of interaction.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper examines how the R&D investment of financially constrained firms and 
endogenously determined aggregate innovation activity depend on product market 
competition. The novel findings come from an analysis of the interaction between 
competition and lack of external finance. The presence of financial constraints affects 
innovation through two channels: The constraints set an upper bound on firms’ R&D 
investments, and they also change their incentives to innovate—firms change their 
R&D strategies depending on whether their competitors are financially constrained or 
not. This demonstrates the importance of analyzing the impact of financial frictions 
on firms’ individual decisions in a model of market interaction.
I show that if firms finance R&D activities only out of current profits, they 
underinvest the most in industries with intense and very relaxed competition. On 
the aggregate level, the presence of financial constraints results in a stronger inverted- 
U competition-innovation pattern than when firms have frictionless access to external 
finance. The key to these results is the assumption that, in order to innovate, firms 
need to invest cash in R&D and that competition affects the amount they can invest. 
The paper models this idea in a very tractable way.
In the empirical part I find that the interaction between competition and financial
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development is an important determinant of the shape of the aggregate competition- 
innovation relationship, which is consistent with the presented theory. Relative to 
the competition-innovation pattern in the most financially developed countries, the 
competition-innovation relationship has an inverted-U shape in less financially de­
veloped systems. This finding is established when I identify the causal impact of 
competition on innovation by exploiting a major EU product market reform, the 
introduction of the ‘single market’, and is robust to a number of alternative specifi­
cations. The empirical analysis helps to explain why the shape of the competition- 
innovation pattern has not been fully resolved to date; it may be that many papers 
in this area do not control for the presence of financial constraints, an important 
determinant of this relationship.
This paper contributes to policy discussions by stressing the importance of ex­
ternal finance supply for innovation success. The theoretical argument and em­
pirical analysis developed in this paper suggest that innovation-enhancing policies 
implemented through competition reforms ought to be complemented by promoting 
financial development.
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Fig. 3.1: Innovation Intensity: Unconstrained Equilibrium
Note: The top (middle) two graphs depict the R&D investment of each firm in the 
neck-and-neck state (of the laggard) as a function of competition, while the bottom 
two graphs show the aggregate innovation intensity. The blue (dark) solid lines 
are the R&D investments from Proposition 3.2.1 depicted for competition levels at 
which the financial constraints do not bind. The blue dashed lines depict the same 
quantities ignoring financial constraints. The red (light) solid lines depict profit 
7To (7r_i) each firm in the neck-and-neck state (the laggard) gets for competition 
levels at which the financial constraints are binding. In the top (middle) graphs, 
red lines connect to blue ones at threshold competition levels A (A); in the bottom 
graphs the dashed lines switch to solid ones at A and back to dashed ones at A (see 
Proposition 3.2.4). Parameters: Left: 7Ti =  0.94, 7r_i =  0.08, h = 0.30, r = 0.02; 
Right: 7Ti =  0.73, 7r_i =  0.14, h = 0.00, r = 0.02.
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Fig. 3.2: Innovation Intensity: Financially Constrained Equilibrium
Note: The top (bottom) graph on the right depicts the firm’s R&D investments 
in the neck-and-neck (the laggard’s R&D investment in the unleveled) state as a 
function of competition: (i) The blue (dark) solid lines are the firm’s R&D invest­
ments from Proposition 3.2.1 depicted for intermediate competition levels at which 
the unconstrained equilibrium exists, A £ (A, A); (ii) The blue dashed lines depict 
the same quantities if financial constraints are ignored in the relaxed competition 
region, A £ and the intense competition region, A £ [A, 1]; (iii) The red
(light) solid lines are the firm’s R&D investments from Proposition 3.2.5 if financial 
constraints are binding. The top left graph shows the corresponding aggregate in­
novation intensities, while the bottom left graph shows the fraction of industries in 
the neck-and-neck state. Parameters: 7Ti =  0.95, 7r_i =  0.09, h =  0.25, r =  0.02.
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R&D/Capital Expenditures and Competition 
High (blue) vs. Low (red) FD Countries, Intense/Relaxed vs. Medium Competition
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Fig. 3.3: R&D/Capital Expenditures and Competition: Empirical Relationship
Note: The Figure depicts fitted lines obtained from high/low financial development 
full-interaction specifications based on 0 to 25 percent of the profit-cost margin vari­
able from Table 3.7 columns (2) and (6), and similar specifications based on 50 to 100 
percent of the profit-cost margin variable from Table 3.8 columns (2) and (6). The 
dependent variable in the top two graphs is R&D expenditures while the dependent 
variable in the bottom two graphs is capital expenditures. Red (light) line: Fit­
ted regression line based on the coefficient in front of the low financial development 
country group interaction variable; Blue (dark) line: Fitted regression line based on 
the coefficient in front of the high financial development country group interaction 
variable. Thick (thin) line denotes significance (no significance) at the 5% level.
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&D Expenditures and Competition: Semi-Parametric Specificatic 
High (blue) vs. Low (red) FD Countries, Competition by Quintiles
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Fig. 3.4: R&D Expenditures and Competition: Semi-Parametric Specification
Note: The Figure depicts fitted lines obtained from high/low financial development 
full-interaction specifications analogous to the ones reported in the top panel of 
Table 3.6 but estimated separately on all quintiles of the profit-cost margin variable. 
The dependent variable is R&D expenditures in all graphs. Red (light) line: Fitted 
regression line based on the coefficient in front of the low financial development 
country group interaction variable; Blue (dark) line: Fitted regression line based on 
the coefficient in front of the high financial development country group interaction 
variable. Thick (thin) line denotes significance (no significance) at the 5% level.
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A ppendix B: Tables
Tab. 3.1: EU ‘single-market’ Industry-Country-Year Data in 1995-2004
Mean
CapEx 
Median S.D. N Mean
R&D 
Median S.D. N Mean
Margin
Median S.D.
EU-SMP
1993
Austria 0.143 0.129 0.076 902 0.044
by Country 
0.021 0.067 912 0.315 0.309 0.119 No
Belgium 0.162 0.142 0.089 547 0.027 0.005 0.063 652 0.337 0.332 0.114 Yes
Denmark 0.160 0.141 0.083 775 - - - 0 0.297 0.294 0.100 Yes
Finland 0.142 0.123 0.088 889 - - - 0 0.352 0.343 0.115 No
France 0.139 0.121 0.070 859 0.051 0.017 0.097 740 0.249 0.236 0.113 Yes
Germany 0.118 0.106 0.058 559 0.052 0.019 0.076 587 0.249 0.247 0.100 Yes
Ireland 0.141 0.122 0.089 607 - - - 0 0.399 0.402 0.145 Yes
Italy 0.180 0.161 0.083 981 0.022 0.004 0.056 277 0.414 0.422 0.103 Yes
Netherlands 0.126 0.109 0.070 836 - - - 0 0.358 0.349 0.111 Yes
Portugal 0.239 0.226 0.109 509 0.001 0.000 0.005 534 0.366 0.364 0.131 Yes
Spain 0.134 0.116 0.077 974 0.027 0.012 0.047 168 0.359 0.351 0.109 Yes
Sweden 0.148 0.131 0.077 880 0.050 0.010 0.093 259 0.287 0.278 0.127 No
UK 0.122 0.107 0.066 836 0.035 0.009 0.084 593 0.390 0.386 0.122 Yes
IS - Food products and beverages 0.203 0.184 0.089 720 0.007
by NACE 2-digit Industry 
0.004 0.008 340 0.427 0.422 0.105
17 - Textiles 0.143 0.127 0.080 544 0.009 0.005 0.010 259 0.297 0.300 0.092 -
18 - Apparel 0.099 0.080 0.070 205 0.001 0.000 0.002 96 0.335 0.319 0.138 -
19 - Leather 0.093 0.083 0.047 204 0.004 0.003 0.006 89 0.314 0.307 0.099 -
20 - Wood, products o f wood and cork 0.176 0.160 0.089 419 0.002 0.001 0.002 167 0.347 0.326 0.109 -
21 - Pulp, paper and paper products 0.198 0.180 0.088 169 0.006 0.005 0.004 75 0.418 0.419 0.100 -
22 - Printing and publishing 0.149 0.129 0.091 236 0.001 0.001 0.002 112 0.371 0.366 0.116 -
23 - Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0.214 0.203 0.124 46 0.021 0.007 0.029 32 0.558 0.584 0.133 -
24 - Chemicals 0.161 0.138 0.084 509 0.067 0.050 0.076 250 0.412 0.422 0.116
23 - Rubber and plastics 0.161 0.155 0.063 170 0.030 0.014 0.041 78 0.337 0.339 0.088
26 - Other non-metallic mineral products 0.173 0.158 0.088 597 0.008 0.004 0.010 281 0.391 0.386 0.132
27 - Basic metals 0.175 0.161 0.080 351 0.014 0.007 0.016 179 0.333 0.323 0.122
28 - Fabricated metal products 0.131 0.117 0.066 554 0.008 0.004 0.010 262 0.301 0.305 0.099
29 - Machinery and equipment 0.111 0.100 0.050 549 0.073 0.037 0.143 268 0.293 0.298 0.102
31 - Electrical machinery 0.126 0.115 0.066 469 0.050 0.037 0.049 218 0.300 0.307 0.123
32 - Radio, television and communication equipment 0.165 0.141 0.100 211 0.194 0.172 0.161 112 0.302 0.301 0.149
33 - Medical, precision and optical instruments 0.096 0.086 0.053 387 0.067 0.048 0.074 188 0.323 0.314 0.131
34 - Motor vehicles 0.173 0.159 0.096 237 0.062 0.019 0.079 117 0.302 0.291 0.128
35 - Other transport equipment 0.117 0.104 0.062 325 0.060 0.020 0.087 153 0.252 0.261 0.131
36 - Manufacturing N.E.C. 0.121 0.109 0.067 445 0.019 0.005 0.049 213 0.348 0.335 0.106
37 - Recycling 0.248 0.242 0.101 136 0.001 0.000 0.002 62 0.468 0.496 0.119
Note: The number of observations, N, corresponds to industry-country-year observations with non-missing values of 'CapEx' and ‘Margin' ('R&D‘ and ’Margin*) across 101 three-digit 
NACE manufacturing industries in 13 EU countries over the period 1993-2004. ‘CapEx’ is defined as gross investments in tangible goods divided by value-added. *R&D’ is defined as 
total intra-mural R&D expenditure divided by value-added. ‘Margin’ is defined as operating profit and is scaled by value-added. ‘EU-SMP 1993’ indicates which countries participated in 
the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ at its inception in 1993. Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU in I99S. The statistics in the bottom panel are based on the ‘EU-SMP 1993’ 
countries only—my main sample. Before computing the statistics (Mean, Median, and Standard Deviation), I remove outliers by using the l-to-99 percentile range of the variables. See 
the Data Appendix for complete definitions and sources o f variables.
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Tab. 3.2: Financial Development: EU ‘single-market’ Countries in 1990-1994
Private
Credit
Market
Capitalization
Market Value 
Traded
Accounting
Standards
Basic Statistics
Mean 0.79 0.34 0.15 62
Median 0.72 0.27 0.12 62
S.D. / Mean 0.39 0.73 0.83 0.18
Min 0.42 0.13 0.04 36
Max 1.41 0.97 0.45 78
Min Country Denmark Belgium Belgium Belgium
Max Country Netherlands UK UK UK
N 10 10 10 9
Correlations
Private Credit 1.00
Market Capitalization 0.58* 1.00
Market Value Traded 0.66** 0.89*** 1.00
Accounting Standards 0.48 0.66* 0.65* 1.00
High/Low Financial Development Country Groups
Austria High Low Low Low
Belgium Low High Low Low
Denmark Low High Low Low
Finland Low Low Low High
France High High High High
Germany High Low High Low
Ireland Low Low High -
Italy Low Low Low Low
Netherlands High High High High
Portugal Low Low Low Low
Spain Low Low Low High
Sweden High High High High
UK High High High High
Note: The top panel: I first compute the country average of each financial development measure in the 
period 1990-1994 (the exception is Accounting Standards, which corresponds to 1990). Second, I 
present the Mean, Median, Coefficient of Variation, Min, and Max of the country averages from the 
first step across 10 EU countries that participated in the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ at its inception 
in 1993 (see Table 1). The bottom panel classifies countries into a high or low financial development 
group based on above/below median levels of the respective financial development measure. The 
financial development measures and high/low indicators are used as explanatory variables in 
regressions. See the Data Appendix for complete definitions and sources of variables.
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Tab. 3.3: Descriptive Statistics by Competition and Financial Development
Intense Competition 
Margin < 25pct
Medium Competition 
25pct < Margin < 75pct
Relaxed Competition 
Margin > 75pct
High Low
Private Credit 
High Low High Low
Margin 0.189 0.227 0.319 0.363 0.471 0.500
CapEx 0.096 0.128 0.111 0.154 0.140 0.176
R&D 0 . 0 2 2 0.003 0.014 0 . 0 0 2 0.008 0.000
N - CapEx 999 824 2,046 1,717 1,019 878
N - R&D 756 362 933 764 399 337
High Low
Market Capitalization 
High Low High Low
Margin 0.194 0.224 0.315 0.367 0.471 0.503
CapEx 0.107 0.105 0.125 0.144 0.135 0.176
R&D 0.015 0.015 0 . 0 1 1 0 . 0 0 2 0.005 0.000
N - CapEx 945 913 1,945 1,821 963 896
N - R&D 603 580 907 708 475 278
High Low
Market Value Traded 
High Low High Low
Margin 0.182 0.231 0.320 0.354 0.489 0.486
CapEx 0.097 0.118 0.114 0.147 0.127 0.193
R&D 0 . 0 2 2 0.003 0.014 0 . 0 0 2 0.008 0 . 0 0 1
N - CapEx 913 909 1,858 1,922 926 955
N - R&D 701 390 916 802 303 439
High Low
Accounting Standards 
High Low High Low
Margin 0 . 2 0 2 0.235 0.332 0.337 0.485 0.479
CapEx 0.097 0.117 0 . 1 1 2 0.152 0.140 0.193
R&D 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.003 0.008 0 . 0 0 1
N  - CapEx 862 1,443 1,766 1 , 6 8 8 877 847
N - R&D 550 597 626 987 325 466
Note: The Table reports Median o f ‘Margin’, ‘CapEx’, and ‘R&D’ across 10 EU countries that participated 
in the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ at its inception in 1993 (see Table 1). Medians are reported 
individually for industries characterized by ‘Intense Competition’ (defined as the first quartile o f  ‘Margin’ 
variable), ‘Medium Competition’ (defined as the second together with the third quartile o f  ‘Margin’ 
variable), and ‘Relaxed Competition’ (defined as the fourth quartile o f  ‘Margin’ variable) separately for 
high/low financial development country groups (see Table 2). ‘N  - CapEx’ is the number o f  industry- 
country-year observations with non-missing values o f  ‘CapEx’ and ‘Margin’; ‘N  - R&D’ is the number o f  
industry-country-year observations with non-missing values o f  ‘R&D’ and ‘Margin’. See the Data 
Appendix for complete definitions and sources o f  variables.
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Tab. 3.4: EU ‘Single Market Programme’ (SMP): Industry-Country Pairs Affected by the 
Reform
SMP Group I SMP Group 2 SMP Group 3 SMP Group 4.1 SMP Group 4.2 SMP Group 4.3
N Empl N Empl N Empl N Empl N Empl N Empl
by Country
Belgium 2 4.0 6 0.9 8 1.6 9 1.3 7 1.1 21 1.4
Denmark 2 4.8 6 0.7 8 1.6 7 2.5 6 2.5 12 1.0
France 2 2.4 6 1.7 8 2.4 9 3.5 9 1.4 21 1.6
Germany 2 6.1 6 1.0 7 5.6 9 1.2 9 1.2 17 1.6
Ireland 2 2.6 6 0.6 8 1.2 9 1.1 9 0.6 21 1.0
Italy 2 1.9 6 0.6 8 1.0 9 1.7 9 1.1 21 1.8
Netherlands 2 7.3 5 0.5 8 1.1 9 1.3 9 1.4 17 0.7
Portugal 1 0.1 6 0.7 8 0.8 9 2.1 6 0.4 21 2.3
Spain 2 1.3 6 0.7 8 1.4 9 0.9 9 0.7 21 1.3
UK 2 2.9 3 1.1 8 1.0 9 2.3 7 1.6 21 1.2
by NACE 2-digit Industry
15 - Food products and beverages 1 1.0 3 2.6 1 1.1
17 - Textiles 4 5.5
18 - Apparel 2 8.2
19 - Leather 1 1.5
22 - Printing and publishing 2 3.0
24 - Chemicals 1 1.7 4 3.4
25 - Rubber and plastics 1 4.1 1 1.2
26 - Other non-metallic mineral products 4 3.6
28 - Fabricated metal products 2 1.4 1 0.7
29 - Machinery and equipment 1 1.0 6 6.3
31 - Electrical machinery 4 5.3 1 1.0
32 - Radio, television and communication equipment 1 2.8 1 3.5 1 1.5
33 - Medical, precision and optical instruments 1 2.8 1 2.8
34 - Motor vehicles 1 0.7 1 5.0
35 - Other transport equipment 1 0.4 2 2.4
36 - Manufacturing N.E.C. 1 0.3 3 6.5
37 - Recycling 1 1.2
Note: The Table lists the number (columns *N’) of NACE 3-digit industries identified (ex ante) to be affected by introduction o f the ‘Single Market 
Programme’ (SMP) o f the EU in 1993 (EU-wide product market reform), and the typical size o f an affected industry (columns ‘Empl’) measured as the 
median percentage share o f affected industries in total manufacturing employment (average over 1985-1987) as presented in Buigues et al. (1990). The top 
panel of the Table counts the affected industries by countiy while the bottom panel groups the affected industries by NACE 2-digit industry codes.
Based on the type o f pre-existing barriers to competition, the affected industries were divided into six groups; SMP Group 1: High-technology, public- 
procurement markets; SMP Group 2: Traditional public-procurement and regulated markets (High price dispersion); SMP Group 3: Traditional public- 
procurement and regulated markets (Low price dispersion); SMP Group 4.1: Sectors with moderate non-tariff barriers (Consumer goods); SMP Group 4.2: 
Sectors with moderate non-tariff barriers (Investment goods); SMP Group 4.3: Sectors with moderate non-tariff barriers (Intermediate goods). See the Data 
Appendix for complete definitions and sources of variables.
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Tab. 3.5: R&D /  Capital Expenditures and Competition
0 )
OLS
robust
(2 )
IV
robust
(3) (4)
GMM GMM
autocorrelation
(5)
GMM
clustered
R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D
Margin
Sargan statistic 
p-value
Hansen J statistic 
p-value
N
R-squared
Partial R-squared
F-statistic
p-value
-0.079***
(0.014)
3,551
0.58
-0.465*** -0.505*** -0.465*** 
(0.107) (0.105) (0.106)
1.622
0.445
6.893** 6.893**
0.032 0.032
3,551 3,551 3,551 
0.39 0.34 0.39
First-Stage Regression Statistics: Margin 
0.019 0.019 0.019
19.58*** 19.58*** 15.06***
0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.512**
(0 .2 0 1 )
2.080
0.354
3,551
0.34
0.019
5.89***
0.000
CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx
Margin -0.024** -0.443*** -0.432*** -0.442*** -0.425**
(0 .0 1 1 ) (0.124) (0.123) (0.143) (0.193)
Sargan statistic - - - 4.309 -
p-value - - - 0.116 -
Hansen J statistic - 6.072** 6.072** - 2.531
p-value - 0.048 0.048 - 0.282
N 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483
R-squared 0.45 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.27
First-Stage Regression Statistics: Margin
Partial R-squared - 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
F-statistic - 14.82*** 14.82*** 10.61*** 3.66**
p-value - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012
Note: The sample consists o f 101 three-digit NACE manufacturing industries across 10 countries that 
participated in the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ at its inception in 1993 (see Table 1) over the 
period 1995-2004. The dependent variable in the first (second) panel is ‘R&D’ (‘CapEx’). ‘Margin’ is 
instrumented using the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ variables described in Table 4. The estimated 
specifications are as follows: ( 1 ) classical linear regression with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors; 
(2) instrumental variables (IV) estimator with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors (using Eicker- 
Huber-White “sandwich” variance-covariance matrix); (3) feasible heteroskedastic-efficient two-step 
generalized methods o f moment (GMM) estimator; (4) GMM estimator with autocorrelation-consistent 
and heteroskedastic-and-autocorrelation-consistent standard errors; (5) GMM estimator with standard 
errors clustered at the country-industry level.
Sargan (Hansen J) statistics correspond to tests o f overidentifying restrictions. Partial R-squared is for 
the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ variables in the first-stage regressions; similarly, F-statistic is the 
test o f the joint significance o f these variables in the first-stage regressions. See the Data Appendix for 
complete definitions and sources o f variables. I remove outliers by using the l-to-99 percentile range 
of the dependent variable. I always control for 3-digit-NACE industry, country, and year dummies, not 
shown. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1 % level, respectively.
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Tab. 3.6: Competition: Financial Development (FD) Full Interaction Specification
(1)
GMM
autocorrelation
(2)
GMM
clustered
(3)
GMM
autocorrelation
(4)
GMM
clustered
(5)
GMM
autocorrelation
(6)
GMM
clustered
(7)
GMM
autocorrelation
(8)
GMM
clustered
R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D
Private Credit M arket Capitalization M arket Value Traded Accounting Standards
Margin * FD Low -0.552**' -0.557** -0.510**' -0.562*** -0.561**' -0.564** -0.467**' -0.476**
(0.129) (0.225) (0.115) (0.201) (0.136) (0.228) (0.107) (0.212)
Margin * FD High -0.149 -0.157 -0.275 -0.308 -0.144 -0.151 -0.045 -0.058
(0.278) (0.337) (0.234) (0.271) (0.287) (0.344) (0.363) (0.365)
F-test 1.52 2.37 0.82 1.37 1.47 2.34 1.47 2.46
p-value 0.2 J 7 0.124 0.367 0.241 0.225 0.126 0.226 0.117
Sargan statistic 0.014 - 0.890 - 0.009 - 0.127 -
p-value 0.906 - 0.346 - 0.923 - 0.722 -
Hansen J statistic - 0.016 - 1.097 - 0.010 - 0.101
p-value - 0.900 - 0.295 - 0.919 - 0.751
N 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551
R-squared 0.47 0.47 0.52 0.49 0.45 0.45 0.49 0.49
First-Stage Regression Statistics: Margin *1 FD  Low
Partial R-squared 0.021 0.021 0.025 0.025 0.019 0.019 0.027 0.027
Shea Partial R-squared 0.022 0.022 0.027 0.027 0.019 0.019 0.027 0.027
F-statistic 15.92*** 6.36*** 19.34*** 7.6*** 14.35*** 6.02*** 20.71*** 9.36***
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
First-Stage Regression Statistics: M argin  * FD  High
Partial R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
Shea Partial R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003
F-statistic 3.21** 3.52** 3.71** 3.89*** 3.34** 3.43** 2.19* 3.63**
p-value 0.022 0.015 0.011 0.009 0.019 0.017 0.087 0.013
CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx
Private Credit M arket Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
Margin * FD Low -0.662**' -0.727** -0.504**' -0.557** -0.799**' -0.927** -0.461**' -0.583**
(0.219) (0.311) (0.152) (0.224) (0.297) (0.396) (0.168) (0.269)
Margin * FD High 0.228 0.449 -0.171 -0.173 0.081 0.243 0.036 0.121
(0.468) (0.807) (0.294) (0.335) (0.395) (0.704) (0.283) (0.507)
F-test • 2.34 1.83 1.11 0.97 2.17 1.83 2.58 2.07
p-value 0.126 0.176 0.292 0.324 0.141 0.176 0.108 0.150
Sargan statistic 0.867 - 3.382* - 0.786 - 2.966* -
p-value 0.352 - 0.066 ■ 0.375 - 0.085 -
Hansen J statistic - 0.312 - 1.971 - 0.269 - 1.250
p-value ■ 0.576 - 0.160 - 0.604 - 0.264
N 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483
R-squared 0.77 0.71 0.83 0.82 0.75 0.69 0.84 0.81
First-Stage Regression Statistics: M argin  * FD  Low
Partial R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.008
Shea Partial R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.008
F-statistic 9.78*** 3.36** 13.12*** 4.49*** 7.25*** 2.69** 11.27*** 3.91***
p-value 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.009
First-Stage Regression Statistics: Margin  * FD  High
Partial R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
Shea Partial R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
F-statistic 2.33* 0.68 3.77*** 0.62 3.60*** 0.78 3.77*** 1.04
p-value 0.072 0.563 0.010 0.602 0.013 0.508 0.010 0.376
Note: The data are the same as in Table 5. The dependent variable in the top (bottom) panel is ‘R&D’ (‘CapEx’). ‘Margin * FD Low’ stands for ‘Margin’ 
variable interacted with 0/1 variable equal 1 for low financial development countries. ‘Margin * FD High’ is defined analogously. See Table 2 for definitions 
of High/Low financial development country groups. ‘Margin * FD Low’ and ‘Margin * FD High' are instrumented using the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ 
variables described in Table 4. The estimated specifications (1), (3), (5), and (7) use the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator with 
autocorrelation-consistent and heteroskedastic-and-autocorrelation-consistent standard errors; specifications (2), (4), (6), and (8) use the GMM estimator with 
standard errors clustered at the country-industry level. F-test is the test of the difference of coefficients ‘Margin * FD Low’ and ‘Margin * FD High’ in the 
second-stage regression.
Sargan (Hansen J) statistic corresponds to tests o f overidentifying restrictions. (Shea) Partial R-squared is for the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ variables in 
the first-stage regressions; similarly, F-statistic is the test of the joint significance of these variables in the first-stage regressions. See the Data Appendix for 
complete definitions and sources o f variables. I remove outliers by using the l-to-99 percentile range o f the dependent variable. I always control for 3-digit- 
NACE industry, country, and year dummies, not shown. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively.
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Tab. 3.7: ‘Intense’ Competition: Financial Development (FD) Full Interaction Specifica­
tion
(1)
IV
robust
(2)
GMM
Q)
IV
robust
(4)
GMM
(5)
IV
robust
(6)
GMM
(7)
IV
robust
(*)
GMM
R&D R&D RAD R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
(Margin <25pet) * FD Low 1.047*** 1.057*** 1.254*** 1.063** 1.088*** 1.089*** 0.985*** 0.941 ♦*♦
(0.343) (0.338) (0.470) (0.463) (0.361) (0.355) (0.345) (0.331)
(Margin <25pct) * FD High 0.073 0.091 0.109 -0.659 0.058 0.059 -0.108 -0.181
(0.276) (0.255) (0.631) (0.539) (0.297) (0.269) (0.358) (0.319)
F-test 12.48*** 12.61*** 1.75 4.30** 11.21*** 11.62*** 9.43*** 10.29***
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.186 0.038 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
Hansen J statistic 0.029 0.029 5.453** 5.453** 0.000 0.000 0.204 0.204
p-value 0.866 0.866 0.020 0.020 0.988 0.988 0.652 0.652
N 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551
R-squared 0.32 0.31 0.06 0.06 0.26 0.26 0.12 0.15
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin <25pct) * FD Low
Partial R-squared 0.014 0.014 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.009
Shea Partial R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.008
F-statistic 9.31*** 9.31*** 3.67** 3.67** 7.82*** 7.82*** 6.31*** 6.31***
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin <25pct) *' FD High
Partial R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Shea Partial R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
F-statistic 3.78*** 3.78*** 4.07*** 4.07*** 3.92*** 3.92*** 4.59*** 4.59***
p-value 0.010 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.003
CapEx CspEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
(M argin <25pct) * FD Low 1.516** 1.556** 1.774* 1.783* 1.381** 1.417** 0.913** 1.035**
(0.672) (0.670) (1.016) (0.997) (0.566) (0.564) (0.451) (0.442)
(Margin <25pct) * FD High 0.006 -0.006 -2.224 -2.234 0.090 0.089 -0.463 -0.522
(0.249) (0.248) (1.577) (1.565) (0.237) (0.237) (0.481) (0.479)
F-test 5.42** 5.84** 2.80* 2.91 * 6.52** 6.96*** 3.40* 4.50**
p-value 0.020 0.016 0.094 0.088 0.011 0.008 0.065 0.034
Hansen J statistic 0.714 0.714 0.002 0.002 0.563 0.563 1.893 1.893
p-value 0.398 0.398 0.962 0.962 0.453 0.453 0.169 0.169
N 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 6,876 6,876
R-squared 0.67 0.66 0.01 0.01 0.68 0.67 0.76 0.73
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin <25pct) '* FD Low
Partial R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Shea Partial R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
F-statistic 3.19** 3.19** 5.30*** 5.30*** 5.54*** 5.54*** 4.13*** 4.13***
p-value 0.023 0.023 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.006
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin <25pct) *' FD High
Partial R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.002
Shea Partial R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.002
F-statistic 10.11*** 10.11*** 2.94** 2.94** 11.76*** 11.76*** 4.47*** 4.47***
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004
Note: The Table is analogous to Table 6 except I interact 0 to 25 percent of the ‘Margin’ variable. ‘(Margin <25pct) * FD Low’ and ‘(Margin <25pct) * FD High’ are 
instrumented using the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ variables described in Table 4. The estimated specifications (I), (3), (S), and (7) use instrumental variables 
(IV) estimator with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors (using Eicker-Huber-White “sandwich” variance-covariance matrix); specifications (2), (4), (6), and (8) 
use feasible heteroskedastic-efficient two-step generalized methods of moment (GMM) estimator. F-test is the test of the difference of coefficients ‘(Margin <25pct) * 
FD Low’ and ‘(Margin <25pct) * FD High’ in the second-stage regression.
Hansen J statistic corresponds to tests o f overidentifying restrictions. (Shea) Partial R-squared is for the EU 'Single Market Programme’ variables in the first-stage 
regressions; similarly, F-statistic is the test o f the joint significance of these variables in the first-stage regressions. See the Data Appendix for complete definitions 
and sources of variables. I remove outliers by using the l-to-99 percentile range of the dependent variable. I always control for 3-digit-NACE industry, country, and 
year dummies, not shown. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Tab. 3.8: ‘Relaxed’ Competition: Financial Development (FD) Full Interaction Specifica­
tion
(1)
rv
robust
(2)
GMM
(3)
IV
robuit
(4)
GMM
(5)
IV
robust
(6)
GMM
(7)
IV
robust
(8)
GMM
RAD RAD RAD RAD RAD RAD RAD RAD
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
(Margin >50pct) * FD Low -0.342** -0.327*** -0.365** -0.370*** -0.345** -0.330*** -0.332** -0.320**'
(0.085) (0.074) (0.089) (0.086) (0.085) (0.075) (0.087) (0.075)
(Margin >50pct) * FD High -0.215 -0.194 -0.270** -0.284*** -0.218 -0.198 -0.189 -0.169
(0.186) (0.178) (0.119) (0.099) (0.184) (0.176) (0.205) (0.193)
F-test 0.70 0.76 0.76 0.74 0.68 0.74 0.76 0.87
p-value 0.404 0.384 0.383 0.391 0.409 0.389 0.383 0.352
Hansen J statistic 0.137 0.137 0.047 0.047 0.139 0.139 0.080 0.080
p-value 0.711 0.711 0.829 0.829 0.710 0.710 0.778 0.778
N 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551
R-squared 0.37 0.40 0.33 0.31 0.35 0.39 0.38 0.40
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin >50pct) * FD Low
Partial R-squared 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.020 0.020
Shea Partial R-squared 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.014 0.014
F-statistic 19.5*** 19.5*** 12.79*** 12.79*** 18.56*** 18.56*** 19.71*** 19.71***
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin >50pct) 1' FD High
Partial R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Shea Partial R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
F-statistic 13.05*** 13.05*** 18.45*** 18.45*** 15.12*** 15.12*** 12.14*** 12.14***
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
(Margin >50pct) * FD Low -0.444** -0.447*** -0.399** -0,397*** -0.509** -0.511*** -0.366** -0.378**'
(0.136) (0.135) (0.111) (0.111) (0.166) (0.166) (0.133) (0.131)
(Margin >50pct) * FD High 0.052 0.052 -0.106 -0.100 0.009 0.009 0.051 0.050
(0.221) (0.221) (0.129) (0.128) (0.221) (0.221) (0.175) (0.175)
F-test 3.82* 3.86** 3.98** 4.08** 3.28* 3.30* 4.36** 4.63**
p-value 0.051 0.049 0.046 0.044 0.070 0.069 0.037 0.031
Hansen J statistic 0.062 0.062 1.219 1.219 0.031 0.031 0.314 0.314
p-value 0.803 0.803 0.270 0.270 0.860 0.860 0.576 0.576
N 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 6,876 6,876
R-squared 0.74 0.74 0.77 0.77 0.69 0.69 0.79 0.79
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin >50pct) * FD Low
Partial R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005
Shea Partial R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005
F-statistic 6.94*** 6.94*** 11.62*** 11.62*** 5.96*** 5.96*** 6.16*** 6.16***
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin >50pct) *" FD High
Partial R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Shea Partial R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
F-statistic 4.34*** 4.34*** 6.34*** 6.34*** 4.28*** 4.28*** 6.20*** 6.20***
p-value 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000
Note: The Table is analogous to Table 6 except I interact SO to 100 percent of the ‘Margin’ variable. ‘(Margin >50pct) * FD Low’ and ‘(Margin >50pct) * FD High' 
are instrumented using the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ variables described in Table 4. The estimated specifications (1), (3), (S), and (7) use instrumental 
variables (IV) estimator with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors (using Eicker-Huber-White “sandwich” variance-covariance matrix); specifications (2), (4), (6), 
and (8) use a feasible heteroskedastic-efficient two-step generalized methods of moment (GMM) estimator. F-test is the test of difference of coefficients ‘(Margin 
>50pct) * FD Low’ and ‘(Margin >50pct) * FD High’ in the second-stage regression.
Hansen J statistic corresponds to tests of overidentifying restrictions. (Shea) Partial R-squared is for the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ variables in the first-stage 
regressions; similarly, F-statistic is the test of the joint significance of these variables in the first-stage regressions. See the Data Appendix for complete definitions 
and sources of variables. I remove outliers by using the l-to-99 percentile range of the dependent variable. I always control for 3-digit-NACE industry, country, and 
year dummies, not shown. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Tab. 3.A.1: ‘Intense’ Competition: Robustness to Autocorrelation and Clustering
0)
GMM
autocorrelation
(2)
GMM
cluttered
(3)
GMM
autocorrelation
(4)
GMM
cluttered
(5)
GMM
autocorrelation
(6)
GMM
clustered
(7)
GMM
autocorrelation
(8)
GMM
cluttered
R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
(Margin <25pct) * FD Low 1.047*** 1.071 1.254*** 1.040 1.088*** 1.090 0.985*** 0.922
(0.270) (0.664) (0.436) (0.749) (0.285) (0.686) (0.292) (0.612)
(Margin <25pct) • FD High 0.073 0.091 0.108 -0.322 0.058 0.059 -0.108 -0.144
(0.411) (0.561) (0.628) (0.955) (0.429) (0.591) (0.534) (0.711)
F-test 5.44** 3.09* 1.67 1.07 5.13** 2.88* 4.28** 2.45
p-value 0.020 0.079 0.196 0.301 0.024 0.090 0.039 0.117
Sargan statistic 0.023 - 2.569 - 0.000 - 0.129 -
p-value 0.878 - 0.109 - 0.989 - 0.720 -
Hansen J statistic - 0.012 - 1.409 - 0.000 - 0.070
p-value • 0.914 - 0.235 - 0.993 - 0.791
N 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551
R-squared 0.32 0.30 0.06 0.15 0.26 0.26 0.12 0.18
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin <25pct) * FD Low
Partial R-squared 0.014 0.014 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.009
Shea Partial R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.008
F-statistic 11.68*** 2.84** 5.21*** 1.59 10.15*** 2.53* 7.44*** 2.83**
p-value 0.000 0.037 0.001 0.190 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.038
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin <25pct) *’ FD High
Partial R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Shea Partial R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
F-statistic 2.63** 2.29* 1.60 1.39 2.55* 2.59* 2.81** 2.20*
p-value 0.048 0.078 0.188 0.245 0.054 0.052 0.038 0.087
CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
(Margin <25pet) • FD Low 1.513** 1.673 1.774 1.788 1.379*** 1.515 0.911** 1.139
(0.589) (1.218) (1.125) (1.676) (0.525) (1.016) (0.405) (0.763)
(Margin <25pct) * FD High 0.005 0.006 -2.224 -2.239 0.089 0.105 -0.462 -0.569
(0.321) (0.450) (1.738) (2.666) (0.305) (0.426) (0.502) (0.801)
F-test 5.99** 2.00 2.27 1.03 6.51** 2.41 3.76* 1.84
p-value 0.014 0.157 0.132 0.311 0.011 0.120 0.053 0.175
Sargan statistic 0.935 - 0.002 - 0.660 - 2.129 -
p-value 0.333 - 0.964 - 0.417 - 0.145 -
Hansen J statistic - 0.239 - 0.001 - 0.183 - 0.636
p-value - 0.625 - 0.979 - 0.668 - 0.425
N 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483
R-squared 0.67 0.63 0.01 0.02 0.68 0.65 0.76 0.70
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin <25pct) 1* FD Low
Partial R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Shea Partial R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
F-statistic 3.98*** 1.08 7.04*** 2.25* 4.9*** 1.92 4.93*** 1.41
p-value 0.008 0.355 0.000 0.082 0.002 0.124 0.002 0.238
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin <25pct) *' FD High
Partial R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.002
Shea Partial R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.002
F-statistic 9.74*** 5.75*** 1.78 0.86 12.39*** 6.9*** 3.33** 1.37
p-value 0.000 0.001 0.149 0.460 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.251
Note: The Table is analogous to Table 7 except here I use the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator with autocorrelation-consistent and heteroskedastic- 
and-autocorrelation-consistent standard errors in specifications (1), (3), (S), and (7); the and GMM estimator with standard errors clustered at the country-industry 
level in specifications (2), (4), (6), and (8). F-test is the test of difference of coefficients ‘(Margin <25pct) * FD Low' and '(Margin <25pct) * FD High’ in the second- 
stage regression. Sargan (Hansen J) statistic corresponds to tests of overidentifying restrictions. Partial R-squared is for the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ variables 
in the first-stage regressions; similarly, F-statistic is the test of the joint significance of these variables in the first-stage regressions. See the Data Appendix for 
complete definitions and sources of variables. I remove outliers by using the l-to-99 percentile range of the dependent variable. I always control for 3-digit-NACE 
industry, country, and year dummies, not shown. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.
3. The Effect of Credit Rationing on the Shape of the Competition-innovation Relationship 146
Tab. 3.A.2: ‘Relaxed’ Competition: Robustness to Autocorrelation and Clustering
(1)
GMM
autocorrelation
(2)
GMM
cluttered
(3)
GMM
autocorrelation
(4)
GMM
cluttered
(5)
GMM
autocorrelation
(6)
GMM
cluttered
(7)
GMM
autocorrelation
(8)
GMM
cluttered
R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
(Margin >50pct) * FD Low -0.342** -0.323** -0.365** -0.376** -0.345** -0.325** -0.332** -0.316**
(0.084) (0.148) (0.092) (0.149) (0.085) (0.148) (0.086) (0.149)
(Margin >50pct) * FD High -0.215 -0.186 -0.270* -0.284 -0.218 -0.190 -0.189 -0.166
(0.226) (0.275) (0.149) (0.181) (0.223) (0.273) (0.260) (0.291)
F-test 0.39 0.52 0.38 0.49 0.38 0.51 0.40 0.55
p-value 0.533 0.473 0.538 0.486 0.539 0.476 0.525 0.457
Sargan statistic 0.028 - 0.015 - 0.028 - 0.016 -
p-value 0.867 - 0.902 - 0.866 - 0.899 -
Hansen J statistic - 0.036 - 0.015 - 0.037 - 0.021
p-value - 0.849 - 0.902 - 0.848 - 0.886
N 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551
R-squared 0.37 0.41 0.33 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.38 0.41
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin >50pct) * FD Low
Partial R-squared 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.020 0.020
Shea Partial R-squared 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.014 0.014
F-statistic 15.27*** 7.14*** 14.59*** 7.86*** 13.79*** 7.07*** 15.19*** 7.32***
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin >50pct) *’ FD High
Partial R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Shea Partial R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
F-statistic 2.33* 3.17** 4.28*** 3.93*** 2.58* 3.54** 2.31* 2.76**
p-value 0.073 0.024 0.005 0.009 0.052 0.015 0.075 0.041
CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
(Margin >50pct) * FD Low -0.444** -0.455** -0.398** -0.441*** -0.509** -0.521** -0.366** -0.393*
(0.146) (0.220) (0.128) (0.171) (0.182) (0.248) (0.136) (0.201)
(Margin >50pct) * FD High 0.052 0.069 -0.106 -0.093 0.009 0.020 0.051 0.067
(0.253) (0.482) (0.183) (0.212) (0.254) (0.482) (0.194) (0.381)
F-test 3.05* 1.48 * 2.61 2.25 2.57 1.31 3.77* 2.04
p-value 0.081 0.223 0.107 0.134 0.109 0.252 0.052 0.153
Sargan statistic 0.056 - 1.010 - 0.027 - 0.347 -
p-value 0.812 - 0.315 - 0.870 - 0.556 -
Hansen J statistic - 0.021 - 0.615 - 0.009 - 0.101
p-value - 0.884 - 0.433 - 0.923 • 0.751
N 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 6,876 6,876
R-squared 0.74 0.73 0.77 0.75 0.69 0.69 0.79 0.78
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin >50pct) '* FD Low
Partial R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005
Shea Partial R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005
F-statistic 6.68*** 2.89** 8.59*** 4.11*** 4.96*** 2.34* 6.97*** 3.20**
p-value 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.072 0.000 0.023
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin >50pct) *' FD High
Partial R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Shea Partial R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
F-statistic 2.21* 0.71 4.28*** 1.01 2.71** 0.64 3.01** 0.99
p-value 0.085 0.547 0.005 0.387 0.044 0.588 0.029 0.397
Note: The Table is analogous to Table 8 except here I use the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator with autocorrelation-consistent and heteroskedastic- 
and-autocorrelation-consistent standard errors in specifications (I), (3), (S), and (7); and the GMM estimator with standard errors clustered at the country-industry 
level in specifications (2), (4), (6), and (8). F-test is the test of difference of coefficients ‘(Margin >50pct) * FD Low’ and ‘(Margin >50pct) * FD High’ in the second- 
stage regression. Sargan (Hansen J) statistic corresponds to tests of overidentifying restrictions. Partial R-squared is for the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ variables 
in the first-stage regressions; similarly, F-statistic is the test of the joint significance of these variables in the first-stage regressions. See the Data Appendix for 
complete definitions and sources of variables. I remove outliers by using the l-to-99 percentile range of the dependent variable. I always control for 3-digit-NACE 
industry, country, and year dummies, not shown. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.
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Tab. 3.A.3: R&D /  Capital Expenditures and Competition: Financial Development (FD) 
Continuous Interaction
(l)
GMM
autocorrelation
(2)
GMM
clustered
(?)
GMM
autocorrelation
(4)
GMM
clustered
(5)
GMM
autocorrelation
(6)
GMM
clustered
(7)
GMM
autocorrelation
(*)
GMM
clustered
R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D
Private Credit M arket Capitalization M arket Value Traded Accounting Standards
Margin -0.864** -0.944** -0.472**’ -0.536** -0.478**’ -0.546** -0.761** -0.833**
(0.427) (0.372) (0.118) (0.212) (0.120) (0.213) (0.334) (0.324)
Margin * FD 0.620 0.654 0.035 0.077 0.131 0.233 0.647 0.671
(0.642) (0.500) (0.244) (0.236) (0.581) (0.548) (0.695) (0.570)
Sargan statistic 0.687 - 1.611 - 1.580 - 0.867 -
p-value 0.407 - 0.204 - 0.209 - 0.352 -
Hansen J statistic - 0.918 - 2.038 - 2.023 - 1.174
p-value ■ 0.338 - 0.153 - 0.155 - 0.279
N 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551
R-squared 0.50 0.46 0.49 0.45 0.49 0.44 0.53 0.49
First-Stage Regression Statistics: M argin
Partial R-squared 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019
Shea Partial R-squared 0.010 0.010 0.030 0.030 0.025 0.025 0.021 0.021
F-statistic 15.06*** 5.89*** 15.06*** 5.89*** 15.06*** 5.89*** 15.06*** 5.89***
p-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
First-Stage Regression Statistics: M argin  * FD
Partial R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.014 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
Shea Partial R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.022 0.022 0.015 0.015 0.012 0.012
F-statistic 9.39*** 5.43*** 10.86*** 4.92*** 8.73*** 4.28*** 8.68*** 5.43***
p-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.001
CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx
Private Credit M arket Capitalization M arket Value Traded Accounting Standards
Margin -1.408** -1.869* -0.613** -0.610** -0.849** -0.784* -1.740** -1.740**
(0.627) (1.018) (0.276) (0.309) (0.384) (0.415) (0.682) (0.818)
Margin * FD 1.570* 2.031 2.038 2.829 5.992 6.120 3.285** 3.293
(0.898) (1.320) (1.631) (1.818) (3.738) (3.771) (1.600) (2.152)
Sargan statistic 2.871* - 3.683* - 0.762 - 0.001 -
p-value 0.090 - 0.053 - 0.383 - 0.974 -
Hansen J statistic - 1.773 - 2.160 - 0.398 - 0.000
p-value - 0.183 - 0.142 * 0.528 - 0.982
N 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 6,876 6,876
R-squared 0.77 0.70 0.74 0.59 0.60 0.58 0.79 0.79
First-Stage Regression Statistics: M argin
Partial R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005
Shea Partial R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.008
F-statistic 9.91*** 3.21** 9.91*** 3.21** 9.91*** 3.21** 6.95*** 2.16*
p-value 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.091
First-Stage Regression Statistics: M argin  * FD
Partial R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
Shea Partial R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004
F-statistic 6.24*** 1.67 1.18 0.68 1.97 1.00 3.07** 0.82
p-value 0.000 0.172 0.314 0.564 0.116 0.392 0.027 0.486
Note: The data and the equation specification are analogous to the ones used in Table 5 except here I interact ‘Margin’ with continuous measures of financial 
development (see Table 2). The dependent variable in the first (second) panel is ‘R&D’ (‘CapEx’). ‘Margin’ and ‘Margin * FD’ are instrumented using the 
EU 'Single Market Programme’ variables described in Table 4. The estimated specifications (1), (3), (3), and (7) use the GMM estimator with autocorrelation- 
consistent and heteroskedastic-and-autocoiTelation-consistentstandard errors; specifications (2), (4), (6), and (8) use the GMM estimator with standard errors 
clustered at the country-industry level. Sargan (Hansen J) statistic corresponds to tests of overidentifying restrictions. (Shea) Partial R-squared is for the EU 
‘Single Market Programme' variables in the first-stage regressions; similarly, F-statistic is the test o f the joint significance of these variables in the first-stage 
regressions.
See the Data Appendix for complete definitions and sources of variables. I remove outliers by using the l-to-99 percentile range of the dependent variable. I 
always control for 3-digit-NACE industry, country, and year dummies, not shown. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 3%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Tab. 3.A.4: ‘Intense’ Competition: Financial Development (FD) Continuous Interaction 
Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (*)
GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
autocorrelation clustered autocorrelation clustered autocorrelation clustered autocorrelation clustered
R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
Margin <25pct 2.575♦*♦ 2.510* 0.764* 0.325 1.154*** 0.823 2.853*** 2.872*
(0.808) (1.365) (0.438) (0.542) (0.393) (0.673) (0.870) (1.570)
(Margin <25pct) * FD -2.757** -2.722* 0.383 0.269 -5.889 -5.909 -4.285** -4.536*
(1.209) (1.639) (1.844) (2.241) (4.816) (5.795) (1.775) (2.614)
Sargan statistic 0.063 - 3.797* - 2.642 - 0.513 -
p-value 0.801 - 0.051 - 0.104 - 0.474 -
Hansen J statistic - 0.030 - 3.072* - 1.237 - 0.170
p-value ■ 0.863 - 0.080 - 0.266 - 0.680
N 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551
R-squared 0.29 0.31 0.05 0.50 0.04 0.05 0.41 0.40
First-Stage Regression Statistics: Margin <25pct
Partial R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Shea Partial R-squared 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.011
F-statistic 4.47*** 2.57* 4.47*** 2.57* 4.47*** 2.57* 4.47*** 2.57*
p-value 0.004 0.054 0.004 0.054 0.004 0.054 0.004 0.054
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin <25pct) * FD
Partial R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003
Shea Partial R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.007
F-statistic 2.78** 2.57* 1.55 2.02 0.75 0.98 2.63** 2.30*
p-value 0.040 0.054 0.200 0.109 0.523 0.401 0.048 0.077
CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded ■ Accounting Standards
Margin <25pct 2.895** 3.518 3.353 3.184 2.237** 2.364 2.496*** 2.905
(1.296) (2.744) (2.777) (3.493) (1.020) (1.888) (0.878) (2.021)
(Margin <25pct) * FD -2.854** -3.516 -12.595 -12.316 -12.978* -13.649 -3.728** -4.329
(1.370) (2.713) (11.063) (13.391) (6.267) (10.802) (1.472) (3.188)
Sargan statistic 2.092 - 0.295 - 0.124 - 2.916* -
p-value 0.148 - 0.587 - 0.725 - 0.088 -
Hansen J statistic - 0.686 - 0.100 - 0.033 - 0.504
p-value - 0.408 - 0.752 - 0.857 - 0.478
N 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 6,876 6,876
R-squared 0.65 0.55 0.65 0.61 0.46 0.41 0.85 0.84
First-Stage Regression Statistics: Margin <25pct
Partial R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
Shea Partial R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.011
F-statistic 6.65*** 5.41*** 6.65*** 5.41*** 6.65*** 5.41*** 5.47*** 4.36***
p-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.005
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin <25pct) * FD
Partial R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Shea Partial R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.009
F-statistic 8.03*** 6.40*** 2.83** 3.11** 5.28*** 4.71*** 4.74*** 4.54***
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.026 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.004
Note: The data are the same as in Table 5. The dependent variable in the top (bottom) panel is ‘R&D’ (‘CapEx’). ‘Margin <25pct' stands for 0 to 25 percent of 
the ‘Margin’ variable, ‘(Margin <25pct) * FD’ stands for 0 to 25 percent of the ‘Margin’ variable interacted with continuous measures of financial development 
(see Table 2). ‘Margin <25pct’ and ‘(Margin <25pct) * FD’ are instrumented using the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ variables described in Table 4. The 
estimated specifications (1), (3), (5), and (7) use the GMM estimator with autocorrelation-consistent and heteroskedastic-and-autocorrelation-consistent standard 
errors; specifications (2), (4), (6), and (8) use the GMM estimator with standard errors clustered at the country-industry level. Sargan (Hansen J) statistic 
corresponds to tests of overidendfying restrictions. (Shea) Partial R-squared is for the EU ‘Single Market Programme' variables in the first-stage regressions; 
similarly, F-statistic is the test of the joint significance of these variables in the first-stage regressions.
See the Data Appendix for complete definitions and sources of variables. I remove outliers by using the l-to-99 percentile range of the dependent variable. I 
always control for 3-digit-NACE industry, country, and year dummies, not shown. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Tab. 3.A.5: ‘Relaxed’ Competition: Financial Development (FD) Continuous Interaction 
Specification
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (*)
GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM ' GMM GMM
autocorrelation cluitered autocorrelation clustered autocorrelation clustered autocorrelation clustered
R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
Margin >50pct -0.478** -0.485** -0.365** -0.401** -0.360** -0.395** -0.449** -0.462**
(0.228) (0.228) (0.098) (0.168) (0.094) (0.162) (0.189) (0.208)
(Margin >50pct) * FD 0.236 0.229 0.083 0.087 0.199 0.205 0.249 0.240
(0.376) (0.315) (0.177) (0.151) (0.407) (0.341) (0.403) (0.342)
Sargan statistic 0.010 - 0.155 - 0.137 - 0.025 -
p-value 0.919 - 0.694 - 0.711 - 0.873 -
Hansen J statistic - 0.011 - 0.144 - 0.127 - 0.025
p-value - 0.917 - 0.705 - 0.721 - 0.875
N 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551
R-squared 0.35 0.33 0.29 0.21 0.30 0.22 0.36 0.32
First-Stage Regression Statistics: Margin >50pct
Partial R-squared 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
Shea Partial R-squared 0.013 0.013 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.028 0.028
F-statistic 8.48*** 3.62** 8.48*** 3.62** 8.48*** 3.62** 8.48*** 3.62**
p-value 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.013
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin >50pct) * FD
Partial R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.006
Shea Partial R-squared 0.007 0.007 0.018 0.018 0.013 0.013 0.016 0.016
F-statistic 4.68*** 2.75** 8.41*** 4.36*** 6.68*** 3.15** 4.73*** 2.93**
p-value 0.003 0.042 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.024 0.003 0.033
CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
Margin >50pct -1.099** -1.293* -0.375** -0.439 -0.339** -0.283 -0.776** -0.783**
(0.501) (0.745) (0.167) (0.281) (0.160) (0.283) (0.324) (0.379)
(Margin >50pct) * FD 1.154 1.332 0.140 0.605 1.702 2.575 1.554 1.500
(0.742) (0.998) (0.883) (1.299) (1.801) (2.403) (1.401) (2.374)
Sargan statistic 0.592 - 4.450 - 4.010** - 0.343 -
p-value 0.442 - 0.035 - 0.045 - 0.558 -
Hansen J statistic - 0.251 - 1.387 - 1.734 -
p-value - 0.616 - 0.239 - 0.188 ■
N 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 6,876 6,876
R-squared 0.66 0.59 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.68 0.80 0.82
First-Stage Regression Statistics: Margin >50pct
Partial R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
Shea Partial R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.011 0.011
F-statistic 3.16** 1.45 3.16** 1.45 3.16** 1.45 2.22* 1.06
p-value 0.024 0.226 0.024 0.226 0.024 0.226 0.084 0.363
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin >50pct) * FD
Partial R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Shea Partial R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
F-statistic 1.78 0.60 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.44 0.29 0.10
p-value 0.149 0.613 0.702 0.775 0.693 0.725 0.833 0.960
Note: The data are the same as in Table 5. The dependent variable in the top (bottom) panel is ‘R&D’ (‘CapEx’). ‘Margin >50pct’ stands for SO to 100 percent 
of the ‘Margin’ variable, ‘(Margin >50pct) * FD’ stands for SO to 100 percent of the ‘Margin’ variable interacted with continuous measures of financial 
development (see Table 2). ‘Margin >50pct’ and ‘(Margin >50pct) * FD’ are instrumented using the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ variables described in Table 
4. The estimated specifications (1), (3), (S), and (7) use the GMM estimator with autocorrelation-consistent and heteroskedastic-and-autocorrelation-consistent 
standard errors; specifications (2), (4), (6), and (8) use the GMM estimator with standard errors clustered at the country-industry level. Sargan (Hansen J) statistic 
corresponds to tests of overidentifying restrictions. (Shea) Partial R-squared is for the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ variables in the first-stage regressions; 
similarly, F-statistic is the test of the joint significance of these variables in the first-stage regressions.
See the Data Appendix for complete definitions and sources of variables. I remove outliers by using the l-to-99 percentile range of the dependent variable. I 
always control for 3-digit-NACE industry, country, and year dummies, not shown. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Tab. 3.A.6: ANOVAs: EU ‘single-market’ Countries in 1995-2004
CapEx R&D Margin
Industry 15.77 65% 10.10 90% 38.80 62%
(101) (101) (101)
Country 7.19 30% 0.96 9% 23.27 37%
(10) (7) (10)
Year 1.13 5% 0.01 0% 0.60 1%
(10) (10) (10)
Model 24.11 45% 11.16 57% 62.79 52%
Total 54.17 19.48 120.92
N 7,483 3,551 7,483
R-squared 0.44 0.56 0.51
Note: The Table presents three-factor (Industry, Country, Year) ANOVAs of 
‘CapEx’, ‘R&D’, and ‘Margin’ for 10 EU countries that participated in the EU 
‘Single Market Programme’ at its inception in 1993 (see Table 1). Numbers in cells 
refer to the partial sum of squares while the numbers in parentheses refer to the 
number of indicators. Percentages show the fraction of the model's (total) variation 
explained by a given factor (model). I remove outliers by using the l-to-99 percentile 
range of the dependent variable. All factors are significant at the 1% level, p-values 
not shown. See the Data Appendix for complete definitions and sources of variables.
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Tab. 3.A.7: First-Stage: Competition and the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ (SMP) In­
struments
(1)
OLS
robust
(2 )
OLS
robust
(3)
OLS
robust
(4)
OLS
robust
Margin Margin Margin Margin
Affected Industries Classified as SMP Group 1 -0.003 -0 . 0 0 2
(0.004) (0.004)
Affected Industries Classified as SMP Group 2 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.037***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Affected Industries Classified as SMP Group 3 -0 .0 1 1 *** -0 .0 1 1 *** -0 .0 1 0 ** -0 .0 1 0 **
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Affected Industries Classified as SMP Group 4.1 -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Affected Industries Classified as SMP Group 4.2 0 . 0 0 1 -0 . 0 0 1
(0.006) (0.005)
Affected Industries Classified as SMP Group 4.3 -0 .0 0 2 *** -0 .0 0 2 *** -0 .0 0 2 ** -0 .0 0 2 **
(0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 1 )
Industry dummies Yes Yes No No
Country dummies Yes Yes No No
Industry-year dummies No No Yes Yes
Country-year dummies No No Yes Yes
F-statistic 8.67*** 1 2 .8 8 *** 7.75*** 11.55***
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Partial R-squared 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009
N 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483
R-squared 0.52 0.52 0.58 0.58
Note: The sample consists of 101 three-digit NACE manufacturing industries across 10 countries that participated in the 
EU ‘Single Market Programme’ (SMP) at its inception in 1993 (see Table 1) over the period 1995-2004. The dependent 
variable is ‘Margin’ while regressors are based on the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ variables described in Table 4. 
The ‘Affected Industries Classified as SMP Group 1’ variable is created as follows: First, I take 0/1 variables equal 1 for 
NACE 3-digit industry-country pairs from the list o f ‘SMP Group 1’ industries identified (ex ante) to be affected by the 
introduction of the EU's ‘Single Market Programme’ in 1993 (EU-wide product market reform). Second, I interact the 
indicator variables with the percentage share of each affected industry in total manufacturing employment in each 
country (average over 1985-1987). The remaining EU ‘Single Market Programme’ regressors are defined analogously for 
‘SMP Group 2’, ‘SMP Group 3’, ‘SMP Group 4.1’, ‘SMP Group 4.2’, and ‘SMP Group 4.3’ industry groups.
Partial R-squared is for the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ variables; similarly, F-statistic is the test of the joint 
significance of these variables. See the Data Appendix for complete definitions and sources of variables. I remove 
outliers by using the l-to-99 percentile range of the dependent variable. In specifications (1) and (2) I control for 3-digit- 
NACE industry, country, and year dummies; in specification (3) and (4) I control for 3-digit-NACE industry-year and 
country-year dummies, not shown. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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VA
CapEx
R&D
Margin
Affected Industries 
Classified as 
SMP Group 1
Affected Industries 
Classified as 
SMP Group 2
Affected Industries 
Classified as 
SMP Group 3
Affected Industries 
Classified as 
SMP Group 4.1
Tab. 3.DA.1: Definition of Variables
Industry-level Variables 
Industiy-country-year-level (period 1995-2004) value-added at factor cost (vl2150). Value- 
added is the difference between what was produced and what was used as “inputs” by 
production. It is the main indicator o f the wealth created in a company. Source: Eurostat, 
Structural Business Statistics, Detailed data on all enterprises.
Industry-country-year-level (period 1995-2004) gross investment in tangible goods (v l5110) 
divided by value-added (VA). Source: Eurostat, Structural Business Statistics, Detailed data 
on all enterprises.
Industiy-countiy-year-level (period 1995-2004) total intra-mural R&D expenditure (v22110) 
divided by value-added (VA). Total intra-mural expenditures are all expenditures for Research 
& Development undertaken within the company, regardless o f the source o f funds. Source: 
Eurostat, Structural Business Statistics, Detailed data on all enterprises. 
Industry-country-year-level (period 1995-2004) gross operating surplus (vl2170) divided by 
value-added (VA). Gross operating surplus is surplus generated by operating activities after 
the labor factor input has been recompensed. It is the balance available to the company which 
allows it to recompense the providers of funds and debt, to pay taxes, and eventually to 
finance all or part o f its investment. Income and expenditure classified as financial or 
extraordinaiy in company accounts is excluded from the gross operating surplus. Source: 
Eurostat, Structural Business Statistics, Detailed data on all enterprises.
EU ‘Single Market Programme' Variables 
First, we take 0/1 variables equal 1 for NACE 3-digit industry-country pairs identified ex-ante 
to be affected by the introduction of the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ (SMP) in 1993 (EU- 
wide product market reform). The list o f industries (denoted ‘SMP Group 1 - High- 
technology, public-procurement markets’) considered is: 322 - Manufacture o f television and 
radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy; 331 - Manufacture of 
medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic appliances. Second, we interact the indicator 
variables with the percentage share of each affected industry in total manufacturing 
employment in each country (average over 1985-1987). Source: Buigues et al. (1990), Table 
26 o f statistical Annex, p. XVI.
First, we take 0/1 variables equal 1 for NACE 3-digit industry-countiy pairs identified ex-ante 
to be affected by the introduction of the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ (SMP) in 1993 (EU- 
wide product market reform). The list o f industries (denoted ‘SMP Group 2: Traditional 
public-procurement and regulated markets (High price dispersion)’) considered is: 159 - 
Manufacture of beverages; 244 - Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and 
botanical products; 282 - Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and containers o f metal; 
manufacture of central heating radiators and boilers; 283 - Manufacture o f steam generators, 
except central heating hot water boilers; 342 - Manufacture o f bodies (coachwork) for motor 
vehicles; manufacture of trailers and semi-trailers; 352 - Manufacture o f railway, tramway 
locomotives, rolling stock. Second, we interact the indicator variables with the percentage 
share of each affected industry in total manufacturing employment in each country (average 
over 1985-1987). Source: Buigues et al. (1990), Table 26 of statistical Annex, p. XVI.
First, we take 0/1 variables equal 1 for NACE 3-digit industry-country pairs identified ex-ante 
to be affected by the introduction of the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ (SMP) in 1993 (EU- 
wide product market reform). The list of industries (denoted ‘SMP Group 3: Traditional 
public-procurement and regulated markets (Low price dispersion)’) considered is: 155 - 
Manufacture of dairy products; 156 - Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch 
products; 158 - Manufacture of other food products; 311 - Manufacture of electric motors, 
generators and transformers; 312 - Manufacture o f electricity distribution and control 
apparatus; 313 - Manufacture of insulated wire and cable; 316 - Manufacture o f electrical 
equipment n.e.c.; 321 - Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic 
components. Second, we interact the indicator variables with the percentage share of each 
affected industry in total manufacturing employment in each country (average over 1985- 
1987). Source: Buigues et al. (1990), Table 26 of statistical Annex, p. XVI.
First, we take 0/1 variables equal 1 for NACE 3-digit industry-country pairs identified ex-ante 
to be affected by the introduction of the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ (SMP) in 1993 (EU- 
wide product market reform). The list of industries (denoted ‘SMP Group 4.1: Sectors with 
moderate non-tariff barriers (Consumer goods)’) considered is: 181 - Manufacture o f leather 
clothes; 182 - Manufacture of other wearing apparel and accessories; 221 - Publishing; 223 - 
Reproduction of recorded media; 252 - Manufacture o f plastic products;297 - Manufacture of 
domestic appliances n.e.c.; 323 - Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or 
video recording or reproducing apparatus and associated goods; 341 - Manufacture o f motor 
vehicles; 362 - Manufacture o f jewellery and related articles. Second, we interact the indicator 
variables with the percentage share of each affected industry in total manufacturing 
employment in each country (average over 1985-1987). Source: Buigues et al. (1990), Table 
26 of statistical Annex, p. XVI.
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Tab. 3.DA.1: Definition of Variables (cont.)
Affected Industries First, we take 0/1 variables equal 1 for NACE 3-digit industry-country pairs identified ex-ante
Classified as to be affected by the introduction o f the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ (SMP) in 1993 (EU-
SMP Group 4.2 wide product market reform). The list o f industries (denoted ‘SMP Group 4.2: Sectors with
moderate non-tariff barriers (Investment goods)’) considered is: 286 - Manufacture of cutlery, 
tools and genera) hardware; 291 - Manufacture of machinery for the production and use of 
mechanical power, except aircraft, vehicle and cycle engines; 292 - Manufacture of other 
general purpose machinery; 293 - Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery; 294 - 
Manufacture of machine-tools (split into DK2941, DK2942 and DK2943 in NACE Rev.l .1); 
295 • Manufacture o f other special purpose machinery; 296 - Manufacture of weapons and 
ammunition; 351 - Building and repairing of ships and boats; 353 - Manufacture of aircraft 
and spacecraft. Second, we interact the indicator variables with the percentage share o f each 
affected industry in total manufacturing employment in each country (average over 1985- 
1987). Source: Buigues et al. (1990), Table 26 of statistical Annex, p. XVI.
Affected Industries First, we take 0/1 variables equal 1 for NACE 3-digit industry-country pairs identified ex-ante
Classified as to be affected by the introduction of the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ (SMP) in 1993 (EU-
SMP Group 4.3 wide product market reform). The list o f industries (denoted ‘SMP Group 4.3: Sectors with
moderate non-tariff barriers (Intermediate goods)’) considered is: 151 - Production, 
processing, preserving of meat, meat products; 171 - Preparation and spinning o f textile 
fibres; 172 - Textile weaving; 174 - Manufacture o f made-up textile articles, except apparel; 
175 - Manufacture o f other textiles; 193 - Manufacture o f footwear; 241 - Manufacture of 
basic chemicals; 242 - Manufacture of pesticides and other agro-chemical products; 245 - 
Manufacture of soap, detergents, cleaning, polishing; 246 - Manufacture of other chemical 
products; 251 - Manufacture of rubber products; 261 - Manufacture of glass and glass 
products;
262 - Manufacture of non-refractory ceramic goods other than for construction purposes; 
manufacture of refractory ceramic products; 263 - Manufacture of ceramic tiles and flags; 264 
- Manufacture o f bricks, tiles and construction products; 315 - Manufacture o f lighting 
equipment and electric lamps; 332 - Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, 
checking, testing, navigating and other purposes, except industrial process control equipment; 
364 - Manufacture of sports goods; 365 - Manufacture o f games and toys; 366 - 
Miscellaneous manufacturing n.e.c.; 372 - Recycling of non-metal waste and scrap. Second, 
we interact the indicator variables with the percentage share o f each affected industry in total 
manufacturing employment in each country (average over 1985-1987). Source: Buigues et al. 
(1990), Table 26 o f statistical Annex, p. XVI.
Financial Development Country-level Measures 
PCDMBANKOFINSTGDP Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP. Average over 
the period 1990-1994. Source: The World Bank Financial Structure and Economic 
Development Database.
STMCAPGDP Stock market capitalization to GDP. Average over the period 1990-1994. Source: The World
Bank Financial Structure and Economic Development Database.
STMTVTGDP Stock market total value traded to GDP. Average over the period 1990-1994. Source: The
World Bank Financial Structure and Economic Development Database.
ACCOUNT Index created by examining and rating companies’ 1990 annual reports on their inclusion or
omission of 90 items in balance sheets and income statements and published by the Center for 
International Financial Analysis & Research, Inc. The maximum is 90 while the minimum is 0. 
Source: The Center for International Financial Analysis & Research, Inc.
FD High 0/1 variable, equal to 1 if a country has above-median value o f financial development among
the 10 countries that participated in the EU's ‘Single Market Programme’ at its inception in 
1993. ‘FD High’ is constructed separately for each financial development measure listed 
above. Source: The World Bank Financial Structure and Economic Development Database.
FD Low 0/1 variable, equal to 1 if a country has below-median value o f financial development among 
the 10 countries that participated in the EU's ‘Single Market Programme’ at its inception in 
1993. ‘FD Low’ is constructed separately for each financial development measure listed 
above. Source: The World Bank Financial Structure and Economic Development Database.
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A ppendix C: Proofs 
Proof o f Proposition 3.2.1
Consider the value functions of the leader, of each firm in the neck-and-neck state, 
and of the laggard when their rival’s strategy is characterized by the R&D investment 
pair {x ,y}  in the two states. Let Vi, Vo, and VI i denote the steady state values 
of being currently the leader in the unleveled state, a firm in the neck-and-neck 
state, and the laggard in the unleveled state, respectively. Vo is obtained from the 
optimization problem
Vi and VIi are determined analogously. For dt small, e rdt «  1 — rd t, the terms of
The first line of (3.3), which describes the optimization problem of each firm in 
the neck-and-neck state, reads as follows. The annuity value of being a firm in the 
neck-and-neck state at date t, rVo, equals current profit flow minus R&D investment 
flow, 7To — a;,-plus capital gain, V\ — Vo, in case the firm innovates and becomes the 
leader (which happens with intensity yjx), minus capital loss, Vo — VIi, in case the 
firm’s competitor innovates and the firm becomes the laggard (which happens with 
intensity y/x). In the second line of (3.3), the annuity value of being the laggard at 
date t , rVLi, equals current profit flow minus R&D investment flow, 7r_i — y, plus the 
expected capital gain (y/y -I- h) (Vo — VIi) in case the laggard innovates and catches 
up with the leader. Finally, the annuity value of being the leader at date t , rVi, 
equals current profit flow 7Ti minus expected capital loss (y/fj +  h) (Vi — Vo)in case 
the laggard innovates and the industry switches to the neck-and-neck state. The
Vq =  max |(7To — x ) d t - h e  rdt £>/zVidt +  y /x V -id t  4- 1 — ^yfx  +  y/x^j dtj Voj j  .
order (dt)2 can be ignored, and the system of equations becomes
rVo =  max |(7r0 - x )  + y/x(V1 -  V0) -  yfx (V0 -  V_i) j
rV-i = max{(7r_i — y) +  (y/y + h) (V0 -  VLi)} , 
v
X
(3.3)
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first order conditions are V\ = 2y/x -f Vo and VLi =  —2y/y +  Vo for a firm in the 
neck-and-neck state and the laggard, respectively. System of equations (3.3) together 
with FOCs and symmetry (x =  x, y = y) leads to
7T0 =  rV0 +  2y/x^/y  -  x ,
7ri =  rVo +  2yfx (h +  r +  y), (3.4)
tt_i =  rV0 -  2{h +  r)y/y -  y.
Solving (3.4) when 7To =  tt_i +  (1 — A)(7Ti — 7r_i) and simplifying using II =  7Ti — 7r_i 
and H  =  h-\-r  gives
' x = HA + 2 H ( H -  yjH 2 +  IIA ),
y = AH2 +  (1 +  2A)n -  2H y/H 2 + I IA -_________ I (3>5)
 ^ 2^J(H 2 +  nA ) (3H 2 +  (1 +  A )n  -  2H V H 2 +  IIA) j
Further simplification yields the results presented in Proposition 3.2.1. Solution (3.5)
is the only one with x  >  0 and y > 0 for II > 0 and H  > 0 (within the class of
symmetric stationary Markov equilibria). In the special case when r  =  0 and h = 0
result (3.5) simplifies to
{x =  nA , y =  n  [l +  2 ( a  -  VA(1 +  A ))l } . (3.6)
P ro o f  of C oro lla ry  3.2.2
Comparative static results obtained by differentiating the R&D investment of a firm 
in the neck-and-neck state (part one of Proposition 3.2.1) and simplifying using 
n  =  7 n -  7r_i, H  = h +  r, and ft = y/H 2 +  A ll > H  are
dx  _  /  H \  n dx  . /  H \  n , dx  2 (fi -  H )2 n
dA  (  f i )  a n  (  n ) > ’ 80 dH  q
Similarly, comparative static properties of the laggard’s R&D investment in the 
unleveled state (part two of Proposition 3.2.1) are 
dy H  2H2 +  n  -  3HU + 2fi2 \  „- = n  2 -  — ------- , < o,
dA  . \  n  Sls/2H2 +  n  -  2HU + fi2/
dy , „ A A H  (1 +  4A )/f2 +  2A(1 + A )n  -  3AHCI n ,
= 1 +  2 A  - -----------   ' ' ’  > 0, and
a n  fi Q V 2H 2 +  n  -  2 h q  +  fi2
dy „ rr 2H 2 2 (3H4 + 5A H 2H +  ft4 — HQ (2H2 +  n  +  4fi2)) „
Trk =  6 H    2fi +  —--------------- . „ v  — < 0.
dH  fi Ov/2H 2 +  n  -  2HQ  +  fi2
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As 0 < x  < II and 0 < y < II, if the technological leadership rent satisfies II < 1 so 
that 0 < yfx < 1 and 0 < yfy < 1, innovation intensities yfx and yfy are well-defined 
probabilities.
P ro o f  o f C oro llary  3.2.3
In the steady state, the flow of industries from the neck-and-neck state to the un­
leveled state matches the opposite flow
2 A V i= ( l  - \ ) ( y / y  + h). (3.7)
Solving (3.7) for A gives the steady state fraction of industries in the neck-and-neck 
state
. A = ^ + f c
2y/x + yfy + h
Substituting (3.7) and (3.8) into the definition of the aggregate innovation intensity 
I  = 2Xy/x -f (1 — A) [yfy -j- h) and simplifying gives
V x ( v f  + h)_
2 y / i  + J y  + h ' ( 1
where x and y are the R&D investments from Proposition 3.2.1. Differentiating (3.9) 
with respect to II, r, A, and h and applying the comparative static results derived 
in Corollary 3.2.2 gives
d l  _  2 { ^ y  + h)2^  + i x i ^
d n  y fx  (2yfx  +  yfy +  h )  y f y
dj_ = 2 {V y  +  h)2Vy% +  i x i ^
d r  y / x { 2 y / x  +  ^ / y  +  h ) 2 y / y
d l  2 (N/y + h)2v/ i/ f f  + 4*§jk
y f l  ( 2 y / x  +  y f y  +  h )  y f y
d l  =  2 [(Vv + h)2^ h + 2xi (2v f r + f t ) '  
d h \ fx  (2i/x + y/y + h ) 2 y/y
> 0, (3.10)
< 0, (3.11)
> <  0, and (3.12)
> <  0. (3.13)
Substituting the R&D investments from Proposition 3.2.1 into (3.9) and applying 
restrictions r  — 0, h  = 0 gives
_  4 V A J l  +  2A -  2v/A(1 + A j
/  =  %/n v . (3.14)
2-v/A + y j  1 +  2A  -  2 a /A (1  +  A )
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Differentiating (3.14) with respect to A and solving equation =  0 reveals that 
> 0 for A < |  while < 0 for A > This proves statement two in Corollary 
3.2.3.
Analyzing (3.12) when r  > 0 and h > 0 reveals that there exist 0 < h~ <
h+ < 1 such that when h G (h~,h+): > 0 for A G [ |,  A p ^ )  and < 0 for
A G (Apeak, !]• Condition ^  = 0 determines Apeak as a solution to the implicit
equation 4gf . 2 =  V. Analyzing (3.13) when r > 0 and h > 0 reveals that
( a t )  \ d fc )
there exist 0 < hpeak < 1 such that > 0 for h G [0, hpeak) and < 0 for
A G (hpeak, 1]. Condition =  0 determines hpeak as a solution to the implicit 
eouation v
W  [(ft)*-*] '
Examples of peaks of the two inverted-Us: For 7Ti =  0.9, 7r_i =  0.2, r = 0.03, 
h = 0.15, solution to equation =  0 is at A =  0.554, the equilibrium R&D 
investment of a firm in the neck-and-neck state is x  =  0.219 < ttq =  0.512, the 
equilibrium R&D investment of the laggard in the unleveled state is y = 0.107 < 7r_i, 
and the aggregate innovation intensity is I  = 0.632. For 7Ti =  0.9, 7r_i =  0.2, 
r = 0.03, A =  0.6, solution to equation =  0 is at h = 0.399, the equilibrium 
R&D investment of a firm in the neck-and-neck state is x  =  0.188 < ttq = 0.340, the 
equilibrium R&D investment of the laggard in the unleveled state is y = 0.030 < 7r_l5 
and the aggregate innovation intensity is I  =  0.689.
Proof of Proposition 3.2.4
Part one is obtained by solving the system of inequalities
> 7T_1 4- (1 — A) (7Ti — 7T_i) , 7Ti > 7T_i > 0, ^ < A < 1, H  > 0 J  ,
where H  = /i +  rand x  is from Proposition 3.2.1 for parameters {711, 7r_i, A, H }. The 
threshold competition intensity of a firm in the neck-and-neck state, A, presented in 
part one of Proposition 3.2.4 solves x  =  7To for A. Similarly, part two of Proposition 
3.2.4 is obtained by solving the system of inequalities
l y  > 7r_i, 7Ti > 7T_i > 0, i  < A < 11 for parameters {tti, 7r_i, A}
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under a simplifying restriction H  = 0. The laggard’s threshold competition intensity, 
A, presented in part two of Proposition 3.2.4 solves y = 7r_i for A when H  > 0. 
Solving the system of inequalities
{A < 1, 7Ti > 7r_i > 0, H  > 0} for parameters {7Ti, 7r_i, H}
gives
A < 1 <=> I tt_! <  ^  and i? < 11 _  77-1
2 2 0 ^
Similarly, solving the system of inequalities
< A, 7Ti > 7r_i > 0, H > o |  for parameters {7Ti, 7r_i, H}
gives
i  <  A <(=(• f y  j < 3 and H  < H IG H {ttu tt^ ) \  or
< 7r_i 8X1,1 H  < '
where
■n\—2 6 7 r i7 r _ i + 4 l 7 r f y  y/sU BjjIGH+n f —4nfir-i+ 387T  J nf  x - 2 0 7 r  1 7 r i  x+ 4 9 7 r i  j
H IG H (iti, it- i ) = — and
S U B h i g h  =  — 67Ti7r_i +  637rj7rl1 — 140^1^! +  567^1^! +  2107Ti7rL1 — 3 4 3 ^ !
+ 4 8 \ / 6 7 r i  7 r L i ( tt? — 5 7 r j 7 r _ i  +  4 3 ^ 1 ^ ^  — 4 9 ^ ^ ) .
Threshold function i7(7Ti,7r_i) is available upon request. Solving the system of in­
equalities
{A < A, 7Ti > 7r_i > 0, H  > 0} for parameters {7Ti, 7t_i, H}
gives
A < A ^7r_i < ^ 4^ 7ri anc  ^ LOW(7Ti ,7T-i ) < H^j or — 7r— >
where
LOW(n,*-r) h V ^ | l  + W ^ = ) - Ti + ^ ^ ^ a n d
SU B Low = 97ri 7r- i  +  817rfttIj -  487rj7rij.
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By combining the conditions for |  < A, A < 1, and A < A I obtain the necessary and 
sufficient condition for the existence of three competition regions: (i) The relaxed 
competition region, A G [ |,  A], in which the laggard is financially constrained; 
(ii) The intermediate competition region, A G (A, A), in which the unconstrained 
equilibrium of Proposition 3.2.1 exists; (iii) The intense competition region, A G 
[A, 1], in which the firms in the neck-and-neck state are constrained, i.e., \  < A < 
A < 1; as follows
^7r_i < - — tti and LOW (tt\, 7r_i) < h  + r < H IG H {7ri,7r_i)^ or
~  7r_1 ~ an^ < •
By differentiating, the threshold competition intensity of a firm in the neck-and- 
neck state, A, satisfies
tt2 H(H2+TT-l+TTl)
o-A- H* —  7 T _ 1  /  =  -dA  _  y/m+2^ ^
d l n "  2n 2
dA  7T1 +  {y/H* +  2tti - H ) H
> 0 , and
dn -1  2n 2
dA l f l p  + n  \  
dH n  WH*  + 27n n ) * u-
Similarly, the laggard’s threshold competition intensity, A, satisfies 
d A  8ff2V5rir(J/ + V ^ )  + (n -7 r_ 1)7r1
TT— =  ------------- -------------- ---------------------  > 0 <=
diri 4 ( if  +  TP
< = >  ( tt- i  <  y )  or ( y  < ?r_i and H x(tti, tt_ i ) < H^j ,
dA_ == ^ i r ^ - I l - U P - Z H y / W i ;  _  /  +  (.H2 -  2 ^ ) ^  \  < Q
f a - i  ^  n 2 ( i f  +  v / 7 r i r ) 2 n 2 v/ 7 f i i j <
• < = ►  ( w - i  <  y )  or ( y  <  t f - i  <  ^ ( ^ l )  and H 2(irx, t t _ x )  <  or
(7rZi(7Ti) < 7r_i and n -i)  < H ) , and
4 ( F  +  yT fll) y^T I 7Ti -  ( t f  +  V ^ l ) ‘ “ *1 
 < 0.
9H  2 ( /f  +  y/WIi) II
Threshold functions ^ ( ^ 1, 7r_i), H_2{^h  tt-i), ^ 3(^1, tt-i), and 7rTT(7ri) are available 
upon request.
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Proof o f Proposition 3.2.5
Assume that the laggard invests 7r_i in the relaxed competition region A G [ |, A], 
The system of equations (3.3) together with the FOC for a firm in the neck-and-neck
state, V\ = 2y/x^ + Vo, the restriction on laggard’s R&D investment yc = 7r_i, and
symmetry (xu = x u, y c = yc) leads to
7T0 =  rVo +  y fx l  (Vb -  V-i) -  x u,
7Ti =  rV0 + 2y/x^ (h + r + y/7f~[), (3.15)
rV ^  =  {h T (Vo VLi).
Solving (3.15) when 7To =  7r_i +  (1 — A)(7Ti — 7r_i) and simplifying using II =  7Ti — 7r_i 
and H  = h + r gives
( 3 A - 2 ) n  + 2 ( / f  +  2 ^ F I 7 ) t f - S 7 7 £ I„ , {SUBXu+ 
18 {H + J W + '
V / \ * v * / *£u , * 1 / 1 ixu = --------------------------   1- -  t ? , where
SU BX. = s j* l  + i  (H  + v^FTT)2 [{H +  + 3AII -  tt,] . (3.16)
Assume that a firm in the neck-and-neck state invests ttq in the intense compe­
tition region A G [A, 1]. The system of equations (3.3) together with the FOC for
the laggard, V-\ =  —2y/yZ + Vo, the restriction on R&D investment of a firm jin the 
neck-and-neck state x c = 7To, and symmetry (xc = x c, yu = yu) leads to t
rV0 =  v^o (Vi -  Vb) -  2^/ttoy/yH,
■Tn =  rVi +  ^  +  ^ W - V b ) ,  (3.17)
tt_i =  rVo -  2y/jfa (h + r) -  yu.
Eliminating Vo and V\ from (3.17), applying 7r0 =  7r_i +  (1 — A)(7Ti — 7r_i) and 
simplifying using II. =  — 7r_i and H  = h + r gives equation
yu +  2 H y /y^+ it-\  =  [^  ~ 2 ^  +  ^ )] ~  (3.18)
y  V U  yfy 'u  +  H  +  y /'K  1 -  An ’ v '
which defines yu implicitly. Explicit solution of (3.18), though complicated, exists 
and is available upon request.
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Proof o f Corollary 3.2.6
The substitution of the threshold competition intensity A from Proposition 3.2.4 
into x u (Proposition 3.2.5) and into x  (Proposition 3.2.1) verifies that x u = x = 
~J — n/71- 1^  at A =  A. This result together with the fact that xu is
continuous,
dxu n  
~dK = 3
(
1 +
H - 2  +
\
> 0, and
/' j i f+ 4  (h + v « r r ) 2 [ ( f f + v ^ i ) 2 +  3A n  -  *1
xu > x  when A =  \  establishes that xu > x  for all A G [ |,  A).
The substitution of the threshold competition intensity A from Proposition 3.2.4 
into yu (Proposition 3.2.5) and into y (Proposition 3.2.1) verifies that
yu = y = ^ V2SUB& -  2\ I h 2 + n  + I h ~  ^ 7 p )
at A =  A, where SUB& =  yjn\ +  H  (H  +  y/H 2 +  27Ti) . Fact that yu > y for all 
A G (A, 1] is established using numerical simulations. These simulations are available 
upon request.
P ro o f o f C oro llary  3.2.7
In the steady state, the flow of industries from the neck-and-neck state to the un­
leveled state matches the opposite flow 2Xy/x^, = (1 — A) (y/y^ +  h). Solving for 
A and substituting into the definition of the aggregate innovation intensity I  = 
2Xy/x^ +  (1 -  A) (y/fc +  h) gives I{Xu,yc} = where x« and ^  are the
R&D investments from Proposition 3.2.5. The aggregate innovation intensity I{Xc,yu} 
is derived analogously.
Corollary 3.2.6 says that xu = x  and yc = y at A =  A. Therefore, it must be 
that I{Xu,yc} = I  at A =  A. Similarly, as xc = x  and yu = y at A =  A, it must be 
that I{Xc,yu} = I  at A =  A. Facts that I {Xu,Vc} < /  for A G [§, A) and I{Xc,yu} < I  
for A G (A, l] are established using numerical simulations. These simulations are 
available upon request.
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